What? The unspeakable EXISTS???? The unspeakable doesn't 'exist' -
for this would mean that it was in a categorical mode of
Secondness….and therefore, would no longer be 'unspeakable' - since
being in Secondness means that it is 'spoken'.
The unspeakable - like dark energy/matter is primal energy, I would
think....and is prior to the modal categories. [See Peirce's outline
of the emergence of matter and habits...].
Does experience precede analysis? Well, that's a yes and a no. We
aren't empty buckets, and as both Aristotle and Peirce asserted, we
don't function without beliefs - which we have before we experience
our world - and during and after that experience. The scientific
method enables us to analyze and change those beliefs.
Edwina
On Fri 11/01/19 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Hey Stephen! Now my antiesoteric seizure is over, I agree with you.
The unspeakable exists, experience preceeds ratio and analysis.
Friends? Best, Helmut 11. Januar 2019 um 18:57 Uhr
Von: "Stephen Curtiss Rose"
[Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Unspeakable
https://buff.ly/2Cewjo6 [1] ] [ Mohrfeld, Joseph C. (2005)
"Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Unspeakable," Journal of
Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato: Vol. 5
, Article 17.
Available at: https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/jur/vol5/iss1/17 [2]
] I surmise Jesus drove Nietsche mad though some might blame his
sister. I assume that N's remarks on the beautiful and amor fati
indicate a fundamental ambivalence inherited from his father. Peice I
include because of my curious sense of relationship to him and to what
I sense were mystical experiences that he alludes to. Of course the
unspeakable has been spoken of forever by religion with massive
effect if you are not blinded by media. but religion cannot achieve
the level of personal spirituality that is needed to create the
change wrought by this unspeakable The individual is the seat of
possible enlightenment. I warrant that the three men under discussion
were products of their time and that understandings are in the eye of
the interpreter. Best, S amazon.com/author/stephenrose [3]
On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:21 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
Stephen, list, What do you mean with unspeakable? I think the
early Wittgenstein claimed that one should not speak about some (not
reasonably to be spoken-about) things (so lamented too-far-going
speakability, not unspeakability), but later revised this dogma.
Nietzsche was a disgrudged protofascist, always trying to speak about
things of which he thought that others did not want to speak about- so
I dont think he believed in any unspeakability. Peirce, I think, did
neither say that there are things that cannot be spoken about.
Neither do I think, that each sign perfuses everything, and can or
could be accessed by any living thing. Because not all organisms are
capable of telepathy. Sorry, if my post seems disgrudged too, I am
just having an anti-esoteric seizure. Next time I will be easier and
more empathic and discourse-ethics-following again. Best, Helmut
11. Januar 2019 um 16:53 Uhr
"Stephen Curtiss Rose"
wrote: The reality of the semiotic envelops and essentially
transcends thought. It is what Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Peirce
each in their own way perceaved when confronted with the
"unspeakable" -- it is the wisps of Reality that perfuse everything
and are accessible within every living thing. I mean signs.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [6] On Fri, Jan 11, 2019
at 10:49 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, list, Are we talking
about two different meanings of "continuity"? In semiosis, thirdness
provides continuity in the sense that it makes the semiosis go on,
but a semiosis is not continuous in the (mathematical) sense of
continuum, because there may be two signs following each other, in
between whom there is not a third one. Like, if you first imagine a
white elephant, and next a red one, without having imagined a pink
one in between. Best, Helmut 11. Januar 2019 um 15:01 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
List
I don't see the paradox. It's a basic axiom in Peirce that
semiosis is continuous. And also, that matter is discrete and finite.
That's why his three categories are a foundation of his semiosic
theory. Thirdness provides continuity of Type - which is then
articulated, continuously, into the discrete finite Token
instantiations of Secondness - and both are linked to Firstness,
which provides a continuous entropic dissipation and the possibility
of differentiation and novelty. I'm not going to provide quotes since
this analysis is found all through his work.
Edwina
On Fri 11/01/19 7:12 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [9]
sent: Gary, Jon, list, I dont think that space and time are
continuous, because in quantum scale there are steps, e.g. each
single graviton providing a certain amount of acceleration. This is
not observable in the scale of our perception, so our representation
of acceleration is one of continuity. But this representaion is not
continuous itself, but a discrete state of consciousness.
