Edwina, Stephen J., List, Edwina, thanks for your good wishes for my travels. I'll be heading to the airport soon, but before I left I wanted to suggest that since your present discussion on patriarchy/matriarchy seems not at all Peirce-related that if you want to continue it that you consider taking it off-list.
Best, Gary R (writing as list moderator) *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 8:32 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Stephen, list > > I disagree; I think that there are both matriarchal [very few] and > patriarchal cultures - and I don't define them as you do, based on the > educational role of each gender, but on the economic role of that gender in > the society. > > That is, the society must politically privilege the gender that provides > the economic wealth and sustenance of the society. By politically > privilege, I mean that this gender is given the social authority to 'make > decisions'. As I outlined, a population whose economic sustenance is based > on the hard work of agriculture and domestication of animals, will > privilege the male - and give men the legal authority to make economic and > legal decisions. > > Our modern economy no longer requires the physical strength of the male > and therefore, privileging the male is no longer functional. Changing the > mindset of the population, however, takes time. That is, the cultural mores > and attitudes that supported this basic economic decision last longer than > the economic function. I usually say that it takes three generations to > change a cultural belief! But I don't think that there is anything 'more > moral' about gender equality in a society - because, as I said, it's really > an economic function and not an issue of 'the best moral way to behave'. We > humans ADD all this moral and cultural rhetoric to an economic function - > to make that function stable. But 'morally' - I don't think that this is > the issue. > > My concern now is the disappearance of the functional nuclear family. That > has far-reaching social implications which I suspect most of us aren't even > aware of. > > Edwina > > > > > > On Fri 31/05/19 7:36 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" [email protected] sent: > > Mary, list > > I am of the view that there is no such thing as patriarchal culture. The > role of Culture is to process the relationship between the known and the > unknown. Hence all cultures are comprised of the duality that is > matriarchal-patriarchal. [This relates to my interest in the concept of > "knowing how to be" (Dasein)]. > > The focus of the matriarchal role is the cultural known, and emphasis is > on maintaining traditions, security, cohesion. It is the mother that > introduces the child to the cultural known. It is from the mother that the > child first learns to define the things that matter (pragmatism). The > matriarchal role resists entropy. > > The focus of the patriarchal role is the cultural unknown, and emphasis is > on evolution, change, direction. It is the father that teaches the child > about transcendence (or otherwise) beyond the cultural known. The > patriarchal role confronts entropy, and tests the limits of the cultural > known. > > Another way of stating all of this. At the gates to the cultural known > stands the mother. At the gates to the unknown beyond culture stands the > father. THIS is why the spiritual role, throughout all of history's > sustainable religions, has always been governed by the patriarchal > dimension, and why the nurturing role, throughout all cultures, has been > governed by the matriarchal dimension. > > The tragedy of feminism is its trivialization of the all-important > matriarchal dimension. Inequality is that which forces people into roles > that they are not naturally predisposed to playing out. Only equal > opportunity is fair and just. Equal outcome, by contrast, is bias. The > inequality that today most urgently needs to be addressed is the forced > inequality of equal outcome. > > Regards > sj > > > From: Mary Libertin [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, May 31, 2019 4:52 AM > To: [email protected] > Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L > Subject: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, > [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisite > > Edwina, Gary R, Gene, list, > > The usage of the term *patriarchy* in our recent posts fascinates me. Gene > and I state the fact that we live in a patriarchy. Saying that does not > elevate us any more than do the excellent arguments of Edwina and Richard > elevate themselves. > > Tone is a Peircean concept and one which could be well used. I don’t know > how to do so effectively, (insert smiley face 😀) I would have hoped the > tone in my comments early on would have led others to accept/be more aware > of my feelings about my being more comfortable as a Peircean than a > theological trinitarian. I am working within the system to change it, as > Gary eloquently and hopefully leads by example. My wife and I will be > introduced as new > members of our local episcopal church on Sunday. We are not only working > within religion but also within patriarchy. > > I am cavalier with the word *patriarchy*, perhaps, but inequality needs to > be addressed. Isn’t that either a Christian and/or a Peircean? I feel so > much more hopeful and grounded because of your comments. I’ll not post > again on this topic. > > Cheers, Mary Libertin > > > > Thanks for the > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:16 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > Gary R, Gene, Mary, list > I don't think that the term 'patriarchy' merits the 'we are now superior > to this idea' sneers and condescension one sometimes associates with the > term. I think one should look at the system-of-patriarchy as a rational > means of organizing a population of a particular size and a particular > economic mode. > That is - hunting and gathering economies are SMALL - around 