Helmut

        Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God'
rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are
logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

        I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the
view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My
understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF
MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a
process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a
semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the
R-I.

        Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this
mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My
understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by
developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to
develop as morphological forms. 

        Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the
term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept
that 'all signs are one'....seems to me to ignore these laws or
habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent
[we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics,
biology] - can or should they be ignored?

        And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a
swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these
normative rules of formation are relatively stable and
scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can
conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

        In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it,
where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that
all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that
easily. 

        Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
  Edwina, All,   I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing:
Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest
consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not
scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are
connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say
that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the
universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each
other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due
to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or
are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs,
such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not?
Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide
such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared
illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe"
(whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things
(justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it
is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is
unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist
because it is not proved.   Helmut     21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list  

        I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever. 

        Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 

        I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity? 

        I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interaction....and becomes an Immediate Object.  Therefore - does
this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the
Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm
of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality? 

        And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not
necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad. 

        Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these
discussions. 

        Edwina 
 On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:         John, Jon, List   John quoted Jon, then wrote:       
Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:     > If each of my premisses is true, and
the form of my argumentation     > is valid --which it unquestionably
is, as demonstrated below --     > then the conclusion must also be
true; i.e., my argumentation     > is sound.           JS: That is
the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would     never
state or accept any such claim.        Nonsense. To begin with, Jon
is claiming nothing more than what a deductive syllogism can. There
is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it whatsoever. And you
should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic").
It's intellectually unbecoming.    Here's a version of the syllogism
Jon offers:                         Semeiotic Argumentation for the
Reality of God.               
    * 
    *Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is
a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR] 
    *The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence
that Peirce claimed this, GR] 
    *The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
[this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed
"necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object
Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR]. 
   John wrote:        JS: First, your premises are your
interpretations of Peirce's writings     taken from different
contexts where he was focusing on different     topics.          GR: 
Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's
one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's
Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows
Peirce's strong suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God  (and elsewhere) in the context of certain basic
semeiotic principles.    John wrote:        JS: As Peirce himself
said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized     version of
language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest    
weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.    
   GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this?
And whose thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think
further about what Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument."
Personally, I am very interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm
between religion and science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts
tend toward that desideratum. 
        JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing,
and using     the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still
at the     forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept
any     reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably"
precise,     valid, and sound -- not even his own.        We should
all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever ways seems
productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in ordinary
language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this discursive
reasoning ought demonstrate that point. Meanwhile, and again, a
deductive syllogism is sound as long as the premises are asserted to
be true, and there is nothing "anti-Peircean" about that (just
consider the myriad deductive syllogisms Peirce offers in his work).
        JS: Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics
enabled     him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a
way     that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost  
  anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything    
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the    
original quotations by Peirce.        GR: And yet you have written
discursively extensively about Peirce's thought, sometimes offering
supporting quotes, often not, occasionally offering EGs. I do not see
any Peirce scholars "translating each statement by Peirce to an EG,"
etc., you included.          JS:  Peirce developed his methodeutic as
a "critic" of reasoning.       Diagrammatic reasoning is the
centerpiece, and EGs are his       preferred system.  If you want to
make any claim that resembles       the one at the top of this note,
you must translate each statement       by Peirce to an EG, translate
your statements to EGs, and apply       the EG rules of inference to
derive the conclusion.          GR: That may be your ideal, and even
were it Peirce's, again, you yourself do not do that, and it is
impossible for anyone to do so on an email list.
          JS: If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But
if you       refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of
words.          GR: I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while
insulting and hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to
accept your "help" that  he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words"
is, in my opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.    Again, you
ought to stop this intellectual assault. "Blocking the way of inquiry
is the worst possible sin." John Sowa . Best,   Gary R               
                  Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New
York 
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       On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:13 PM John F Sowa  wrote: On
5/20/2019 4:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
 > If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
 > is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
 > then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
 > is sound.
 That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would
 never state or accept any such claim.
 First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
 taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
 topics.  The meanings of words, even for Peirce, shift subtly
 from one context to another.
 As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized
 version of language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest
 weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.
 Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
 the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
 forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept any
 reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
 valid, and sound -- not even his own.
 Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
 him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
 that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
 anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything
 Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
 original quotations by Peirce.
 Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
 Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
 preferred system.  If you want to make any claim that resembles
 the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
 by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
 the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.
 If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But if you
 refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.
 John    
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