Discretenesss of states of consciousness: See Edelman/Tononi "A
Universe of Consciousness", 2000. An animal with smaller brain, a
coot, moves its head foward and back when swimming, so while it is
moving back, the head stands still relatively to the environment to
provide not-blurred picture processing. I guess that semiosis and
mind are not happening like one of them in the other, but are the
same, like mind being a process too. Edelman/Tononi write that
consciousness is a process, so maybe mind is too. But to avoid
Zenions paradoxon to say that a process always is continuous would be
jumping to a conclusion, I think. I guess, there just is some unsolved
question existing about the nature of discrete states or
discontinuity. Best, Helmut 10. Januar 2019 um 22:38 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote: Jon, list, I've been studying your post for the past
couple of days and find your suggestion that, just as time and space
are continuous, so is semiosis, most interesting. I have a slight bit
of unease with your substitution of Peirce's comment that we ought to
say that "we are in thought, and not thoughts are in us" (JAS: "we
ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in semiosis, and
not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds"). A more exact
substitution would be that "our Quasi-minds are in semiosis and not
that semiosis (i.e., the activity of signs) is in our Quasi-minds."
Reflecting on this reminded me that Peirce wrote:
Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one
mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the
Sign they are, so to say, welded ( Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism, 1906, CP 4.551). I wonder how Peirce's
remark that signs requiring "at least two Quasi-minds" which "are. .
.welded" "in the sign itself, yet must nevertheless be distinct"
(emphasis added) affects your theory. That is, does this distinction
between "Quasi-utterer" and "Quasi-interpreter" add a problematic
element to your suggestions of the continuous character of semiosis
and that of our Quasi-minds being more in semiosis than the other way
around? Perhaps your unpacking the Peirce quotation above would help
me in this matter. But further, something vague, which has not yet
fully taken form as a question, has been troubling me as regards your
suggestion of semiosic continuity. It has to do with Peirce's famous
dictum that 'symbols grow'. Now while it is generally agreed that
space is expanding, I'm not sure that one could same the same of time
(except in some vague sense in which the piling on of innumerable
discrete instances might represent some abstract sort of expansion).
But while both are continuous, individually at least, neither can be
said, I think, to be growing. On the other hand evolution (and,
generally, life itself) concerns growth and, at least in its
biological forms, requires both space and time. Now it seems to me
that semiosis is more like evolution than either space or time taken
separately even given Einstein's theory of space-time or the solution
of famous logical paradoxes. Well, that's about as far as I've been
able to get with this. While the exact question lies below my own
conscious threshold. I'm hoping that perhaps you'll be able to
discern what it is that's troubling me and address it. And knowing
something of your approach to inquiry, I'm hoping that just taking up
my vague not-quite-questions might prove to be of assistance in honing
your novel theory. Best, Gary Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia
College of the City University of New York On Wed,
Jan 9, 2019 at 11:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: List: I have
been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that "just as
we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we
ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us"
(CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series
of articles that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868),
so by substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds
are in semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual
(Quasi-)minds. As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit
of Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by
understanding continuous motion through space-time as a more
fundamental reality than discrete positions in space and/or moments
in time. We arbitrarily mark the latter to facilitate measurement
and calculation for particular purposes, but space is not composed
of points and time is not composed of instants. Likewise, I suggest
that semiosis is continuous, and we arbitrarily isolate discrete
signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate analysis for
particular purposes. We can say that a Dynamic Object determines a
Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an individual
(Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just when
and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). Nevertheless, the Type is not
composed of its Tokens. Moreover, every Instance contributes to the
Sign's Informed Breadth by adding that Token's Dynamic Object; as
Peirce put it, "Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use
of the sign" (R 200:E87; 1908). Nevertheless, this collection could
never amount to the Sign's Substantial Breadth, which (I have argued)
corresponds to its General Object. In other words, the Sign (as a
Type) and its General Object are both continuous, while each
Instance (as a Token) and its Dynamic Object (even if it includes
multiple items) are both discrete. In fact, it seems to me that a
necessary condition for a Token to be an Instance of a Type is that
the Token's Dynamic Object must likewise be an instantiation of the
Type's General Object. When I pick something up and say out loud,
"This is a vase," the word "vase" that I pronounce is an actual
constituent of the real continuum of all potential Tokens of the
corresponding Type, which could be in any spoken or written language
or other Sign System; and I am asserting that what I now hold in my
hands is an actual constituent of the real continuum of all
potential vases. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas,
USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [10] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[11]
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