30 people in > a band. Their economic mode is just that: hunting 'what is there' and > gathering 'what is there'. These people do not own the land or its goods. > When they've 'eaten their way out of a terrain', they must migrate. The > metaphysical or religious ideology is animism - with multiple spirits and > multiple gods. And, neither patriarch or matriarchy - because, again, this > economic mode is not based on land or goods ownership or production. And it > can only support SMALL populations. > Horticulture and pastoral nomadism - emerges in biomes where the land > enables SOME agriculture and SOME small scale ownership of animals. The > populations remain small but are larger than the H&G - possibly in the > hundreds and thousands. Patriarchy is found among pastoral nomadism. Why? > Because the economy is based around the work-of-the-men. > And that's the key. Any society must socially and politically privilege > whichever gender or group provides the economic infrastructure of the > group. So- a pastoral nomadic economy, which requires the men to herd and > control the animals - will be patriarchal. It will also be patrilineal - > for the, eg, cattle, must be passed on to the next generation 'as a whole', > not split up into one cow here and one cow there. So, the eldest son will > inherit the whole herd. > Religious? Multiple gods. Polytheism. > The next larger societal mode will be settled agriculture - an economic > mode that requires inherited and stable land bases, ownership of > domesticated animals, and a lot of hard physical labour. So again, quite > naturally, it will be patriarchal and patrilineal. Nothing mean or > subversive about it - but a logical, rational social decision. And - with > this economic mode, you get the capacity to support large populations in > the hundreds of thousands. AND - you then get monotheism...one supreme god. > Edwina > > > > On Thu 30/05/19 6:50 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected] sent: > Gene, Mary, List, > > Gene quoted me: > Gary R: “one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ (the > Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the Father > through God the Son.” > GR: I imagine that there are at least some Christians--especially those > who think along the Trinitarian lines I've outlined--who might say and > believe something like this. In addition, in many progressive communities > and churches such as mine, Riverside Church in Manhattan, one is not at all > unlikely to hear words like "Mother-Father God" coming from the pulpit > (btw, the Senior Minister is a woman, Amy Butler), and to hear prayers > where 'Creator' substitutes for 'Father', etc. The patriarchy is seen to be > the problematic 'thing' which it is. > GH: Peirce’s first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay, saw through father-son > patriarchalism, and grasped how it abstracted the mother, the third part of > a family trinity, to ethereal spirit. And “ Mary as the Mother of God” and > “the Holy Family” remain alienating veils, as Ludwig Feuerbach pointed out, > masking through abstraction the earthly family. > GR: Fay was perhaps more than anything else a feminist in her public life. > I don't know whether she "saw through" anything, while a growing sense of > patriarchy was dawning on especially English and American women in her day. > More to the substantive point, there is a tendency in all religions that I > know of to employ symbols pointing to the noumenal, to the Holy, to God. > But it's important not to confuse the finger pointing to the moon with that > which it only indicates. And while fundamentalism involves just that > confusion and conflation, not all religious people are so confused. This is > especially important, I think, as one because more critically aware of such > problematics as our patriarchal history. Meanwhile, folk like me have not > found it necessary to throw the baby (God) out with the bathwater (what > needs to be radically rethought and reconstructed in religion). > There's not much in history (both East and West with few exceptions) which > is not to some considerable extent patriarchal, for example, nearly all > institutions, including most religious ones as well as religion more > generally speaking (with such exceptions as certain--but not all--primal > indigenous religions). Some of us who are, for example, members of one of > the monotheistic religions are today dealing with this history as best we > can. Religious symbolism is--as all symbolism is and must be-- interpreted, > and that interpretation can grow, deepen; or, contrariwise and even > perversely, it can rigidify, for example, to aim at excluding those who > don't conform to its dogmas. > GH: And apart from obvious patriarchalism, there is also the obvious > anthropocentrism. The human family as religious model, though perhaps a > good starter for relational thinking for the anthropocentric humans > predominant today, is simply too confined, too human-all-too-human, to > provide a basis for a sustainable religion. > As you've suggested, anthropocentrism--and perhaps especially the > relations within the human family--quasi-necessarily plays an important > role in the creation and development of religions East and West. Peirce > suggested that it was natural and necessary that we conceive of God as at > least in some ways like a person, although even that conception is, of > course, itself symbolic--as so much of religion is. Yet, as Peirce argued, > "symbols grow," and, as Gary Fuhrman put it in a recent blog post titled > "Do Symbols Grow?" > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2019/05/do-symbols-grow/ > <http://parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fgnusystems.ca%2Fwp%2F2019%2F05%2Fdo-symbols-grow%2F> > "as new meanings for a symbol develop, old ones fall away and die." And we > can establish our social 'would-bes' in the direction of the worst meanings > falling away and dying while the best are nurtured and