Dan, list

        A really splendid argument. Many thanks.

        It would also be interesting to explore how many of the
hunter-gatherer languages follow the Piraha linguistic format, since
'sharing' is a basic socioeconomic mode in most such societies. 

        How easy is it then, for someone from a socioeconomic mode that
functions very differently from another - to not only learn a new
language, but also, learn the cognitive infrastructure that grounds
that language?

        Edwina
 On Sun 21/04/19  2:31 AM , Dan Everett [email protected] sent:
 Folks,
 Lexical semantics is a large field and there are various positions
specialists take on exactly how word-meanings are best to be
characterized. For example, most scholars (not all), argue that there
is no simple verb 'to give' but that this English verb is
characterized by a representation along the lines of: 
        Anna gave Max a book.
        give: lambda z  lambda y lambda x lamba  e act(x) &  become
poss(y,z)( e)    

        ('lambda' is of course the lambda operator)
 In other words, any verb, in this case 'give' is broken down into
more basic components. No language is required to have a verb that is
exactly like the English verb 'to give' but if it does, it must be
composed of these finer predicates, so that the triadic semantics of
'to give' (English) is derivative, not basic (though the combinations
of these basic predicates in this form will in fact produce a
di-transitive or "triadic" syntax).  
 Some linguists would refer to the number of lexical arguments as the
valency of the verb and the number of syntactic arguments as the
transitivity of the verb (noun, etc). 
 And this can vary radically across languages. 
 For example, in the Piraha language that I have worked on for
decades, there are only about 90 or so distinct verb roots (which are
not to be confused with verb stems, in turn not to be confused with
verbs, and not to be confused with lexical representations). So to
produce a verb like 'bring back' (corresponding roughly to a single
verb such as 'return', as in 'return the screwdriver when you're
finished') in Piraha the actual verb might be:
'go-turn-carry-aspectual distinction affixes...' (i.e. a verb stem
composed of several verb roots plus a number of affixes playing
derivative semantic roles).  
 In a language like English with an extremely simple verbal
morphology (maximum of five forms - sing, sang, sung, sings, singing)
this is deceptively easy. In Spanish a verb would have 30-50 forms.
But in Piraha (not uncommon for polysynthetic languages of the
Americas) each verb can have as many as 65,000 forms (sixty-five
thousand). And there simply is no way to compare predicates ilke
"give" one-to-one with any Piraha verb.  
 If we consider a basic English-conceived/interpreted predicate like
'give' then of course it is difficult to imagine that it wouldn't
have three arguments, e.g. a giver, a thing given, and a recipient.
But this simple conception does not manifest itself in all languages.
So for example, abstracting away from the much greater complexity of
Piraha verbal morphology, there simply is no simple verb 'to give' in
the language. There is a combination of verb roots that means,
roughly, 'x transfers y to z with the expectation that z will
transfer b to x' That is, the concept of giving requires reciprocity
in Piraha (a hunter-gatherer culture).  
 In the case of Amele that I mentioned earlier, there is NO verb 'to
give.' One can find, for example, 'John apple Bill' with no verb and
in the right context imply that 'John gave an apple to Bill.' But
there is no actual verb translated 'give' in the language. 
 All languages are severely *underdetermined* meaning that the
predicates of the language do not fully specify meanings or even
literally specify meanings. Full meanings are supplied by the
cultural act of interpretation.  
 These are reasons that I favor the triadic system of semiotics of
CSP to the dyadic system of Saussure. But the argumentation is subtle
and detailed. And the semiotics has to fit the linguistics - it does
not substitute for the linguistics. 
 As far as syntax goes, syntax never, ever fully specifies all the
imaginable connections between predicates and arguments. Syntax acts
as a filter on potential meanings, guiding the interpretation process
to avoid certain interpretations. This active, dynamic role of
interpretation is why the Saussurian system cannot work and why I
favor Peirce's work. 
 Now to the syntax. If we were to assume that there are three symbols
(without worrying about lexical decomposition), e.g. "John," "give,"
"apple", "Mary," we can think of various ways of combining them. The
simplest way would be simple linear concatenation: "John give Mary
apple." Another would be hierarchy + concatenation, e.g. "[John
[[give Mary] apple]]" and the final would be hierarchy + recursion.
  Peirce's semiotics is semantically recursive, though the syntax is
of almost no concern to that work. Chomsky's grammatical proposals
require both syntactic and semantic recursion. My own work requires
Peircean recursion, while allowing syntactic recursion to be optional
across languages.
 This would all take a lot more space for me to unpack for
non-specialists (i.e. non-linguists). Peirce's discussions of
predicates is little more than a first pass. This doesn't mean he was
wrong, but that verbal semantics is far more complex than he
understood, because it is based on a science that did not exist,
except perhaps in an extremely inchoate form that he helped to birth,
at the time he was writing.  
 Guessing at whether predicates are triadic or not by non-linguists
is akin to me, a non-engineer, telling my grandson, a bio-medical
engineer, how I think the best way to design an artificial heart
would be. 
 I have referred many times to work of mine and others on these and
related subjects. I suggest reading a few of those (or just an
introductory linguistics text). Here are a couple of more references:


