List: This is the promised alternative to a lengthy digression in my previous post, which was already quite lengthy itself.
CSP: There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign; so that, most connections resulting from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a second in so far as this is "married" to a third. Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is the interpretation of either premiss as married to the other; and of this sort are all the principal translation-processes of thought. (R 1476:36; c. 1904) Peirce here characterized the conclusion of an Argument--i.e., its Interpretant--as the "offspring" of its "married" premises; and yet he held to "a different conception of the Proposition and Argument from the traditional view that a Proposition is composed of Names [Subjects], and that an Argument is composed of Propositions" (CP 4.572; 1906). An *additional *element is necessary to "marry" multiple Propositions into an Argument or multiple Subjects into a Proposition--a Logical Leading Principle or a Continuous Predicate, respectively. Francesco Bellucci called attention to their parallel roles in his 2018 book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, crediting List founder Joseph Ransdell with being "The first to perceive the similarity between" them (p. 351 n. 30). There is an important difference, though. In the case of an Argument, the "offspring" of the "married" Propositions is another Proposition; but in the case of a Proposition, the "offspring" of the "married" Subjects is *not *another Subject. Moreover, since *only *an Argument "separately shows what interpretant it is intended to determine" (CP 5.139, EP 2:204; 1903), the "offspring" of the "married" Subjects cannot be *any *part of the Proposition itself. What else could it be? Peirce's definitions of "Pheme" as a "much widened" generalization of "Proposition" in the draft and final versions of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" offer a clue. CSP: Such a sign intends or has the air of intending to force some idea (in an interrogation,) or some action (in a command,) or some belief (in an assertion,) upon the interpreter of it, just as if it were the direct and unmodified effect of that which it represents. (R 295:12; 1906) CSP: In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort of compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it. (CP 4.538; 1906) Compare these with what Peirce said about an Argument in the published article. CSP: It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter. (CP 4.538; 1906) An Instance of an Argument normally *submits its conclusion* to the interpreting Quasi-mind as its Dynamic Interpretant, which is always an Instance of another Sign; specifically, a Proposition. I suggest that an Instance of a Proposition normally *urges an Exertion* to the interpreting Quasi-mind as its Dynamic Interpretant. After all ... CSP: One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a different proposition. (EP 2:312; 1904) Affirming, denying, judging, doubting, and inwardly inquiring into a Proposition are different *responses *to it, typically when it is *asserted* by another Quasi-mind--which might be a temporally previous state of the *same *Quasi-mind. Putting as a question, wishing, asking for, commanding, and teaching are alternative ways of *uttering *a Proposition that correspond to different *intended *responses--answering, fulfilling, giving, obeying, and learning, respectively. It is only when a Proposition is "merely expressed" that no particular Exertion is expected; instead, *presenting *a Proposition elicits a *Feeling *as its Dynamic Interpretant. Moreover, a Subject by itself can *only *be presented, such that it can *only *determine an interpreting Quasi-mind to a Feeling--specifically, awareness of its *meaning*. CSP: There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight ... in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. (CP 5.475; 1907) CSP: ... there is something which the sign in its significant function essentially determines in its interpreter. I term it the "interpretant" of the sign. In all cases, it includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. (EP 2:409; 1907) This is consistent with Peirce's straightforward summary of the possible combinations of relations that a Sign can have with its Final and Dynamic Interpretants, which T. L. Short confirmed on *a posteriori* grounds in his 2007 book, *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (pp. 250-252). CSP: 1st, an argument only may be *submitted *to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be *urged *upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for *contemplation*. (CP 8.338; 1904) Subject, Proposition, and Argument obviously correspond to rheme, dicent, and argument in this text and to Seme, Pheme, and Delome in the later division according to "the Nature of the Influence"; while presented, urged, and submitted correspond to Suggestive, Imperative, and Indicative in the later division according to "the Manner of Appeal" (EP 2:490; 1908). An Instance of an Argument may be urged/Imperative, rather than submitted/Indicative, because it always *involves *Instances of Propositions that are *normally *urged/Imperative; and an Instance of an Argument or a Proposition may be presented/Suggestive, rather than submitted/Indicative or urged/Imperative, because it always *involves *Instances of Subjects that can *only *be presented/Suggestive. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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