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I don't think the problem is a binary conclusion. The problem I have
with these arguments is that they are strictly that - intellectual
arguments. Without pragmatic evidence or even, universality.
Therefore - there can be no valid conclusion.
That is, as JAS does, to maintain the reality of God as
exo-Universe, by setting up a purely theoretical argument that begins
with the Peircean statement that 'the Universe is composed of Signs' -
and then, regress to the Peircean claim that 'since semiosis is
continuous then, all signs are ONE sign'..and then, regress further
to say that 'A Sign must have an object external to itself' -....to
then reach the conclusion that the Universe is A Sign and has an
external Object to itself, which JAS names as 'God' -
I think that such a purely intellectual argument as 'logical proof
of the reality of God' is extremely weak as an argument in itself and
in addition, it ignores two factors of the basic Peircean framework -
that there is NOTHING external to the Universe, and to declare that a
Sign must have an external Object ignores that this external Object
must also function as a Sign - and thus, must be within the semiosic
process; ie within the Universe - which operates as a semiosic
process. Does this mean transcendence or immanence?
All we can comment with regard to the reality or not of 'God' is, of
course, a purely theoretical argument - since we all acknowledge that
there is no empirical evidence of either God's reality or
non-reality; and thus, of course, of the binary transcendence or
immanence.
My concern is the use we make of Peirce to substantiate our beliefs.
JAS and I interpret Peirce's framework in two totally different ways.
Edwina
On Fri 17/05/19 9:31 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose [email protected]
sent:
Peirce grew up at a time when awareness was still locked into
Constantinian Orthodoxy and it is very doubtful that at some points
he did not take God to be as delivered in the texts. I think that now
we can have a conception of deity as being All but that does not mean
we need to subscribe to efforts to define him in the binary terms of
transcendence and immanence. Today the Deity is understood to be the
creative force that underlies the whole and we are at a loss to
define that with precision of measure it. I understand the Abba to
whom Jesus refers with authority in Mark 1 to be equivalent to the
Word of whom John spoke and of heaven to be seen as having many who
could be considered close enough to being the Word to be seen as that
as we move more and more to understanding that we are all united in
what constitutes Reality. t Buy 99 cent Kindle books at
http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 10:46 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary F., List:
GF: If the Universe is a Sign whose Object is God, then we must ask
how that Sign can convey knowledge of its Object. This is problematic
because the complete absence of God from the Universe of experience
would preclude any acquaintance with, or collateral experience of,
that Object ... it’s not clear to me how a Creator completely
separated from His Creation manages to bridge the gap between Himself
as Object and the Universe as Sign, in such a way that it determines
another quasi-mind to any Interpretant.
As I just clarified in my response to Gary R., I am not advocating
"the complete absence of God from the Universe of experience," or
claiming that He is "completely separated from His Creation." After
all, Peirce clearly held that God is still active in the Universe,
still creating it, still giving it new Signs and fresh energy.
Perhaps that is one reason why he considered the Humble Argument to
be grounded in "spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason" (CP
6.475, EP 2:443; 1908), and thus "open to any honest man" such that
it had "made more worshippers of God than any other" (CP 6.486, EP
2:446; 1908). Moreover, Peirce endorsed the well-established
principle (at least in Christian theology) that all of our knowledge
of God is both analogical and incomplete.
CSP: ... that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that
any human attribute is literally applicable--is what he [the
pragmaticist] means by "God." (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
CSP: But I do not, by 'God,' mean, with some writers, a being so
inscrutable that nothing at all can be known of Him. I suppose most
of our knowledge of Him must be by similitudes. (R 843:26-27; 1908)
CSP: The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes
an infinitely incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as
such, supposes its object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis.
This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself;
namely, as vague but as true so far as it is definite, and as
continually tending to define itself more and more, and without
limit. (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; 1908)
As I noted in the previous thread, the first quoted passage compared
"the physico-psychical universe" as a Sign conveying knowledge of God
to a portrait of a man, Boswell's book about Dr. Johnson, and
Aristotle's works. In fact, all of our Collateral Experience with
people who lived and died before we were born, including Peirce
himself, is of this nature--we become acquainted with someone
through indirect experience, mediated by Signs.
CSP: A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the
function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the
definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the
object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon
the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its
function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other
than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it.
