John, List: JAS: ... the apparent contradiction was between saying that a percept "does not stand for anything" (1903) and saying that "a Percept is a Seme" (1906).
JFS: That contradiction is the result of claiming that a Seme is a subject It has absolutely nothing to do with whether a Seme is a subject, but stems from the fact that a Seme is a Sign, since every Sign stands for something--namely, its Object. However, after reviewing the context of the 1903 passage, I am inclined to think that Peirce was not so much ruling out a percept *being *a Sign as limiting the *kind *of Sign that it could be. Here is the entire paragraph. CSP: Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of my table, a yellow chair with a green cushion. That will be what psychologists term a "percept" (*res percepta*). They also frequently call it an "image." With this term I shall pick no quarrel. Only one must be on one's guard against a false impression that it might insinuate. Namely, an "image" usually means something intended to represent,--virtually professing to represent,--something else, real or ideal. So understood, the word "image" would be a misnomer for a percept. The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not "as" anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway. (CP 7.619) A percept does not *profess *to represent or stand for something else, and neither does a Seme--the latter simply "serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906). By contrast, "The perceptual judgment professes to represent the percept" (CP 7.628)--i.e., it is a Proposition (Pheme), because it "separately indicates its object" (CP 2.357; 1902), which is the corresponding percept. However, "the perceptual judgment does not represent the percept *logically*. In what intelligible manner, then, does it represent the percept? ... as an index, or true symptom, just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind or a thermometer the temperature" (CP 7.628). Which part of a Proposition is an Index? "Every subject partakes of the nature of an index, in that its function is the characteristic function of an index, that of forcing the attention upon its object" (CP 2.357). A percept is a Seme, which does not profess to stand for anything by itself, but serves as the subject of a Proposition--namely, the resulting perceptual judgment--by denoting its Object. Of course, this is Semeiotic rather than Phenomenology, which is why I changed the thread topic. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 9:24 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > On 3/17/2019 11:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > the apparent contradiction was between saying that a percept "does not > > stand for anything" (1903) and saying that "a Percept is a Seme" (1906). > > That contradiction is the result of claiming that a Seme is a subject. > > As a First, a Seme is pure possibility, and a percept is the purest > of the pure. Light striking your retina is a pattern of colors. > That is the Mark/Tone or Qualisign that is interpreted as a form. > The direction and orientation are indexicals that determine something. > > Together, they are interpreted as a Second: a token of some type, > such as "a rock". That is the subject that "stands for" something. > > For more explanation, see my recent note in the Bedrock thread. > > John >
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