Gary F, list
I would like to commend Gary F for his clear and excellent outline
of the two worlds in which we live, "we live in two worlds, the world
of fact and the world of fancy' [1.321].
As an atheist, my 'fancy' about the nature of the material and
empirical world is that it is generated by the self-organized
development of innate Mind - a belief which I can no more prove as
'the truth' than can anyone prove the existence of an external
Object, named 'God'.
Of course, I consider that I can find support for this view within
the Peircean texts - but - with the flexibility of our own minds and
interpretations, I acknowledge that some will deny this and instead,
assert that Peirce supports their very different theistic view.
However, what is important, I think, is to acknowledge these two
worlds of 'fact and fancy' - and acknowledge our own role in their
differentiation and their function.
Edwina
On Thu 23/05/19 10:17 AM , [email protected] sent:
Jon, list,
My previous message, like all of my posts, was formatted in HTML, so
I think the formatting must have been lost at your end, Jon. I notice
that your latest message also seems to be in plain text. You should
check the settings of whatever software you use for email to make
sure it properly displays HTML-formatted messages instead of
converting them to plain text.
The Peircean distinction I have referred to in this thread is a
conceptual one, not merely a verbal one, and Peirce expresses it in
various ways. Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can
be conveyed by a sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed
by the sign because the interpreter must already have it in mind in
order for the sign to “tell about it.” I’m sure you are
familiar with the distinction, as you have mentioned it yourself in
previous posts to the list. In my statement of the distinction I used
the word “acquaintance” for (2) because that is the term for it
most often used by Peirce, and I chose “knowledge” for (1)
because your claim is that knowledge of God is conveyed by the
Universe as Sign. The fact that Peirce sometimes uses the more
technical term “information” for (1), and sometimes used
“acquaintance” in reference to a kind of knowledge, has no
bearing on the validity of the distinction. You can find most (but
not all) of the texts where Peirce makes the distinction by searching
for the word “collateral”, but I see no need to copy them all
here.
JAS: If "God" is indeed "the definable proper name," then might it
not also be the exception to the rule that acquaintance with the
Object of a Sign requires Collateral Experience/Observation?
GF: Quite possibly; and that would explain why “knowledge of
God” is indeed exceptional, and not at all like our knowledge of
Peirce or any person who has existed. But that would not be what I
call positive knowledge, in the usual Peircean sense of
“positive,” the sense in which mathematics is not a positive
science but logic and semiotics are positive sciences. As I mentioned
earlier, I distinguish between knowing and believing, not on the basis
of one being more “certain” than the other, but in the sense that
knowledge is the goal of the positive sciences which practice
inductive hypothesis-testing, while belief is defined pragmatically
as a cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. The essential
difference between science and religion, as I use those words, is
that science aims at theoretical knowledge in the sense I’m using
here, while religion aims at guiding the practical conduct of its
believers. Looking at them this way, religion and science are not
opposed but complementary. Scientists have a core belief that the
universe is intelligible, which guides their practice of science;
religious believers cannot actually conduct themselves in the real
world or live up to their religious ideals without applying some
factual knowledge which is not given by revelation. As Einstein put
it, religion without science is blind, and science without religion
is lame.
JAS: I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces [in
the observable Universe]; I see His "fingerprints" all over the
Universe, and I also consider certain writings to be revelations from
God Himself. Perhaps this is where faith comes into play, another
theological rather than philosophical issue.
GF: As I explained a few messages back, God being the Creator of
the whole Universe means that it’s not honest to claim some aspects
of the Universe (and not others) as reflecting the attributes of God.
To believe that God is benign is indeed a matter of faith. The
religion I subscribe to, which we call “the Bahá'í Faith”,
likewise sees all created things as signs of a benign God, and
considers certain scriptures to be specially “revealed” by God
through individuals singled out to serve that purpose. So I can say
that I believe these things, meaning that I accept Bahá'í
teachings generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. But I
do not claim to know these things — except in a Bahá'í context,
where the verb “know” often means “have faith in”. (I have
occasionally seen scriptures that use the word “Know” in the
imperative, which would be nonsense in a non-religious context,
because you can’t order someone (or will yourself) to have factual
knowledge.) In every other context, including the Peirce list, I use
the words “know” and “knowledge” only in reference to factual
and fallible cognition. It is in this sense that I pronounce the
Creator to be unknowable. By the way, I can also affirm the
unknowability of God in a Bahá'í context, but not in the same
sense, because Bahá'í belief is that He is unknowable “in His
Essence”, which leaves a loophole for revelation. But I promised
not to say anything about theology, and I hope this will suffice to
illustrate my rather strict distinction between belief and knowledge
— a distinction emphasized more by me than by Peirce.
GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such
as real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable
tokens of Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce,
God the Creator is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a
person with a proper name, and not a general.
JAS: On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists
is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are
essentially the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person
is only a particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892).
Accordingly, if God is a real person Who does not exist, then He is
not an individual, but a real general.
GF: Here you are equivocating on the use of the term individual.
I’m sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” person
is not an individual in the strict logical sense. You are also
familiar with the difference between common nouns, which are names of
generals, and proper nouns or names, which designate individuals such
as persons. Since “God” is, as Peirce says, a proper name, God is
an individual person — unless, as per your suggestion above,
“God” is an exception to the usual grammatical rule. Normally a
proper name refers to an Individual, as Peirce affirms in this
passage that you yourself quoted:
CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is
existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent
individual knowledge of the individual it names. It is then, and
then only, a genuine Index. The next time one meets with it, one
regards it as an Icon of that Index. The habitual acquaintance with
it having been acquired, it becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant
represents it as an Icon of an Index of the Individual named. (CP
2.329; 1903)
JAS: What was the "percept or other equivalent individual knowledge"
that was "existentially connected" with Peirce's name in that initial
encounter?
GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had
collateral experience of such names designating individuals who have
written books, and of such names being mentioned by other writers in
my experience of reading; also the experience of searching for
replicas of that name in the reasonable expectation that I could find
indices of something he had written, and thus eventually acquire a
replica of such a text by means of which I also had collateral
experience. Need I go on? or point out that none of this collateral
experience applies to the proper name “God”? Having seen images
of many of his manuscripts, I can honestly say that I recognize
Peirce’s handwriting. I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s
handwriting; nor do I recognize the content of the Bible as written
by anyone other than human beings. Authors can bear witness to the
feeling of being inspired, I can even say that myself, but I have no
experience of other authors being inspired, only of the testimony
that they choose to express in that form.
Here again is the passage of which I highlighted parts in bold which
did not come through to your screen. I hope you can see it this time.
[CSP:[ As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if
that principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be
accepted, the equivocal language will soon disappear. For realis and
realitas are not ancient words. They were invented to be terms of
philosophy in the thirteenth century, and the meaning they were
intended to express is perfectly clear. That is real which has such
and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those
characters or not. At any rate, that is the sense in which the
pragmaticist uses the word. Now, just as conduct controlled by
ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the
nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable habits and
not quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental
circumstances, and in that sense may be said to be destined; so,
thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the
fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which
will be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of
whole generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate
fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually assumes that it
is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously
discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of “real,”
the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion
is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be general.
Consequently, some general objects are real. (Of course, nobody ever
thought that all generals were real; but the scholastics used to
assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no,
experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay
just there, and not in holding that generals could be real.) One is
struck with the inexactitude of thought even of analysts of power,
when they touch upon modes of being. One will meet, for example, the
virtual assumption that what is relative to thought cannot be real.
But why not, exactly? Red is relative to sight, but the fact that
this or that is in that relation to vision that we call being red is
not itself relative to sight; it is a real fact. ] CP 5.430, EP
2:342-343 ]
GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious
discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on
experiential evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can
afford us neither acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential
evidence that the Creator is really the subject of any particular
predicate, for the simple reason that no such hypothesis is testable
by observation.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 22-May-19 00:14
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was,
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited
Gary F., List:
GF: I took this claim of yours to be based on a confusion of
acquaintance with knowledge, overlooking Peirce’s frequent
distinction between the two and his stipulation that acquaintance can
only come from collateral experience, or collateral observation, and
cannot be given by signs.
Let me quote again the passage with which you began this exchange,
since I gather that you are taking it as a basis for positing a sharp
distinction between acquaintance and knowledge.
CSP: The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It
cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for
that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely,
that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some
further information concerning it. No doubt there will be readers who
will say they cannot comprehend this. They think a Sign need not
relate to anything otherwise known, and can make neither head nor
tail of the statement that every Sign must relate to such an Object.