(EP 2:391; 1906)
CSP: That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to
the Interpretant is a Form ... in respect to the Form communicated,
the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that
which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP
2:544n22; 1906)
The effect of a Sign is its Interpretant, and I have suggested that
knowledge of God is the Final Interpretant of the Universe--"that
which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate
opinion were reached" (CP 8.184, EP 2:496; 1909 Feb 26), or "the
effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which the
circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect" (SS 110;
1909 Mar 14). This is a would-be, an ideal, a regulative hope; the
actual effects of the Universe on us are Dynamic Interpretants, and
due to the fallibility of our Interpretative Habits, they may or may
not conform to (or even approach) the Final Interpretant.
Nevertheless, the latter is "the absolute Truth," "The entelechy of
the Universe of being ... in its aspect as a sign," "the ultimate
interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304; 1904)--and therefore, I
suggest, the purpose of the Universe.
CSP: Thus the hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of
each Universe as purposed; and this will stand or fall with the
hypothesis. Yet a purpose essentially involves growth, and so cannot
be attributed to God. Still it will, according to the hypothesis, be
less false to speak so than to represent God as purposeless. (CP
6.466, EP 2:439-440; 1908)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 5:19 PM wrote:
Gary R, list,
Cosmotheandric?? Anyway, what I have to say in this post is very
much about the continuity of semeiosis, so let’s not drop that from
the subject line just yet.
I think Jon has done a good job of representing Peirce’s views on
the Universe as Sign, and the reality of God, but I think he’s,
well, transcended anything Peirce said by placing before us a
dichotomous choice of the Creator as either immanent or transcendent
with respect to the Universe (or the three Universes). After all,
Peirce did not say that God was “transcendent,” and although he
ruled out “immanence” in the drafts of NA, he did not mention it
one way or the other in the published article. I think your
trinitarian(?) option is as logically viable, and perhaps more
pragmatically and morally viable, than Jon’s position as I
understand it. But for now I’d like to stick with semiotics rather
than delving into ethics or pragmatism just yet.
If the Universe is a Sign whose Object is God, then we must ask how
that Sign can convey knowledge of its Object. This is problematic
because the complete absence of God from the Universe of experience
would preclude any acquaintance with, or collateral experience of,
that Object. I think Peirce makes the problem clear enough in this
passage from 1909:
[[ The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It
cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for
that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely,
that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some
further information concerning it. No doubt there will be readers who
will say they cannot comprehend this. They think a Sign need not
relate to anything otherwise known, and can make neither head nor
tail of the statement that every Sign must relate to such an Object.
But if there be anything that conveys information and yet has
absolutely no relation nor reference to anything with which the
person to whom it conveys the information has, when he comprehends
that information, the slightest acquaintance, direct or indirect,—
and a very strange sort of information that would be,— the vehicle
of that sort of information is not, in this volume, called a Sign.
] CP 2.231, R 637]
If we suppose that semiosis is a continuous process of determination
from Object to Sign to Interpretant, then it’s not clear to me how a
Creator completely separated from His Creation manages to bridge the
gap between Himself as Object and the Universe as Sign, in such a way
that it determines another quasi-mind to any Interpretant. I know
this is a reformulation of an old theological question, but I’ve
never heard an answer to it that I found at all persuasive. In the
paragraph before the R 637 quote above, Peirce uses the term
“emanation” instead of “determination” in a way that seems to
emphasize the continuity of the process:
[[ If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, either in
thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other
context, showing how, upon what system or for what reason the Sign
represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign
and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the
explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional
explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will
make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall,
or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own
explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according to
this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a Precept of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the “species” of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole.
If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the “
ratio,” or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These,
of course, are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them
useless. ]]
By the way, the theological problem of the deus absconditus only
arises, as far as I know, in monotheistic religions (though certainly
not in all of them). It does not arise in Buddhism, for instance,
which is not a monotheistic religion. Now, I’m familiar with a fair
amount of Mahayana scripture, and I’ve never come across anything
like this:
GR: at least in some schools of Mahayana Buddhism, it is said that
the Buddha spun the wheel of dharma in the creation of the world and
then immediately went into a state of Nirvana. In such a situation
the creator is indeed entirely separate from his creation
post-creation.
I’d appreciate it if you could cite a source for that. (If it’s
right, I must have been reading the wrong texts!)
Gary f.
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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