Gary R., List: GR: Yet, if normative science is somehow to be 'guided' by phenomenology, how are the 'facts of phenomenology' to be expressed? That to me is the essential question.
I agree, since I still struggle to see how anyone can think or talk *about *Phenomenology *without *engaging in Semeiotic. After all, any fact is always expressed in a *proposition*; but as soon as we think or say something *about *a phenomenon using a proposition, we are going beyond merely *observing *that phenomenon in itself--we are now *representing* it *with *something else, and *relating* it *to *something else. GR: So, how does a phenomenologist go about "describing the object, as a phenomenon" then abstracting its "suchness"? Neither "abstracting" nor "suchness" appears in what you quoted. Peirce consistently associated "suchness" with 1ns, and that is only one irreducible element of the phenomena. Moreover, my understanding is that we distinguish it from 2nd and 3ns by precission, rather than abstraction. GR: But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather developed semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic abstraction' in the passage quoted below). So is "object," yet Peirce seemingly used it at a synonym for "phenomenon" in 1903. Hypostatic abstraction is what turns an observed phenomenon into an *object *of thought and discourse--i.e., an Object of Signs--without necessarily taking a position on its *reality*. GR: Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are terms of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, a posteriori work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of phenomenology uncovered. I agree that all of those fall under Semeiotic as thinking *about *the "facts of phenomenology," rather than observing the phenomena themselves and thinking *through *them (cf. CP 4.549; 1906), which I currently see as the scope of Phenomenology itself. GR: Examples of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. But what you went on to quote from Peirce are not *descriptions*; they can only be properly interpreted by those who are able to associate such concepts with previous Collateral Experience, whether direct or indirect. Someone not *already *acquainted with magenta, attar, railway whistles, quinine, mathematics, or love could understand and learn *nothing *from mere invocations of their color, odor, sound, taste, or emotional quality. GR: Thus, there is finally no little abstraction in coming to identify the "suchness" of, say, the quality 'red' as opposed to "seeing a red object." I am only saying that iconoscopy (involving a *logica utens*) strives to do just that: that is, for example, abstract 'redness' in this example. I am still not convinced that such *abstraction *properly falls within Phenomenology; the Phaneron contains no objects and no realities, only "images" (De Tienne's term). We *prescind *the red color in the Percept, which in itself has no parts, creating a *predicate*; then we *abstract *the quality of redness as an *object *capable of representation in a Perceptual Judgment, creating a *subject*; and then we *generalize *by positing a *real *character that is *really *embodied in something *external *to us--a *real *possibility that may be (and is) embodied in *other *things, as well. GR: Have they themselves even experimented with phenomenological observation through methods which yield such 'maybes' as those described above? It seems to me that the issue boils down to where the lines are drawn between Phenomenology, Normative Science (especially Semeiotic), and Metaphysics; and it is at least arguable--recent List debates notwithstanding--that not much is ultimately riding on that particular determination, since such classifications are somewhat arbitrary. My own more abstract bent is presumably what attracts me to Semeiotic, and makes it difficult for me to appreciate Phenomenology as you clearly do. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 4:46 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > You asked: "Are you sure that you are in full agreement with this > statement?" and quoted yourself. > > JAS: There are "facts of phenomenology," but as soon as we begin > analyzing these "familiar phenomena"--especially with respect to their > "conformity ... to ends which are not immanent within" them--we are > engaging in Normative Science, not Phaneroscopy. > > > And commented: JAS: What I quoted from Peirce right above that comment > seems to entail that anything much beyond merely *observing *whatever is > or could be present to the mind and *recognizing *its indecomposable > elements properly falls under Normative Science, rather than Phaneroscopy. > > Here's the pertinent passages from the quote you mentioned just above: > > CSP: . . . the procedure of the normative sciences is *not purely > deductive*, as that of mathematics is, nor even principally so. Their > peculiar analyses of familiar phenomena, *analyses which ought to be > guided by the facts of phenomenology* in a manner in which mathematics is > not at all guided, separate Normative Science from mathematics quite > radically. In the third place, there is a most intimate and essential > element of Normative Science which is still *more *proper to it, and that > is its *peculiar appreciations*, to which nothing at all in the > phenomena, in themselves, corresponds. These appreciations relate to the > conformity of phenomena to *ends *which are not immanent within those > phenomena. (emphasis added; CP 5.126, EP 2:198-199; 1903) > > > This passage notes that normative science concerns itself with "the > conformity of phenomena to ends," but no claim has been made by me or Andre > de Tienne that phenomenology means to do this. Yet, if normative science > is somehow to be 'guided' by phenomenology, how are the 'facts of > phenomenology' to be expressed? That to me is the essential question. As > Peirce puts it: "The question is what the *phenomenon *is" (EP2:154). In > CP 5.126 quoted just above, Peirce also points to the way in which, while > mathematics is purely deductive, "the procedure of the normative sciences > is *not purely deductive [. . .]*, nor even principally so," such that a > non-deductive science is needed, as he wrote, to 'guide' it. Certainly, and > even emphatically, logic as semeiotic has its deductive part, especially > evident in logical critic, but the normative sciences taken as a whole are > "*not > purely deductive [. . .]*, nor even principally so." > > You quoted another passage: > > CSP: But before we can attack any normative science [. . .] it is plain > that there must be a preliminary inquiry which shall justify the attempt to > establish such dualism. This must be a science that does *not *draw any > distinction of good and bad in any sense whatever, but just contemplates > phenomena as they are, simply opens its eyes and describes what it sees. > Not what it sees in the real as distinguished from figment,--not regarding > any such dichotomy,--but *simply describing the object*, as a phenomenon, > and stating what it finds in all phenomena alike. (emphasis adde; CP 5.37, > EP 2:143; 1903) > > > So, how does a phenomenologist go about "describing the object, as a > phenomenon" then abstracting its "suchness"? To state "what it finds in all > phenomena alike" is, for Peirce, to say, firstly, that phaneroscopy finds > three universal categories of phenomena--and some would limit phenomenology > to just that fundamental finding. But such a severe limitation would > certainly result in a poor excuse for a science, really empty except for > its finding 1ns, 2ns, 3ns in the phaneron. Why would Peirce think that such > an eviscerated *science* would be essential in guiding the normative > sciences? > > What de Tienne and I have been arguing is that various 'objects' fall into > these categories (the objects of de Tienne's Iconoscopy he refers to as > *images*, image having a special meaning in his usage in this paper), and > I have further argued that some of these 'objects' in their "suchness" can > be arranged trichotomically (what I call category theory). Peirce offers > numerous examples of objects categorially expressing 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns. I > have been claiming that one needs only a logica utens to single out such > objects categorially and to arrange them trichotomically. > > In "Iconosopy Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic" Tienne argues for a > methodological step beyond phanerscopic observation but before semeiotic. > > Phaneroscopy and semeiotic study two entities with distinct modes of > being: the phaneron and the sign. Each consists in a continuum, one of > first intention, the other of second intention, the latter lying within the > former. . . . . An image in this sense is not a drawing or a picture, > but at first a [formal] logical concept with a mathematical basis . . [The > image] is at the junction between the percept (phaneral element) and the > perceptual judgment (the most elementary kind of semiotic event) through > the percipuum, and it can be observed through a special kind of activity > called iconoscopy (from the Abstract, op.cit). > > In this regard, Peirce wrote > > That step of thought, which consists in interpreting an image by a symbol, > is one of which logic neither need nor can give any account, since it is > subconscious, uncontrollable, and not subject to criticism. . . But it is > evident that the image must be connected in some way with a symbol if any > proposition is to be true of it. The very truth of things must be in some > measure representative (CP 4.479). > > > You would appear to see this quite differently, as you wrote: > > JAS: Phaneroscopy examines Percepts *in themselves*, as Semes (CP 4.539; > 1906) that have no parts, and employs *precission *to analyze them > *mathematically *into predicates (NEM 3:917; 1904) with three irreducible > *valencies*, which correspond to the Categories. > > > But 'seme' is a term of logic as semeiotic, indeed a rather developed > semeiotic. So are 'precission' and 'predicates' (and 'hypostatic > abstraction' in the passage quoted below). As for the valencies of the > objects which phenomenologists observe, armed with only a logica utens, > they can identify the valencies of various 'objects' (in all three > categories) drawing upon the principles of the simplest logic, the logic of > mathematics, which posits monadic, dyadic, and triadic valencies (then, > employing a reduction thesis, showing that these three are both necessary > and sufficient, that higher valencies may be reduced to combinations of > these three). This will suggest