grow. > > GH: The idea that “Man is made in God’s Image” is a conceit of human > exceptionalism, a product of the historical development of the > anthropocentric mentality. If you grant a creator, all living beings are > made in the creator’s image, except for that human subset of > anthropocentric humans, who are made from their own idolatry. Nietzsche > asked, “Which is it: is man one of God’s blunders, or is God one of man’s > blunders?” ( Twilight of the Idols, 1889). Sadly, both may be true. > > Feuerbach, who not only influenced the problematic Nietzsche, who, in my > opinion, one ought to have outgrown by the time one leaves ones > intellectual adolescence when nihilist intellectual brilliance had been so > seductive. Yes, Feuerbach influenced not only Nietzsche but also that > arch-antiSemite. Wagner (read his thoroughly disgusting essay "The Jew in > Music" if you have any doubt of that), Hitler's favorite composer. And > Nietzsche appears to have been the Nazis' favorite philosopher. Übermensch > indeed! > > So, we have lost our innocence if we ever had it. Were those > 'hunter-gatherers' you so admire, Gene, really so pure of heart? Whether > the answer is yes or no, we will most certainly never be hunter-gatherers > again. All we can hope to do is to try to correct some of the errors which > led to our blood-stained history. Oh, sure, one can point to the > Inquisition and the bloody crusades, but Mao, Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, > etc., etc. tortured and murdered millions--and not in the name of God. And > the misuse of religion by politicians, for example, is patent, perhaps most > especially in the USA. > > In the Christian church which I attend, Riverside Church > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riverside_Church > <http://parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FRiverside_Church> > we interpret the Gospel as strongly suggesting that we ought act together > towards achieving social justice in our communities and beyond. Riverside > is an inter-faith, inter-racial, LGBTQ welcoming place where one might hear > a sermon by a Rabbi one Sunday, an Imam another, a gay or transgender > Christian minister another, etc. Here are some of our social justice > ministries and initiatives: > > *Maranatha ministry: fostering greater understanding of the LGBTQ > community. I am on a committee which awards three scholarships to LGBTQ > college students actively working within their educational institutions to > this end. > *Prison Ministry: supporting incarcerated men and women to obtain justice > and services within the New York State prison system. > *Coming Home: empowering those men and women who have been imprisoned and > need support and opportunities to reenter their communities. > *Beloved Earth: helping the community to become good stewards of the Earth > (we plant trees and do much more). > *Sojourners: works with immigrants in detention centers > > And there are other social-justice initiatives including a nationwide > anti-gun violence program. > > As for the Holy Spirit, as a Person of the Trinity, She more than anything > else represents a personification of the Love between the other two Persons > of the Trinity involving the idea of the possibility of our living this > love in our human relations as we come more and more to consecrate our > lives to truly valuing the lives around us, and the Earth which is surely > our Mother. The patriarchal grip can be broken in religion, but not by > disparaging it out of hand. And, further, it is possible to have, as it > seems to me that Peirce did, a conception of science which is neither naive > nor at odds with science. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > Virus-free. http://www.avg.com"; target="_blank">www.avg.com > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 5:15 PM Eugene Halton <[email protected]> > wrote: > Gary R: “one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ (the > Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the Father > through God the Son.” > Peirce’s first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay, saw through father-son > patriarchalism, and grasped how it abstracted the mother, the third part of > a family trinity, to ethereal spirit. And “Mary as the Mother of God” and > “the Holy Family” remain alienating veils, as Ludwig Feuerbach pointed out, > masking through abstraction the earthly family. > And apart from obvious patriarchalism, there is also the obvious > anthropocentrism. The human family as religious model, though perhaps a > good starter for relational thinking for the anthropocentric humans > predominant today, is simply too confined, too human-all-too-human, to > provide a basis for a sustainable religion. > The idea that “Man is made in God’s Image” is a conceit of human > exceptionalism, a product of the historical development of the > anthropocentric mentality. If you grant a creator, all living beings are > made in the creator’s image, except for that human subset of > anthropocentric humans, who are made from their own idolatry. Nietzsche > asked, “Which is it: is man one of God’s blunders, or is God one of man’s > blunders?” (Twilight of the Idols, 1889). Sadly, both may be true. > Gene Halton > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 3:55 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > Jon, List, > > In an earlier message in this thread I suggested that in order to avoid > confusion, when speaking of trinity without explicit religious > underpinnings that we type the 't' lowercase, but that we capitalize it > when referring to the Trinity of theology. In my message below, Trinity is > almost always capitalized since it means to relate to Peirce's religious > metaphysics in conjunction with his cosmological views, not entirely > separate as I see it. In any case, those who are adverse to theology might > consider skipping reading this post. > > I'm going to be traveling abroad with perhaps limited Internet