http://www.zas.gwz-berlin.de/fileadmin/mitarbeiter/wunderlich/Wunderlich_14_Lexical_Decomposition.pdf
[1]

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3353824/Huang_Lexical.pdf
[2] 

http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072-e-15
[3]

https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957
[4] 
 And then for the connoisseur, there are grammars of individual
languages. 
 So there is no utility in statements like "I certainly do assume
that ... the relation of giving is irreducbly triadic." First, even
in English it IS reduceable. Second, there is considerable
cross-linguistic variation in the mapping between lexical semantics
(i.e. with lexical decomposition) and syntax, or, as I stated
earlier, between valency and transitivity. 
 Thus the English verb "to give" is ditransitive, but not necessarily
divalent. 
 Dan
 On Apr 20, 2019, at 5:37 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 list, I approve: languages and cultures are tools! They can be used
as far as they are good for, but they don´t limit! Other tools are
easily available for everybody, for Amele people too. Dyadic giving,
m. a! They gave something away to the world, or they gave everything
they could to a special person? Before missionaries arrived, and it
worked? Best, helmut    20. April 2019 um 21:17 Uhr
  "Gary Richmond" 
 wrote:           Jon, Dan, List,   Jon quoted Dan, then commented:  
               DE:  By the way, predicates in natural languages can
vary for cultural reasons. For example, "to give" in most languages
is triadic, but it is dyadic in Amele of New Guinea (as I discuss in
Language: The Cultural Tool).                                      
JAS: That is interesting, but I assume we can still say that the
relation of giving is irreducibly triadic, regardless of how it is
expressed in any particular language.                    I certainly
do assume that we can say "that the relation of giving is irreducibly
triadic" and, this seems to me, to point again to the essential
distinction between 'relation(ship)' and 'correlation' which Jon has
been emphasizing in consideration of triadic relations. Perhaps this
distinction also points to a difference in the subject matter of
linguistics and semeiotic, whatever their overlaps may be.   In any
event, the exchange between Dan and Jon reminded me of the peculiar
case of the language of the Trobriand Islanders, one I'd learned
about decades ago in a college course which included analyses of
certain cultural and even conceptual differences expressed through
language. The Trobriand Islanders language is especially interesting
for several reasons.                  The Trobriand peoples speak
Kilivila, though various different dialects of it are spoken amongst
each different tribe. It is an  Austronesian language, although [it]
has the distinction of having a complex system for classifying 
nouns.                  In this regard and, for example, it would
appear that Kilivila doesn't express 'causation' or, perhaps, one
might say 'process', 'growth', etc. As the article quoted from would
have it, there appear to be in some languages "non-lineal
codifications of reality." As this appears as a characteristic of
Kilivila, one reads:                             Drawing upon earlier
work earlier work by Bronisław Malinowski,  Dorothy D. Lee's
scholarly writings refer to "non-lineal codifications of reality". In
such a linguistic system, the concept of linear progress of time,
geometric shapes, and even conventional methods of description, are
lost altogether or altered. In her example of a specific indigenous
yam, Lee explains that when the yam moves from a state of sprouting
through ripeness to over-ripeness, the name for each object in a
specific state changes entirely - the description of the object at
different states of development relates to wholly different
perceptions of the object. Ripeness is considered a "defining
ingredient" and thus once it becomes over-ripe, a yam is perceived as
a new object altogether. The same perception pertains to time and
geometric shapes.                Lee, Dorothy D. B. (1950). Lineal
and nonlineal codifications of reality. Psychosomatic Medicine
march-april 1950. p. 89.              
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trobriand_Islands#Language [7]         
         While, of course, in nature there is process, growth, change,
development, ripening, decay, etc., apparently language does not
necessarily need to reflect that fact. I should note that I have
since read somewhat different analyses of Kilivila than Lee's, but I
have not been able to quickly locate them.    Best,   Gary           
      Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication
Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 
                 [8]
