Hello Jon S, List,
Let me start here: "As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding continuous motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than discrete positions in space and/or moments in time." Over the years, several of my colleagues have expressed a similar sentiment: if only Peirce had been around to see Einstein's great discoveries concerning the special and general theories of relativity, then he would have been in a much better position to understand the nature of these things. My initial reaction to such expressions is that Peirce's fundamental hypotheses concerning the nature of time and space--and the relations between them--may very well run deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein had to offer. Taking the discussion in lecture 8 of RLT as a starting point for a discussion, consider the following: 1. As far as we are able to glean from his writings, Einstein does not appear to accept the reality of chance. In fact, he argues against it. Peirce, on the other hand, holds that an appeal to the reality of chance along with a tendency for relations between qualities and habitual patterns of order to grow can explain how space, time and the laws that govern them might have evolved. 2. Einstein does not appear to offer an adequate explanatory hypothesis concerning the origins of the spatial and temporal relations that hold between the kinetic energy that is initially distributed through space shortly after the big bang. Peirce does offer a hypothesis, and I find it somewhat plausible. More to the point, it seems especially productive as compared to other competing hypotheses. The hypothesis is that, from an initial condition of homogeneous possibility, the infinitude of spatial and temporal dimensions differentiated and unfolded by a process of the vague becoming more determinate. Homogeneity grows into heterogeneity. From chance, order grows. 3. From an initial condition of enormous potential (e.g., much concentrated potential energy), how did particles, nuclei, stars, atoms, molecules, etc. come to be as natural kinds? Starting with the explosion of the initial relatively mass-less force "particles" radiating as distributed fields (e.g., photons and gluons), more stable configurations of particle-like configurations of energy having qualities of spin and charge were attracted to one another based on the complementary character of their respective qualities. What law is at work? Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing the association of the different qualities that energy may take based on their respective relations of attractability and affectability. While Peirce's grand hypotheses concerning the nature of time, space and the initial spread of kinetic energy are more vague than the explanations Einstein was able to offer, I think there may be principled limits to kinds of mathematical relations that may be fruitfully applied to the explanation of such basic laws as principles in our theories. In the study of the continuity of spatial and temporal relations, we move back from metrical geometries, to projective (as Einstein did), and focus our attention on the methods used in the study of topology. If we are trying to explain how space comes to have the metrical characters that it does (locally or globally), then Peirce appears to be on the right track in pointing out that the question of "why four dimensions, or 6, 12, or 16?" is the prior question. What is more, it doesn't look like the answer to that question can be given separately from explaining how the qualities of what is in space (e.g., the fields, particles, waves, or what have you) come to stand in stable relations to each other. In turn, we can ask: does Peirce's hypotheses concerning the dimensionality of space and time help to explain the laws articulated in the general theory of relativity. If they do, then that would be a remarkable thing. What is more, do they help to correct what might be some possible errors in the expression of those laws in the general theory? Cosmologists working today on the relation between time and space (e.g., Lee Smolin) seem to suggest that the answer to both questions is "Yes." In effect, what is the grand hypothesis that Peirce offers as the guess at the riddle? Let me state the question and the answer simply. Question: what are fundamental laws governing all growth of order in the cosmos ranging from physical, to chemical, biological and human social systems? Answer: the grand laws governing the evolution of all things are the laws of logic, together with the law of chance and the law of continuity. As human beings, we are fallible in our understanding of those laws. Our representations of the laws of logic function as guiding principles that govern our inquiry--and our conceptions of those principles involve error, vagueness and the like. Among the laws of logic, which are really primordial? It is the law of abduction that governs the attraction that holds between things having similar or complementary qualities. It is the law of induction that governs the tendency for patterns that do occur that have a higher likelihood of occurring again. This, together with chance and continuity, is what is needed to explain the growth of order from its inception. As far as I can see, Peirce had certain the advantages in being a truly great logician as well as a practicing scientist who was remarkably well versed in a wide range of sciences and mathematics when it comes to tacking the hardest questions. Having such advantages, he was able to see both (1) more deeply and (2) further than Einstein was able to see with respect to the deepest and hardest questions as they arise in metaphysics and the special sciences generally. Getting a handle on these sorts of deep connections is, at root, what is needed to explain the evolution of the real nature of space, time and the stuff found in it. In the end, only an evolutionary explanation is likely to be satisfactory. All other forms of explanation leave too much unexplained. In making this comparison, I don't put much stock in the question of "Who was greater, Einstein or Peirce?" They were both really great. Einstein in physics. Peirce in logic, metaphysics and the proper use the two sorts of theories for the sake of framing remarkably productive hypotheses that serve all of the special sciences. What is more, he put those hypotheses to work in actually explaining how the laws governing time, space, energy and various configurations of massy sorts of things might have evolved. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2019 12:52:22 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited List: Nearly four months ago, I posted the following. JAS: I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that "just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series of articles that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds. As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding continuous motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than discrete positions in space and/or moments in time. We arbitrarily mark the latter to facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space is not composed of points and time is not composed of instants. Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is continuous, and we arbitrarily isolate discrete signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate analysis for particular purposes. We can say that a Dynamic Object determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). Nevertheless, the Type is not composed of its Tokens. In the wake of our various discussions since then, I believe that these comments still hold up quite well. In fact, I recently came across a passage in a discarded manuscript draft for the end of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.572) that sheds further light on the matter. CSP: [I mentioned on an early page of this paper that this System leads to a different conception of the Proposition and Argument from] the traditional view that a Proposition is built up of Names, and an Argument of Propositions. It is true that of the four meanings of the term Argument (for the Middle Term, for the Copulation of Premisses, for the setting out of Premisses and Conclusion, and for the Logical operation of converting Premisses into Conclusion), the second and third justify the traditional account. But in the last sense, which alone is the essential one, an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) Semeiosis is a continuous "inferential process," analogous to motion; definite Propositions are "artificial creations" for the purpose of describing that Argument, analogous to positions; and Semes are "creations of a second order" for the purpose of representing those Propositions--perhaps analogous to coordinates? I suspect that Peirce had something similar in mind when he wrote another passage less than two years earlier, which I have quoted previously. CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images. Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates predicates. Subjectal abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are creations of thought. But this is hardly more than a phrase; for creation and thought have different meanings as applied to the two … That the abstract subject is an ens rationis, or creation of thought does not mean that it is a fiction. (NEM 3:917-918; 1904 Nov 21) An Argument can be analyzed into definite Propositions married by a logical leading principle, and a Proposition can be analyzed into abstracted subjects married by a prescinded predicate. However, these parts are all "creations of thought," entia rationis, Perceptual Judgments rather than Percepts themselves--which is presumably why "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one" (NEM 3:885; 1908 Dec 5). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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