access > beginning this weekend through the 12th of June, but before I left, I did > want to ask a question that came to mind again regarding Peirce's religious > metaphysics (his cosmological theology, if I may so phrase it). I hinted at > it earlier, but now would like to deepen the question. > > It seems to me that, on the one hand, Peirce suggested, and you have > argued in your Signs paper, Jon (as suggested by the Blackboard metaphor in > the last of the 1898 lectures) that 'before' this Universe came into being, > 'before' there was anything Existent (so 'before' Time, 'before' the > so-called Big Bang), that God, from all the Platonic possibilities, that > is, from all imaginable and unimaginable essential Platonic forms which > might possibly be involved in the creation of some Universe (the Blackboard > metaphor, if I finally have it right), that on a kind of subset of that > Blackboard of ur-continuity--so upon a kind of Whiteboard--He scribed those > potential qualities and characters which would factor in the creation of > this Universe. (Btw, as I understand Peirce, this is not the only possible > universe the Scriber might create, and Peirce hints at a kind of multiverse > theory, one which seems to me quite different from most modern versions of > such theories.) > > However, you also quoted Peirce to the effect that God is creating this > Universe continuously, that the world was not created on some particularly > busy day several thousands of years ago, as Genesis (and, mutatis mutandis, > the Whiteboard metaphor) would have it, but is happening now and will be > happening until the World's end. > > It seems to me that in consideration of the ur-Continuity of the > Blackboard from which God selected those Platonic characters ('Platonic' is > Peirce's word in this context) which would be inscribed on 'our' > Whiteboard, that that Person is, if I understand you correctly, the > semeiotic Object of this Universe, the Creator of the vast evolving Symbol > which is this Cosmos, our Universe. > > But, in consideration of the continuous creation occurring now, it seems > to me that if God the Father is not immanent in this Universe then that > continuous creation must be the ongoing work of He who is God with the > Father but who is not the Father, that is, Christ. And this is one of the > reasons that I introduced this thread on trinity (there are, of course, > others). > > [Note: I have already pointed to some thinkers having a trinitarian view > of the cosmos which is not specifically Christian or even, for that matter, > necessarily religious (although, personally, I don't see how a trinitarian > view of the cosmos wouldn't lead to a Trinitarian and, so, religious one, > while the religion need not be Christianity according to some advocates of > trinitarian thinking).] > > For now this problematic of both an ur-creation leading to the putative > 'Big Bang' and an ongoing continuous creation is resolved in my mind in > imagining that while the First Person of the Trinity (God the Father) is > not immanent in the Universe, is not Himself actively and continuously > creating it, that the Second Person is (whom some, notably Matthew Fox and > Richard Rohr, have referred to as the Cosmic Christ), and that this is the > consequence of the communication between the First and Second Persons via > the Third, viz., the Holy Spirit. I understand this to be expression of the > (evolutionary) Love of all three Persons of the Trinity for God's creation > and for humankind, Man having been made in His image. > > It seems to me that Peirce analyses this trichotomically (i.e., > tri-categorially) and semiotically. However, I'm now suggesting that his > pure categorial analysis speaks to the ur-creation (where there are 'as > yet' no signs as such) while the semeiotic analysis concerns itself > specifically with the on-going creation. In this regard, it also comes to > mind, perhaps not completely irrelevantly, that in Peirce's Classification > of Sciences that Phenomenology (yielding the three Universal Categories) > precedes Logic as Semeiotic, and that Pure Mathematics precedes them both. > > Now you've already noted that this way of thinking--that is, imagining > God, as the Second Person of the Trinity, that is Christ, immanent in and > continuing God, as the First Person, the Father's creation, and in > communion with Him through the Holy Spirit--is something you really haven't > (or, really, even want to) entertain given your conservative Christian > views. But I do not see how God can be both completely 'apart' from His > Creation and yet also 'continuously creating' it. So, again, for me seeing > God as Three-in-One and distinguishing the 'roles' (so to speak) of the > three Persons provides something of an answer to the question I've posed. > > I was introduced to the notion of the Cosmic Christ decades ago while > reading Meister Eckhart's writings and sermons which led me to Fox's work, > especially, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ. I 'rediscovered' the concept > and had it reinforced in the past few years through Rohr's ongoing work. I > hope it's clear that I see it as an uniquely powerful idea, especially > within the context of Peirce cosmological musings. Peirce, as I understand > him, was not a conservative Christian. It seems to me, then, that his > positing Three Universal Categories and Three Universes of Experience might > have made the idea of God the Creator of this Universe offering to it His > Son, the Cosmic Christ at work today, plausible to him. It also helps > reconcile, at least for me, his proto-cosmic thinking in the 1898 Cambridge > House lectures with the several semeiotic analyses you've been considering > and from which you've been extensively quoting, and helps answer the > question of how God can be both apart from His creation and yet continually > creating it. > > Of course, Peirce was generally opposed to theology (although not to > religious metaphysics, the distinction not yet clear to me); and, indeed, > religious experience doesn't require theology. > > As I noted in an early post in this thread, despite what I just wrote as a > Christian, I do not myself see the trinity idea as limited to Christian > theology and, in fact, imagine that it might prove valuable in helping > bridge the divide between religion and science, Peirce's desideratum. I > hope to take up that more general view of trinity in future posts. > > For now I'd be interested in what thoughts you might have on this view of > the Trinity. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 1:36 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > Your previous message came through to me as plain text, rather than HTML; > and my reply went out as HTML, rather than plain text; so I guess that we > will just have to chalk up those formatting issues to cyber-gremlins. :-) > > GF: Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed by > a sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign because > the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign to “tell > about it.” > > Thank you for clarifying this. Rather than knowledge vs. acquaintance, I > associate it with (1) the Interpretant that a Sign signifies and (2) the > Object that a Sign denotes. In a Proposition, these are represented by (1) > the continuous predicate, expressing the relation among the subjects, which > is all that the Proposition itself conveys; and (2) the subjects > themselves, which require previous Collateral Experience or current > Collateral Observation in order to be understood by an interpreter. What > remains unclear to me is why you seem to think that such Collateral > Experience/Observation cannot be entirely mediated by other Signs. If even > a Percept is a Seme (Sign) that Retroductively produces a Perceptual > Judgment, which is a Proposition (Sign), how can we gain acquaintance with > anything in a way that is not entirely mediated by Signs? > > GF: ... knowledge is the goal of the positive sciences which practice > inductive hypothesis-testing, while belief is defined pragmatically as a > cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. > > I do not agree with this restriction of knowledge, nor its sharp > differentiation from belief; after all, its standard modern philosophical > definition is justified true belief. For Peirce, a true belief is one that > would be maintained in the Ultimate Opinion, as a result of infinite > inquiry by an infinite community; and a justified belief is one that is > affirmed because it is the conclusion of a valid Argument--whether > Deductive (certain), Inductive (probable), or Retroductive > (plausible)--whose premisses one already believes. Put another way, a > belief is justified as long as one has no good reason for genuinely > doubting it. From this standpoint, knowledge consists of deliberately > adopted Propositions whose corresponding habits of conduct would never be > confounded by any future experience. > > GF: So I can say that I believe these things, meaning that I accept Bahá'í > teachings generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. But I do not > claim to know these things ... > > I assume that this is not because you do not believe those teachings to be > true, but because you do not believe that you are adequately justified in > believing them, since you apparently insist on "inductive > hypothesis-testing" for that. As you seem to acknowledge, Peirce did not > impose such a limitation; again, for him, it was sufficient that the > Reality of God (for example) is the conclusion of a valid Retroductive > Argument. > > GF: I’m sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” person is not > an individual in the strict logical sense. > > Indeed, every "individual" person is a real general; so even if God is an > "individual" person, He is still a real general. Moreover, we can have no > knowledge of any "individual in the strict logical sense," because that > would require it to be completely determinate ; even less so for God, since > (ex hypothesi) He is "infinitely incomprehensible" (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; > 1908). In fact, this limitation serves as a basis for Peirce's "extreme > scholastic realism"--all Objects of knowledge are general, and some Objects > of knowledge are real; therefore, some generals are real. > > CSP: The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or > thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any > time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time > it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for > any time, however short, does not exist at all. All, therefore, that we > perceive or think, or that exists, is general. So far there is truth in the > doctrine of scholastic realism. But all that exists is infinitely > determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual. > This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That > which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be > made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is > never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP > 3.93n; 1870) > > That which exists would be infinitely determinate at any hypothetical > instant in time, but it is really undergoing continuous change in its > relations, such that every true conception of it--i.e., every Sign for > which it serves as the Dynamic Object, including all our knowledge of > it--is always capable of further determination; even more so for God, since > (ex hypothesi) He is real but does not exist. > > GF: You are also familiar with the difference between common nouns, which > are names of generals, and proper nouns or names, which designate > individuals such as persons. > > Yes, they are grammatically different--but are they logically different? > Both are represented in EGs by labeled Spots, and therefore correspond to > general concepts; while indefinite individuals are represented by > continuous Lines, each of which has an inexhaustible supply of potential > branches to accommodate further determination. "Every Dicisign, as the > system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes, is a further determination > of an already known sign of the same object" (CP 2.320; 1903). > > GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had collateral > experience of such names designating individuals who have written books, > and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my experience of > reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of that name in the > reasonable expectation that I could find indices of something he had > written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a text by means of > which I also had collateral experience. > > Okay, but what was the nature of that previous Collateral Experience? > Again, was it somehow not entirely mediated by other Signs? Consider a more > remote example--Socrates apparently did not write anything himself, so > everything that we know about him and his philosophy comes from the > testimony of others. How can we nevertheless have acquaintance (in your > technical sense) with Socrates? Again, why would God be any different? > > GF: I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s handwriting; nor do I > recognize the content of the Bible as written by anyone other than human > beings. > > Even if we set aside the theological doctrine of special revelation, I > (and many others) do "claim to recognize God's handwriting" all over "the > physico-psychical universe." I am disappointed that you did not > specifically address my comments (and Peirce's) about direct perception of > God and personal communication with Him as candidates for the kind of > Collateral Experience/Observation that would straightforwardly enable Him > to be an Object of Propositions, and therefore an Object of knowledge. Here > are a few other relevant passages. > > CSP: We have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential > reaction, whether of Perception or of Exertion (the one theoretical, the > other practical). These are directly hic et nunc. But we extend the > category, and speak of numberless real objects with which we are not in > direct reaction. We have also direct knowledge of qualities in feeling, > peripheral and visceral. But we extend this category to numberless > characters of which we have no immediate consciousness. (EP 2:304; 1904) > > Direct perception results in direct knowledge, and we can even "extend the > category" to include "real objects with which we are not in direct > reaction" and "characters of which we have no immediate consciousness." > > CSP: There is in the dictionary a word, solipsism, meaning the belief that > the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt such a > belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when a person > finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of their > existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that > they are all hypostatically the same ego. In like manner, when a man has > that experience with which religion sets out, he has as good > reason--putting aside metaphysical subtilties--to believe in the living > personality of God as he has to believe in his own. Indeed, belief is a > word inappropriate to such direct perception. (CP 6.436; 1893) > > If our social encounters with other people warrant our believing in their > existence--even warrant our being quite sure of it--then direct perception > of God warrants believing in His Reality. In fact, according to the last > sentence, we need to substitute a different word for belief—knowledge, > based on the previous excerpt? Or acquaintance, perhaps? > > CSP: [We] can know nothing except what we directly experience. So all that > we can anyway know relates to experience. All the creations of our mind are > but patchworks from experience. So that all our ideas are but ideas of real > or transposed experiences. A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls > up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The > unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but > an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent > existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy ... Where would such an > idea, say as that of God, come from, if not from direct experience? Would > you make it a result of some kind of reasoning, good or bad? Why, reasoning > can supply the mind with nothing in the world except an estimate of the > value of a statistical ratio, that is, how often certain kinds of things > are found in certain combinations in the ordinary course of experience ... > No: as to God, open your eyes--and your heart, which is also a perceptive > organ--and you see him. (CP 6.492-493; c. 1896) > > Here Peirce required direct experience for all knowledge, perhaps > foreshadowing his famous statement, "The elements of every concept enter > into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the > gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both > those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP > 2:241; 1903). He also denied that there is anything "absolutely > unknowable," which seems to me to be another way of saying that whatever is > real is knowable. He then suggested the mere idea of God as something that > we could only obtain from such experience, since (inductive) reasoning can > only "estimate the value of a statistical ratio." Finally, similar to what > I quoted last time, he asserted that anyone is capable of directly > perceiving God upon opening one's eyes and heart. Apparently you disagree > with him (and me) about all of this, so we may just have to leave it at > that. > > GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious > discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on experiential > evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can afford us neither > acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the Creator is > really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple reason that > no such hypothesis is testable by observation. > > Thanks for re-posting the quote from Peirce with your bold added. Again, I > do not think that he was as strict as you seem to be about what counts as > "experimental logic," "experiential evidence," and "testable by > observation." After all, he explicitly considered his (Retroductive) > Neglected Argument for the Reality of God to be "the First Stage of a > scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest > Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the > self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life" (CP 6.480, EP 2:446; > 1908). > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > http://www.LinkedIn.com%2Fin%2FJonAlanSchmidt"; target="_blank"> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 9:20 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > My previous message, like all of my posts, was formatted in HTML, so I > think the formatting must have been lost at your end, Jon. I notice that > your latest message also seems to be in plain text. You should check the > settings of whatever software you use for email to make sure it properly > displays HTML-formatted messages instead of converting them to plain text. > The Peircean distinction I have referred to in this thread is a conceptual > one, not merely a verbal one, and Peirce expresses it in various ways. > Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed by a > sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign because > the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign to “tell > about it.” I’m sure you are familiar with the distinction, as you have > mentioned it yourself in previous posts to the list. In my statement of the > distinction I used the word “acquaintance” for (2) because that is the term > for it most often used by Peirce, and I chose “knowledge” for (1) because > your claim is that knowledge of God is conveyed by the Universe as Sign. > The fact that Peirce sometimes uses the more technical term “information” > for (1), and sometimes used “acquaintance” in reference to a kind of > knowledge, has no bearing on the validity of the distinction. You can find > most (but not all) of the texts where Peirce makes the distinction by > searching for the word “collateral”, but I see no need to copy them all > here. > JAS: If "God" is indeed "the definable proper name," then might it not > also be the exception to the rule that acquaintance with the Object of a > Sign requires Collateral Experience/Observation? > GF: Quite possibly; and that would explain why “knowledge of God” is > indeed exceptional, and not at all like our knowledge of Peirce or any > person who has existed. But that would not be what I call positive > knowledge, in the usual Peircean sense of “positive,” the sense in which > mathematics is not a positive science but logic and semiotics are positive > sciences. As I mentioned earlier, I distinguish between knowing and > believing, not on the basis of one being more “certain” than the other, but > in the sense that knowledge is the goal of the positive sciences which > practice inductive hypothesis-testing, while belief is defined > pragmatically as a cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. The > essential difference between science and religion, as I use those words, is > that science aims at theoretical knowledge in the sense I’m using here, > while religion aims at guiding the practical conduct of its believers. > Looking at them this way, religion and science are not opposed but > complementary. Scientists have a core belief that the universe is > intelligible, which guides their practice of science; religious believers > cannot actually conduct themselves in the real world or live up to their > religious ideals without applying some factual knowledge which is not given > by revelation. As Einstein put it, religion without science is blind, and > science without religion is lame. > JAS: I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces [in the > observable Universe]; I see His "fingerprints" all over the Universe, and I > also consider certain writings to be revelations from God Himself. Perhaps > this is where faith comes into play, another theological rather than > philosophical issue. > GF: As I explained a few messages back, God being the Creator of the whole > Universe means that it’s not honest to claim some aspects of the Universe > (and not others) as reflecting the attributes of God. To believe that God > is benign is indeed a matter of faith. The religion I subscribe to, which > we call “the Bahá'í Faith”, likewise sees all created things as signs of a > benign God, and considers certain scriptures to be specially “revealed” by > God through individuals singled out to serve that purpose. So I can say > that I believe these things, meaning that I accept Bahá'í teachings > generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. But I do not claim to > know these things — except in a Bahá'í context, where the verb “know” often > means “have faith in”. (I have occasionally seen scriptures that use the > word “Know” in the imperative, which would be nonsense in a non-religious > context, because you can’t order someone (or will yourself) to have factual > knowledge.) In every other context, including the Peirce list, I use the > words “know” and “knowledge” only in reference to factual and fallible > cognition. It is in this sense that I pronounce the Creator to be > unknowable. By the way, I can also affirm the unknowability of God in a > Bahá'í context, but not in the same sense, because Bahá'í belief is that He > is unknowable “in His Essence”, which leaves a loophole for revelation. But > I promised not to say anything about theology, and I hope this will suffice > to illustrate my rather strict distinction between belief and knowledge — a > distinction emphasized