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     On Sat, Apr 20, 2019 at 1:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:       
Dan, List:        DE:  By the way, predicates in natural languages
can vary for cultural reasons. For example, "to give" in most
languages is triadic, but it is dyadic in Amele of New Guinea (as I
discuss in Language: The Cultural Tool).        That is interesting,
but I assume we can still say that the relation of giving is
irreducibly triadic, regardless of how it is expressed in any
particular language.  Do you disagree?          DE:  On another note,
neurolinguistics research by Evelina Fedorenko and her colleagues at
MIT's Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department shows that language
networks in the brain are built primarily around words/symbols, with
syntax parasitic on words, which I independently predict in my book
and recent work on the origin of language. Also Steve Piantadosi
(Berkeley Psychology) has shown that all the memory needed for much
of language is about 1.5 megabytes, a small amount, with the amount
of memory required for syntax negligible, more evidence that symbols
drive syntax.          Could you please elaborate on what you mean by
"syntax parasitic on words"?  I am neither a linguist nor a cognitive
scientist--and I did not stay at a Holiday Inn Express last
night--but that interpretation of the evidence seems backwards. 
Consider this excerpt from the article about Piantadosi's research
that you linked [10] in a subsequent post.              For example,
when presented with the word "turkey," a young learner typically
gathers bits of information by asking, "Is a turkey a bird? Yes, or
no? Does a turkey fly? Yes, or no?" and so on, until grasping the
full meaning of the word "turkey."              The young learner in
this example must already have mastered basic syntax in order to pose
his/her questions in the first place, and then understand the
responses--which help make the word "turkey" more determinate in
his/her own mind, like adding Spots to a branching Line of Identity. 
This is presumably why symbols require far more memory than
syntax--they have to be situated in relation to all other symbols,
while the  same syntax applies to a vast range of different
circumstances, as the isomorphic Existential Graphs for the triadic
relations of giving and determining reflect.   Moreover, what do you
make of the following comments by Peirce regarding the priority of
syntax?          CSP:  Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel."  This
is identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain":  It
is only the grammatical dress that is different.  Other things being
equal, everybody will prefer the former.  Why?  Because it is
simpler; but why is it simpler?  Because in putting the cause before
the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the truth.  What are
the Subjects of this Proposition.  Cain, first:  that is not only a
Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the
Assertion which a historian would naturally make.  But in the
Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely
(or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality).  But
besides these, "killed" = committed murder upon, is a third Subject,
since no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience,
would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it.  What, then, is left
to serve as Predicate?  Nothing but the flow of causation.  It is
true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience.  When
we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while
a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making
acquaintance with the flow of causation.  So acquaintance with the
flow of causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so
far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is
embodied in the syntax of every tongue.  However, it is not because
of this physiological fact, that it becomes proper to draw the line
between Subjects and Predicate here; neither is it because of the
psychical fact that human minds naturally think in a way broadly
(i.e. a little) similar to the forms of syntax; nor is it even
because of the metaphysical truth, that the order of syntax is the
law of Time and of Becoming.  This is proved by the facts, first,
that it is necessary that the Reasonings by which we discover and
defend the orders of Causation, of human thought, of time, and of
becoming, themselves presuppose the recognition of the corresponding
order in syntax; and secondly, by this, that it has not been the
order [of] time, or Causation, or the structure of the human mind,
nor human anatomy and physiology that have, any or all of them,
determined that that ought to be the order of syntax that in fact