categoriality in the phaneron and serve as > a powerful tool for doing phenomenology. That is, one will be on the look > out for monadic, dyadic, and triadic 'objects' (or, prebits == pre-habits; > on 'pre-bits', "Since the phaneron is a collection, it has parts,"*Charles > S. Peirce's Phenomenology, *Richard Atkins, 103-5) > > JAS: However, the next step employs *hypostatic abstraction* to analyze > those predicates *logically *into subjects of three irreducible *natures*, > which correspond to the Universes, and "marries" them with a *continuous > *predicate. > In other words, it Retroductively formulates a Proposition *about* the > Phaneron--namely, that *something *stands in *some relation* to *something > else*--which is either true or false In fact, this constantly happens > *involuntarily*, resulting in our Perceptual Judgments. > > > Hypostatic abstraction, continuous predicate, proposition, etc. are terms > of semeiotic, and what you've described above is, as I see it, *a > posteriori* work logic does upon the factual findings and principles of > phenomenology uncovered. In my opinion, phenomenology not only reveals that > there are but three universal categories, but that various objects > (prebits) observed will exhibit categoriality and may be arranged in > trichotomies involving 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. But your view is quite different. > > JAS: As I see it, this is no longer Phaneroscopy, which deals only with > *presented *appearances (1ns); it is Normative Science, specifically > Logic as Semeiotic, which deals with *urged *Experience (2ns) and teaches > us how to *learn *from it, such that our *beliefs*--i.e., our *habits of > conduct*--will be stable, rather than confounded by *future *Experience > (cf. CP 3.429; 1896). If I am right about this, then I continue to have a > hard time seeing how Phenomenology could be expanded to include branches > *other > than* Phaneroscopy, as you and Andre De Tienne have proposed. > > > The question remains: how can one represent an image in de Tienne's sense? > Your position would seem to be this can only be done through normative > logical analysis. But, again, I hold that phenomenology can at least > tentatively associate certain objects (prebits) with the categories without > the assistance of a logica docens, and this is, I believe, the principal > thrust of de Tienne's paper, "Iconoscopy." I take the additional step > (which it seems to me that Peirce did as well) of observing that various > categorial *trichotomies of objects* occur within the phenomena including > vectors, or paths through the categories. For example, Atkins gives as an > example the consciousness of time passing (op. cit., 149) and which Peirce > analyses as the tripartite Bergsonian moment: past (2ns) -> present (1ns) > -> future (3ns), each melding (continuously) into the next (and *in an > overlapping moment* the future will be present and what was present and > future will be past). One observes this in the phaneron. > > At CP 1.337 Peirce gives, as he not infrequently does, objects as examples > of categories as well as a couple of trichotomies. > > . . . A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight > road, considered merely as a connection between two places is second, but > so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is third. > Position is first, velocity or the relation of two successive positions > second, acceleration or the relation of three successive positions third. > But velocity in so far as it is continuous also involves a third. > Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection. Every process comes > under that head. Moderation is a kind of Thirdness. The positive degree of > an adjective is first, the superlative second, the comparative third. . . . > Action is second, but conduct is third. Law as an active force is second, > but order and legislation are third. Sympathy, flesh and blood, that by > which I feel my neighbor's feelings, is third. > > > I would suggest that if one gives phaneroscopy its full scope that these > are all objects which a phenomenologist can observe and describe. Examples > of 1ns would seem to be easier to describe than 2ns or 3ns. Take these > examples: > > . . . . Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as > the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, > the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a fine > mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love, etc. CP 1.304 > > > Yet, it must be admitted that beyond these "qualities of feeling" there is > a sense in which phenomenology also and essentially means to get at the > quality itself *(**die Qualität selbst)*, rather than any particular > *experience* of it. So Peirce immediately continues: > > I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, whether > primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that involves > these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves > which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized. . . .That > mere quality, or suchness, is not in itself an occurrence, as seeing a red > object is; it is a mere maybe. CP 1.304 > > > Redness may-be, but need not be (imagine a person who is color-blind to > red). One can then recognize it categorially in experience; that is, it may > possibly 