more by me than by Peirce. > GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such as > real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens of > Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the Creator > is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a proper > name, and not a general. > JAS: On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists is > individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially > the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person is only a > particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892). Accordingly, if God is a > real person Who does not exist, then He is not an individual, but a real > general. > GF: Here you are equivocating on the use of the term individual. I’m sure > you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” person is not an individual > in the strict logical sense. You are also familiar with the difference > between common nouns, which are names of generals, and proper nouns or > names, which designate individuals such as persons. Since “God” is, as > Peirce says, a proper name, God is an individual person — unless, as per > your suggestion above, “God” is an exception to the usual grammatical rule. > Normally a proper name refers to an Individual, as Peirce affirms in this > passage that you yourself quoted: > CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is > existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent individual > knowledge of the individual it names. It is then, and then only, a genuine > Index. The next time one meets with it, one regards it as an Icon of that > Index. The habitual acquaintance with it having been acquired, it becomes a > Symbol whose Interpretant represents it as an Icon of an Index of the > Individual named. (CP 2.329; 1903) > JAS: What was the "percept or other equivalent individual knowledge" that > was "existentially connected" with Peirce's name in that initial encounter? > GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had collateral > experience of such names designating individuals who have written books, > and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my experience of > reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of that name in the > reasonable expectation that I could find indices of something he had > written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a text by means of > which I also had collateral experience. Need I go on? or point out that > none of this collateral experience applies to the proper name “God”? Having > seen images of many of his manuscripts, I can honestly say that I recognize > Peirce’s handwriting. I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s > handwriting; nor do I recognize the content of the Bible as written by > anyone other than human beings. Authors can bear witness to the feeling of > being inspired, I can even say that myself, but I have no experience of > other authors being inspired, only of the testimony that they choose to > express in that form. > Here again is the passage of which I highlighted parts in bold which did > not come through to your screen. I hope you can see it this time. > [CSP:[ As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if that > principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be accepted, the > equivocal language will soon disappear. For realis and realitas are not > ancient words. They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the > thirteenth century, and the meaning they were intended to express is > perfectly clear. That is real which has such and such characters, whether > anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, that is the > sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word . Now, just as conduct > controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, > the nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable habits and not > quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental circumstances, and > in that sense may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by a > rational experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, > equally destined, the nature of which will be the same in the end, however > the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the postponement > of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of us virtually > assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he > seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of “real,” > the state of things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is > real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be general. Consequently, > some general objects are real. (Of course, nobody ever thought that all > generals were real; but the scholastics used to assume that generals were > real when they had hardly any, or quite no, experiential evidence to > support their assumption; and their fault lay just there , and not in > holding that generals could be real.) One is struck with the inexactitude > of thought even of analysts of power, when they touch upon modes of being. > One will meet, for example, the virtual assumption that what is relative to > thought cannot be real. But why not, exactly? Red is relative to sight, but > the fact that this or that is in that relation to vision that we call being > red is not itself relative to sight; it is a real fact. ] CP 5.430, EP > 2:342-343 ] > GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious > discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on experiential > evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can afford us neither > acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the Creator is > really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple reason that > no such hypothesis is testable by observation. > Gary f. > > > Virus-free. http://www.avg.com"; target="_blank">www.avg.com > > -- > null > > > > >
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