There is also Syntropy. Balance. Etc. amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 9:02 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > List > > I don't see the paradox. It's a basic axiom in Peirce that semiosis is > continuous. And also, that matter is discrete and finite. That's why his > three categories are a foundation of his semiosic theory. Thirdness > provides continuity of Type - which is then articulated, continuously, > into the discrete finite Token instantiations of Secondness - and both are > linked to Firstness, which provides a continuous entropic dissipation and > the possibility of differentiation and novelty. I'm not going to provide > quotes since this analysis is found all through his work. > > Edwina > > > > On Fri 11/01/19 7:12 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Gary, Jon, list, > I dont think that space and time are continuous, because in quantum scale > there are steps, e.g. each single graviton providing a certain amount of > acceleration. This is not observable in the scale of our perception, so our > representation of acceleration is one of continuity. But this representaion > is not continuous itself, but a discrete state of consciousness. > Discretenesss of states of consciousness: See Edelman/Tononi "A Universe of > Consciousness", 2000. > An animal with smaller brain, a coot, moves its head foward and back when > swimming, so while it is moving back, the head stands still relatively to > the environment to provide not-blurred picture processing. > I guess that semiosis and mind are not happening like one of them in the > other, but are the same, like mind being a process too. Edelman/Tononi > write that consciousness is a process, so maybe mind is too. But to avoid > Zenions paradoxon to say that a process always is continuous would be > jumping to a conclusion, I think. I guess, there just is some unsolved > question existing about the nature of discrete states or discontinuity. > Best, Helmut > > 10. Januar 2019 um 22:38 Uhr > "Gary Richmond" > wrote: > Jon, list, > > I've been studying your post for the past couple of days and find your > suggestion that, just as time and space are continuous, so is semiosis, > most interesting. I have a slight bit of unease with your substitution of > Peirce's comment that we ought to say that "we are in thought, and not > thoughts are in us" (JAS: "we ought to say that our individual > (Quasi-)minds are in semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual > (Quasi-)minds"). A more exact substitution would be that "our > Quasi-minds are in semiosis and not that semiosis (i.e., the activity of > signs) is in our Quasi-minds." > > Reflecting on this reminded me that Peirce wrote: > > > Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be > declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at > least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and > although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they > must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded > (Prolegomena > to an Apology for Pragmaticism, 1906, CP 4.551). > > > I wonder how Peirce's remark that signs requiring "at least two > Quasi-minds" which "are. . .welded" "in the sign itself, yet must > nevertheless be distinct" (emphasis added) affects your theory. That is, > does this distinction between "Quasi-utterer" and "Quasi-interpreter" add a > problematic element to your suggestions of the continuous character of > semiosis and that of our Quasi-minds being more in semiosis than the other > way around? Perhaps your unpacking the Peirce quotation above would help me > in this matter. > > But further, something vague, which has not yet fully taken form as a > question, has been troubling me as regards your suggestion of semiosic > continuity. It has to do with Peirce's famous dictum that 'symbols grow'. > > Now while it is generally agreed that space is expanding, I'm not sure > that one could same the same of time (except in some vague sense in which > the piling on of innumerable discrete instances might represent some > abstract sort of expansion). But while both are continuous, individually at > least, neither can be said, I think, to be growing. > > On the other hand evolution (and, generally, life itself) concerns growth > and, at least in its biological forms, requires both space and time. Now > it seems to me that semiosis is more like evolution than either space or > time taken separately even given Einstein's theory of space-time or the > solution of famous logical paradoxes. > > Well, that's about as far as I've been able to get with this. While the > exact question lies below my own conscious threshold. I'm hoping that > perhaps you'll be able to discern what it is that's troubling me and > address it. And knowing something of your approach to inquiry, I'm hoping > that just taking up my vague not-quite-questions might prove to be of > assistance in honing your novel theory. > > Best, > > Gary > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 11:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> List: >> >> I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that "just >> as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we >> ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP >> 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series of articles >> that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by >> substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in >> semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds. >> >> As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's >> insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding continuous >> motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than discrete >> positions >> in space and/or moments in time. We arbitrarily mark the latter to >> facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space >> is not composed of points and time is not composed of instants. >> >> Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is continuous, and we arbitrarily >> isolate discrete signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate >> analysis for particular purposes. We can say that a Dynamic Object >> determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an >> individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just >> when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). Nevertheless, the Type is not >> composed >> of its Tokens. >> >> Moreover, every Instance contributes to the Sign's Informed Breadth by >> adding that Token's Dynamic Object; as Peirce put it, "Breadth refers to >> the Object, which occasions the use of the sign" (R 200:E87; 1908). >> Nevertheless, this collection could never amount to the Sign's Substantial >> Breadth, which (I have argued) corresponds to its General Object. In >> other words, the Sign (as a Type) and its General Object are both >> continuous, while each Instance (as a Token) and its Dynamic Object >> (even if it includes multiple items) are both discrete. >> >> In fact, it seems to me that a necessary condition for a Token to be an >> Instance of a Type is that the Token's Dynamic Object must likewise be an >> instantiation of the Type's General Object. When I pick something up and >> say out loud, "This is a vase," the word "vase" that I pronounce is an >> actual constituent of the real continuum of all potential Tokens of the >> corresponding Type, which could be in any spoken or written language or >> other Sign System; and I am asserting that what I now hold in my hands is >> an actual constituent of the real continuum of all potential vases. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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