But if there be anything that conveys information and yet has
absolutely no relation nor reference to anything with which the
person to whom it conveys the information has, when he comprehends
that information, the slightest acquaintance, direct or indirect--and
a very strange sort of information that would be--the vehicle of that
sort of information is not, in this volume, called a Sign. (CP 2.231;
1910)
Two key words are missing here--"knowledge" and "collateral."
First, Peirce was contrasting acquaintance with information, rather
than knowledge; in fact, I have not yet been able to find any passage
where Peirce explicitly distinguished acquaintance and knowledge.
Since you called it his "frequent distinction," could you please
provide some citations? What are your (or his) definitions of
acquaintance and knowledge in this context? Second, Peirce did not
explicitly equate acquaintance with what he elsewhere called
Collateral Experience/Observation. However, he did distinguish two
different kinds of acquaintance--direct and indirect--without
explaining what their differences might be.
I agree that acquaintance with the Object of a Sign comes from
Collateral Experience/Observation, because (as you noted) that is
precisely the requirement that Peirce specified elsewhere for
identifying the Objects of a Proposition as denoted by the Semes that
serve as its subjects. What remains unclear to me is the warrant for
thinking that such acquaintance cannot be given by Signs at all,
implying that it must always be direct. What do you suppose that
Peirce meant by indirect acquaintance, if not acquaintance mediated
entirely by previous Signs? How else could he claim that "long study
of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance" (CP 6.502; c.
1906)? How else can you and I now be acquainted with Peirce, such
that the man himself is the Object of that proper name when we utter
or interpret Propositions about him?
There is also a specific kind of acquaintance that Peirce explicitly
denied to be collateral at all--"acquaintance with the system of
signs," because it is "the prerequisite for getting any idea
signified by the sign" (CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909). If "God" is
indeed "the definable proper name," then might it not also be the
exception to the rule that acquaintance with the Object of a Sign
requires Collateral Experience/Observation? Just a thought.
GF: Yes; we are not in the same situation re knowledge of God as we
are re knowledge of existent beings (such as Peirce) who have left
observable traces of their presence in the Universe.
I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces; I see His
"fingerprints" all over the Universe, and I also consider certain
writings to be revelations from God Himself. Perhaps this is where
faith comes into play, another theological rather than philosophical
issue.
GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such
as real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable
tokens of Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce,
God the Creator is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a
person with a proper name, and not a general.
On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists is
individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are
essentially the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person
is only a particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892).
Accordingly, if God is a real person Who does not exist, then He is
not an individual, but a real general.
GF: As Peirce says, we need some index to direct our attention to a
subject before we can assign attributes to it and thus have any
knowledge of it.
Again, what was the index that first directed our attention to a man
who lived and died before we were born, Charles Sanders Peirce, when
we knew absolutely nothing at all about him? Was it not a Sign, his
proper name, at that point completely unfamiliar to us? How did we
subsequently acquire the extensive knowledge that we now have of him?
Was it not entirely mediated by other Signs?
CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is
existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent
individual knowledge of the individual it names. It is then, and then
only, a genuine Index. The next time one meets with it, one regards it
as an Icon of that Index. The habitual acquaintance with it having
been acquired, it becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant represents it
as an Icon of an Index of the Individual named. (CP 2.329; 1903)
What was the "percept or other equivalent individual knowledge" that
was "existentially connected" with Peirce's name in that initial
encounter? It seems that only one such occasion is sufficient to
establish Collateral Experience/Observation with the Object of any
proper name; and what did Peirce say about God in this respect?
CSP: In considering personality, that philosophy [synechism] is
forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God; but in considering
communication, it cannot but admit that if there is a personal God,
we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in
personal communication with him. Now, if that be the case, the
question arises how it is possible that the existence [ sic] of this
being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer that
I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and
eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the
ones most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time
immemorial. (CP 6.162; 1892)
If someone has a "direct perception of" God and "personal
communication with" Him, then that would seem to qualify as
Collateral Experience/Observation once His proper name is
existentially connected with those events; and Peirce also offered
his best guess at why, nevertheless, not everyone believes that He is
real.
GF: Here we reach the point where I think your argument goes
astray: your assertion that anything real must be knowable. To
explain why I think so, I will quote the entire paragraph which is
the context of the phrase you have quoted, highlighting in bold the
parts that call your assertion into question.
