JFS: "Opinions are never acceptable in a court of law or in a scholarly edition."
I'm no expert, but in the US, if I may nitpick: THELAW.COM LAW DICTIONARY & BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2ND ED. "EXPERT TESTIMONY The opinion stated in court by an expert witness. An admissible expert opinion given in court." Gene H On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 1:52 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > I agree that my comments were about methods of reasoning rather than > specific issues about Lane's book. So I changed the subject line. > > JAS > > As for this thread, it is supposed to be about Peirce's views on > > realism and idealism as explored by Lane in his recent book, not > > our different purposes and respective approaches for studying and > > discussing Peirce's views on those topics (and others). > > I'm not talking about your preferences or mine. I'm talking about > the long-established conventions for scholarship: Maintain a sharp > distinction between an author's "ipsissima verba" and any commentary > about them. If an author did not state something explicitly, any > claims about the text are opinions of the commentator. Opinions > are never acceptable in a court of law or in a scholarly edition. > > > JFS: The term 'objective idealism' could characterize a huge family > > of theories from antiquity to the present. > > > > JAS: Sure, but we are only discussing the particular theory that > > Peirce called by that name in 1891. > > My complaint was not about the topic, but about the method > of reasoning. The following example illustrates the issues: > > JAS > > The whole point of CP 6.24-25 (1891) is that once dualism is > > dismissed in favor of monism, there are only three options--mind > > and matter are independent (neutralism), matter is primordial such > > that mind depends on matter (materialism), or mind is primordial > > such that matter depends on mind (idealism). Peirce unambiguously > > endorsed the last alternative and rejected the others, and as far > > as I know, he never abandoned that view. > > My concerns: CP 6.24 is quite clear as Peirce stated it; there is > no need for a paraphrase to make it clearer. But this paraphrase > distorts CP 6.24 in several ways: > > 1. The phrase "the whole point" implies that there is no other > useful information in CP 6.24-25. But the last sentence of > CP 6.25 makes an important point about Peirce's methodology: > "But before this can be accepted it must show itself capable > of explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws of > motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with > mathematical clearness and precision; for no less should be > demanded of every philosophy." > > 2. The phrase "there are only three options" is an unduly precise > grouping of the huge number of issues that have been debated > since antiquity. It's true that Peirce only mentioned three, > but he added the phrase "it seems" to each of the first two. > That sounds far more tentative than an unambiguous endorsement. > > 3. He calls the third option "the only intelligible theory" but adds > the qualification mentioned in point #1: an explanation of 3-D > space, laws of motion, and everything with "mathematical clearness > and precision". That would require a huge amount of work. > > 4. Since Peirce never accomplished the tasks in point #1, it would be > premature to claim that he "unambiguously endorsed" that option. > Einstein made more progress on those issues than Peirce did, but > there are still many unanswered questions today. > > 5. In the statement "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), the words > 'effete' and 'mind' are extremely vague, and the definitions > of 'matter' have changed enormously since the 19th century, > and new developments are continuing to make revisions. Those > words are so vague that "it's easy to be certain". > > 6. I also wrote that point #5 is so vague that any of the following > terms would be just as certain as Peirce's 'objective idealism': > Theos = Logos = Tao = Dharma = God of Spinoza = pantheism. > > JAS > > In any case, what I characterized as "unambiguous" was not Peirce's > > statement itself, but his endorsement of objective idealism... > > The best possible proof that Peirce endorsed objective idealism is > an exact quotation of CP 6.24-25. No paraphrase by anybody is > acceptable in a court of law or in a scholarly analysis. > > JAS > > but how about dealing with the substance of my posts, rather than > > continually nitpicking at my methodology and choice of words? > > Peirce's devoted his life's work to nitpicking. That is the