Dear Helmut, I am sure I do not know what you are talking about.
With best wishes, Jerry R On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 7:15 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Supplement: About the function of the cerebellum, apart from reading > related scientific texts, I for complete replacement I recommend the song > by the Ramones: "Cretin Hop". > Dear Jerry, dear list, > do you say, that the cerebellum rules? That is, what Heisenberg said, as I > understood it. Naturalism unreflected, isnt it? Would I say, no, it´s not > with me that way, I really am interested in sorting things out, in > cooperation with others, regardless of the percentage my own role plays in > the process, merely being interested in the result, would you call me a > liar? Can I say, no, I am not, can I trust my cerebellum? I know that I > can´t, because I know, that my cerebellum is telling me that I am right, > and others are wrong. But: By being aware of this function of the > cerebellum, can I take this knowledge into regard? I guess, it is hard. > I dont know. Best, Helmut > > > 14. März 2019 um 21:33 Uhr > "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com>*wrote:* > Dear Helmut, list, > > > > You said: > > “What do we want. > > Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are, > > then we outsource the question of reflection.” > > > > *“But it is such a beautiful experiment.” * > > This is probably the strongest motive behind the applications of science; > > the scientist needs the confirmation from an impartial judge, > > from Nature herself, that he has understood her structure. > > And he wants to see the effect of his effort. > > > > From this attitude one can also easily understand the motives which > determine the line of research for the individual scientist. > > Such a line of research is usually based on some theoretical ideas, on > conjectures concerning the interpretation of the known phenomena or on > hopes for finding new ones. > > > > *But which ideas are accepted? * > > Experience teaches that it is usually not the consistency, the clarity of > ideas, which makes them acceptable, but the hope that one can participate > in their elaboration and verification. > > > > It is the wish for our own activity, > > the hope for results from our own efforts, which leads us on our way > through science. > > This wish is stronger than our rational judgment about the merits of > various theoretical ideas. > > ~ Heisenberg, *Tradition in Science* > > > > With best wishes, > > Jerry R > > > > PS: > > > > You said, > > “A think about a think makes the think fall in the sink.” > > haha!! J > > > > on precise “inspectable” schema: > > *I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is > practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even > indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person, > while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what > [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what > shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to define all mental > characters as far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations. ~ * > Peirce > > On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:16 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> >> >> Supplement: It is a question of outsourcing or insourcing. What do we >> want. Do we want to keep the form of EGs as they are, then we outsource the >> question of reflection. But do we want to have some more fun, or, eh, work? >> Then why not insource the topic about reflection in some way. Peirce cannot. >> List, >> I think, that the "existential graphs" don´t have to do with existence in >> the first place, that is with things that do exist, or phenomena of the >> real world, but rather with semes(?) that origin in reflection, reflection >> of reflection, and so on. Do they exist? Are they real? Are they phenomena? >> I guess, every answer may be so constructed to give a "yes", and if the >> phenomenon merely exists in one head. A thought-sign by the thinker to the >> same thinker. It exists, ok, it is real, ok. But what do we gain from this >> generalisation? Nothing. So I propose to more and better analyse >> reflection, its nature, its different levels of representation, and so on. >> Some years ago there was a hype and high flying hopes about research about >> the brain and consciousness. Now there is nothing more of that left. I >> guess, the reason is, that too much focus was directed on the technical >> function of the brain, and not enough focus was directed on the nature of >> reflection. Reflection is tricky. If you think that you are thinking, you >> merely think that you are thinking, but in fact you think that you think >> that you are thinking, and forget to think. A think about a think makes the >> think fall in the sink. And with every "about" the time direction changes. >> EGs dont cover that. They dont tell the reflectional level of a >> proposition. Any proposition, no matter of what order, may be inserted. EGs >> are about nothing but reflection (not about existence, contradictory to >> their label), but do not show of which order the reflection is (reflection >> about a natural process, reflection about this reflection, reflection about >> this reflection...) Why not try to make them do? I can´t, too busy and too >> stupid anyway, so your turn. >> Best, Helmut >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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