Unfortunately, the bold was missing from what you actually posted,
so I will hold off on further comment and ask you first to provide
the quote with the formatting that you intended.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 8:28 AM wrote:
Jon, I think we’re getting closer to the heart of the matter,
which is (and
has been) the nature of knowledge. I think Jeff’s most recent post
showing
the complexity of the object-sign relation also contributes greatly
to this
discussion, but in this post I’ll just insert some answers to your
questions, along with some other comments, trying to further clarify
the
issue.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt < [email protected] [4]>
Sent: 20-May-19 12:09
JAS: Thank you for further clarifying your objection. Initially it
was
that God is completely separated from His creation, and thus absent
from the
Universes of Experience.
GF: Yes, that was what you appeared to be claiming with your
stipulation
that the Object must be external to the Sign which is the Universe.
But you
amended that by saying that God is not completely separate from the
Universe, so then came the next step:
JAS: When I disputed this, it was that our acquaintance with God
must be
entirely mediated by Signs.
GF: That was your counter-claim to my claim that acquaintance with
an
Object is a prerequisite for knowledge of it, which is indeed
mediated by
signs (i.e. propositions). I took this claim of yours to be based on
a
confusion of acquaintance with knowledge, overlooking Peirce’s
frequent
distinction between the two and his stipulation that acquaintance
can only
come from collateral experience, or collateral observation, and
cannot be
given by signs. As he put it, “the proper way in logic is to take
as the
subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be
conveyed
in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of
its
interpreter is requisite” (NEM 3:885, 1908).
JAS: Since I pointed out that we are in the same situation with
respect to
anyone who lived or anything that happened before we were born, you
noted
that those people and events existed, but God did not and does
not--as
Peirce himself explicitly affirmed, which is why he specifically
argued for
the Reality of God instead.
GF: Yes; we are not in the same situation re knowledge of God as we
are re
knowledge of existent beings (such as Peirce) who have left
observable
traces of their presence in the Universe.
JAS: Please do not misinterpret this as an accusation of moving the
goalposts; I am simply explaining the progression of my own
understanding of
your position during the course of our exchange so far. Am I
correct that
the non-existence of God is what you find problematic for our
ability to
acquire knowledge of Him?
GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such
as real
generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens of
Types.
But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the Creator
is the
name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a proper
name, and
not a general. I have said that this Person has not left observable
traces
of His presence in the Universe, and you haven’t disputed that. As
Peirce
says, we need some index to direct our attention to a subject before
we can
assign attributes to it and thus have any knowledge of it.
(Certainty is not
the issue here, as all positive knowledge is fallible, though quite
distinct
from belief.)
If so, then one possible response from me would be to invoke the
Christian
doctrine of the Incarnation; however, I will respect your preference
not to
delve any further into theology at this point. Instead, I will
stick to
relevant Peircean concepts and texts.
GF: Thanks for that, and in return, I’ll spare you an account of
how
Muslims and Bahá'ís get around the problem of knowing the
unknowable. 😊
JAS: In thinking about all of this over the last couple of days, I
noticed
the same thing that you did about the first sentence of "A Neglected
Argument" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)--Peirce considered "God" to be
"the
definable proper name" (emphasis in original), implying that it is
the only
such case; and he then specified what it signifies, not what it
denotes. In
other words, the Immediate Interpretant of "God" (so capitalized) is
"Ens
necessarium, in my [Peirce's] belief Really creator of all three
Universes
of Experience"; and my current understanding of Speculative Grammar
is that
the Immediate Object of "God" is whatever it possibly could denote
in
English accordingly.
GF: OK. But notice that I am not questioning the reality of God the
Creator. I don’t take that to be a universally instinctive belief
or
hypothesis as Peirce does, but I don’t question his honesty in
declaring it
to be his belief. What I question is whether that belief has the
pragmaticistic meaning that he says it does, despite its object
being
“infinitely incomprehensible.”
What you seem to be questioning is how we can know that "God"
actually does
denote something as its Dynamic Object—
GF: No, I’m willing to assume that that proper name does denote
something.