'express' itself, so to speak, in some individual > phenomenologist's experience, or some part of some experience, or some > memory of or comment or writing about some experience (but, then, this goes > beyond phenomenology per se). Thus, there is finally no little abstraction > in coming to identify the "suchness" of, say, the quality 'red' as opposed > to "seeing a red object." I am only saying that iconoscopy (involving a > logica utens) strives to do just that: that is, for example, abstract > 'redness' in this example. > > Some logicians would seem to deny a phaneroscopic science, let alone > iconoscopy and category theory. Have they themselves even experimented with > phenomenological observation through methods which yield such 'maybes' as > those described above? It seems to me possible that especially strong > logical minds, even if they *do *accept the necessity of a phaneroscopic > science between mathematics and the normative sciences, yet deny that > Peircean phenomenology can be further developed, reducing it in effect to > phaneroscopy, that is (and as they see it) to merely observing > categoriality in phenomena, period. > > But I would hold that phenomenology (including, but not limited to > phaneroscopy) has its own work to do, its own methods, and its own possible > development as a science. It is true that Peirce said that at the time he > was working that phenomenology was a "single science." He did not state > that it would necessarily always remain so. In fact, he wrote (and this > quote ends Atkins' book): > > > [Phenomenology is] still in the condition of a science-egg, hardly any > details of it being as yet distinguishable, though enough to assure the > student of it that, under the fostering care that it is sure to enjoy, if > the human culture continues long, it surely will in the future become a > strong and beneficient science (Kenneth Ketner, *His Glassy Essence*, > 328). > > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 4:47 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Are you sure that you are in full agreement with this statement? >> >> JAS: There are "facts of phenomenology," but as soon as we begin >> analyzing these "familiar phenomena"--especially with respect to their >> "conformity ... to ends which are not immanent within" them--we are >> engaging in Normative Science, not Phaneroscopy. >> >> >> What I quoted from Peirce right above that comment seems to entail that >> anything much beyond merely *observing *whatever is or could be present >> to the mind and *recognizing *its indecomposable elements properly falls >> under Normative Science, rather than Phaneroscopy. Consider what he >> likewise wrote a few weeks and a few paragraphs earlier. >> >> CSP: But before we can attack any normative science, any science which >> proposes to separate the sheep from the goats, it is plain that there must >> be a preliminary inquiry which shall justify the attempt to establish such >> dualism. This must be a science that does *not *draw any distinction of >> good and bad in any sense whatever, but just contemplates phenomena as they >> are, simply opens its eyes and describes what it sees. Not what it sees in >> the real as distinguished from figment,--not regarding any such >> dichotomy,--but simply describing the object, as a phenomenon, and stating >> what it finds in all phenomena alike. (CP 5.37, EP 2:143; 1903) >> >> >> CSP: The first [division of philosophy] is Phenomenology, which simply >> contemplates the Universal Phenomenon, and discerns its ubiquitous >> elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other >> series of categories ... For Phenomenology treats of the universal >> Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in >> themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness. >> (CP 5.121-122, EP 2:196-197; 1903) >> >> >> Phaneroscopy examines Percepts *in themselves*, as Semes (CP 4.539; >> 1906) that have no parts, and employs *precission *to analyze them >> *mathematically >> *into predicates (NEM 3:917; 1904) with three irreducible *valencies*, >> which correspond to the Categories. However, the next step employs >> *hypostatic >> abstraction* to analyze those predicates *logically *into subjects of >> three irreducible *natures*, which correspond to the Universes, and >> "marries" them with a *continuous *predicate. In other words, it >> Retroductively formulates a Proposition *about* the Phaneron--namely, >> that *something *stands in *some relation* to *something else*--which is >> either true or false In fact, this constantly happens *involuntarily*, >> resulting in our Perceptual Judgments. >> >> As I see it, this is no longer Phaneroscopy, which deals only with *presented >> *appearances (1ns); it is Normative Science, specifically Logic as >> Semeiotic, which deals with *urged *Experience (2ns) and teaches us how >> to *learn *from it, such that our *beliefs*--i.e., our *habits of >> conduct*--will be stable, rather than confounded by *future *Experience >> (cf. CP 3.429; 1896). If I am right about this, then I continue to have a >> hard time seeing how Phenomenology could be expanded to include branches >> *other >> than* Phaneroscopy, as you and Andre De Tienne have proposed. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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