essence > of logic and semeiotic: Developing and justifying precise methods > for analyzing language, thought, and reasoning down to the smallest, > most precisely defined and justified steps (AKA nits). > > As for substance, I have been begging you to drop the phrase > "harmonize and synthesize". The only things you are harmonizing > are your own opinions. No refereed publication would ever accept > anybody's claim of "harmonizing" anybody else's writings. > > JAS > > Why did you append a lengthy piece by Einstein? > > Three reasons: (1) Einstein was addressing similar issues, and he > started from the same physics that Peirce knew; (2) he adopted the > strategy that Peirce stated in CP 6.25; and (3) he made far more > progress in "explaining the tridimensionality of space, the laws > of motion, and the general characteristics of the universe, with > mathematical clearness and precision." > > In fact, Peirce's foundation in logic, mathematics, philosophy, > science, and religion was closer to Whitehead than Einstein. It's > no accident that Charles Hartshorne, who was the primary editor of > CP vol. 6, adopted a version of Whitehead's process theism. > > See "Peirce and religion: Between two forms of religious belief" > by Hartshorne (1995), Ch. 20 of _Peirce and Contemporary Thought_, > ed. by K. L. Ketner. Also note "The response to Hartshorne" by > V. G. Potter in Ch. 21: > > > Hartshorne: "I shall be comparing three doctrines, Peirce's > > theism, classical theism, and my neoclassical or somewhat revised > > Whiteheadian theism." > > > > Potter: "I agree almost completely with Hartshorne's assessment of > > Peirce's strengths and weaknesses. I thoroughly agree that Peirce > > might indeed be characterized as between two worlds -- the world of > > classical theism (from which he moved away) and the world of process > > theism (at which he had not yet arrived)." > > For a more detailed comparison of Peirce's objective idealism with > Whitehead's process philosophy, see "The problem of novelty according > to C.S. Peirce and A.N. Whitehead" by Maria Regina Brioschi: > > https://air.unimi.it/retrieve/handle/2434/264520/367902/phd_unimi_R09823.pdf > > > In summary, Hawthorne and Potter agreed on the "strengths and > weaknesses" of Peirce's claims about objective idealism. Since > the issues are still debatable, Peirce's weaker claims are more > acceptable than any "unambiguous" version. > > JAS > > Why did your article, "Peirce's Tutorial on Existential Graphs," > > include so much commentary--most of the total content, in fact > > -- rather than merely providing a bare transcription of his > > original text and diagrams? > > That's a good question. In fact, that article is an extension of > my comments on Michel Balat's version of R 514, which he transcribed > at Houghton Library. In my original version, all the text by Peirce, > including quotations from his other writings, is in black. And my > commentary is in red. For that version, with some revisions over > the years, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm > > For the published version, the journal did not support "rubrics" > (commentary in red). See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf > > In this version, I made a clear distinction between the quotations > by Peirce, and I never made any claims that my examples and > commentary were intended by Peirce or that I was "harmonizing" > anything Peirce wrote. > > But what I did do is something that William James told Peirce > not to do (for his 1898 lectures in RLT): use mathematical > (algebraic) notation. That may be the reason why Peirce did not > show the mapping between his EGs and his algebra of 1885. > > That was probably a good strategy for the audience of the lectures. > But it was a disaster for anybody who had learned and used the > algebraic notation. Christine Ladd Franklin, for example, was > one of Peirce's best students, but she never understood the EGs. > > But just look at the tables on pp. 5 to 9 of egtut.pdf. They show > how to translate each of the EGs to Peirce-Peano algebra. Those > tables are essential for modern (21st c) readers. > > Except for some explicit quotations, my presentation of what Peirce > wrote ends at Fig. 16 on page 13. It's quite possible that he may > have some unpublished remarks related to what I wrote. If so, I'd > love to see them. But I don't make any claims about his intentions. > > Section 6 (pp. 22 to 27) covers advanced topics in modern logic. > It shows how Peirce's EGs and rules of inference can clarify and > simplify developments 20 or more years after he died. > > John >
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