ought to be so, but precisely the contrary, it is the fact that the
order of Syntax ought to be as in fact it ought to be that has
determined, first, Real Being and Time to take the same form, and
then, that it should become natural to the mind and should be the
pattern of physical action. (R 664:10-13; 1910 Nov 26-27)          It
seems to me--and Peirce, apparently--that another reason why syntax
requires little memory is simply because it is relatively natural,
generally reflecting "the flow of causation" that we discover long
before we achieve competence in any language.  By contrast, symbols
are ultimately arbitrary, requiring the acquisition of myriad habits
for even rudimentary employment in thought and communication.   In
any case, with Peirce I see the primary distinction here as being
between subjects that denote Objects (as Semes) and continuous
predicates that signify Interpretants (within Propositions).  There
is no limit to the potential number of different words or other
symbols that we could devise and memorize to serve as the former, but
only a handful of syntactical configurations are sufficient to express
the latter, since they represent indecomposable logical relations . 
We can stipulate the proper linear sequence of words for this
purpose, often supplemented by additional words; or we can adopt even
more iconic Signs, such as Spots with certain arrangements of Pegs
attached to other Spots by means of Lines, all scribed on a
two-dimensional Sheet.   Regards,        Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe,
Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [11] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [12]           On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at
1:20 PM Dan Everett  wrote:  The most common word order among the
world's 7000+ languages is Sub Obj Verb. But I have worked on
languages in the Amazon that are SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV, SVO, and OVS. I
have written full grammars of two of them. A propositions can serve
as predicates of higher propositions in some languages. Syntactic
variation is intense.    On another note, neurolinguistics research
by Evelina Fedorenko and her colleagues at MIT's Brain and Cognitivie
Sciences Department shows that language networks in the brain are
built primarily around words/symbols, with syntax parasitic on words,
which I independently predict in my book and recent work on the origin
of language. Also Steve Piantadosi (Berkeley Psychology) has shown
that all the memory needed for much of language is about 1.5
megabytes, a small amount, with the amount of memory required for
syntax neglible, more evidence that symbols drive syntax.   Dan    On
Apr 19, 2019, at 2:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote: 

        Yes, and the location of the predicate in the sentence is also
interesting. For example, in classical ancient Chinese, the verb was
at the end [as it is in Latin]. I thought this implied that whatever
was going on in the full sentence, i.e, subject and object, involved
both as co-agents in the action. What was interesting is how this
ancient Chinese format eventually gave way to the modern mode where
the verb is between the subject and object.

         Edwina
 On Fri 19/04/19 1:42 PM , Dan Everett [email protected] [15]
sent: By the way, predicates in natural languages can vary for
cultural reasons. For example, "to give" in most languages is
triadic, but it is dyadic in Amele of New Guinea (as I discuss in
Language: The Cultural Tool).   Dan                   
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Links:
------
[1]
http://www.zas.gwz-berlin.de/fileadmin/mitarbeiter/wunderlich/Wunderlich_14_Lexical_Decomposition.pdf
[2]
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3353824/Huang_Lexical.pdf
[3]
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199541072-e-15
[4]
https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[6]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trobriand_Islands#Language
[8]
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[9]
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[10] https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190327134547.htm
[11] http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[12] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[13]
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[16]
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[17]
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[18]
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[19] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
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[22] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
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