What I question is how we can know anything about that Entity
defined as Ens
necessarium. (Of course a definition does not count as positive
knowledge.)
i.e., how it can serve as a subject of a Proposition that we are
able to
evaluate as either true or false, which would require previous
Collateral
Experience or current Collateral Observation in order to be
understood at
all. According to Peirce, if God is Real then He has "Properties,
i.e.
characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these
whether
they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men,
or not"
(CP 6.453, EP 2:434; 1908). However, he already expressed
dissatisfaction
with that particular formulation in his Logic Notebook the month
before it
appeared in print.
CSP: As to the Real, I have decided within the last few days that
my
definition in The Hibbert Journal was not advisable, since it gives
rise to
a multitude of perplexing problems of little or no meaning. It is
better to
say that that which truly possesses an attribute independently of
the latter
being attributed to the former by any single finite mind or single
group of
such minds is, in so far, Real, thus avoiding those insoluble &
nonsensical
problems. (R 339:476[322r]; 1908 Sep 9)
It is thus possessing characters independently of them being
attributed to
it, rather than the sufficiency of those characters to identify it,
that
makes something Real. In other words, whether or not we are able to
identify God by His attributes has no bearing on His Reality; only
that He
possesses those attributes regardless of what anyone thinks about
them.
GF: Right! And how do we learn by experience whether a subject
really has
an attribute independently of anyone attributing that character to
that
subject? We formulate a hypothesis and then test it in some way that
would
refute it if it were not true (or less conclusively, confirm it if
it is
true). This testing requires some actual observation which is honest
enough
not to fudge the data or prejudge the question. There’s the rub:
in order to
know that the Creator is really benign (for instance), apart from
your (or
anyone’s) belief that He is, you would have to test that
hypothesis by
observing the unobservable. That is one of the paradoxes involved in
the
claim that the Creator is even ideally knowable, which would have to
be the
case if knowledge of the Creator is the very purpose of Creation.
As I have noted previously, this is a verbal definition of Reality,
at the
second grade of clarity; the pragmaticistic definition, at the third
grade
of clarity, is "the state of things which [would] be believed in
that
ultimate opinion" (CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343; 1905) after infinite
inquiry by
an infinite community.
GF: Sorry, I don’t see that the differences between “grades of
clarity”
have any bearing on the very possibility of knowledge. Here we reach
the
point where I think your argument goes astray: your assertion that
anything
real must be knowable. To explain why I think so, I will quote the
entire
paragraph which is the context of the phrase you have quoted,
highlighting
in bold the parts that call your assertion into question. (The
italics are
Peirce’s.)
[CSP:[ As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if
that
principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be accepted,
the
equivocal language will soon disappear. For realis and realitas are
not
ancient words. They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the
thirteenth century, and the meaning they were intended to express is
perfectly clear. That is real which has such and such characters,
whether
anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, that
is the
sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word. Now, just as conduct
controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of
conduct,
the nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable habits
and not
quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental
circumstances, and
in that sense may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by
a
rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain
opinions,
equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end,
however
the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the
postponement of
the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually
assumes
that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he seriously
discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of “real,”
the state of
things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real. But,
for the
most part, such opinions will be general. Consequently, some general
objects
are real. (Of course, nobody ever thought that all generals were
real; but
the scholastics used to assume that generals were real when they had
hardly
any, or quite no, experiential evidence to support their assumption;
and
their fault lay just there, and not in holding that generals could
be real.)
One is struck with the inexactitude of thought even of analysts of
power,
when they touch upon modes of being. One will meet, for example, the
virtual
assumption that what is relative to thought cannot be real. But why
not,
exactly? Red is relative to sight, but the fact that this or that is
in that
relation to vision that we call being red is not itself relative to
sight;
it is a real fact. ] CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343 ]
GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious
discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on
experiential
evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can afford us
neither
acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the
Creator is
really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple
reason that
no such hypothesis is testable by observation. For this reason I
think what
you say next is wrong:
Consequently, if anything is Real--even it does not now, never has,
and
never will exist--then it must be knowable; and presumably you will
agree
that we do have knowledge of some non-existent Realities. Again,
how is
that possible? And why would God be any different? Are you perhaps
suggesting that entia rationis are the only non-existent Realities
that are
knowable?
GF: That’s not what I had in mind, but it may be so — if such
things as
processes are entia rationis. But that’s another question, quite
apart from
the knowability of the Creator.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Links:
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