Susan Haack posted an article on Researchgate:
"From the Chain to the Cable: Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry through his
Metaphors"
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334749355_From_the_Chain_to_the_Cable_Peirce%27s_Theory_of_Inquiry_through_his_Metaphors_20172020
It begins with a quotation from CP 5.625, which explains the title:
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods,
so far as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be
subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude
and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one.
Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its
weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender,
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.
Basic point: Any argument that is based on a single chain of inferences
cannot be any stronger than its weakest link. Progress in any field,
especially science and philosophy, requires a cable of multiple related
analyses that examine the issues from all possible points of view.
The entire article is well worth reading in detail. But I copied
a few excerpts below to illustrate the issues.
John
__________________________________________________________________
Hobbes and Locke took for granted that a metaphor’s lack of specificity—
which is what Peirce meant by “vagueness” — is a bad thing. Peirce
teaches us, however, that for certain purposes open-endedness and lack
of specificity can be a good thing. True, as he writes in “How to Make
Our Ideas Clear,” an unclear idea sometimes acts like “an obstruction of
inert matter in artery, hindering the nutrition” of a young man’s brain,
condemning him to “pine away … in the midst of intellectual plenty”; and
too many young men have been seduced by “a vague shadow of an idea”
that, in the end, amounts to nothing.1 However, he also writes that
there can be no perfect formulation of a philosophical thesis; and this
means that initially unspecific ideas—such as the instinctive beliefs of
Critical Common-sensism, which are certain precisely because they are
“invariably vague,” must gradually be refined, articulated, and made
more definite...
A good metaphor can suggest where to look for parallels worth pursuing,
paths worth following, and potentially fruitful abductions. Spelling out
the ramifications of an apt metaphor can be a near-indispensable tool of
philosophical inquiry; and an initially indefinite metaphorical picture
may be an excellent way to introduce your audience to a new, unfamiliar,
and fruitful way of looking at things—as we’ll soon see...
Descartes thought he had found an infallible criterion to identify the
indubitable: “what I clearly and distinctly perceive is true”; but the
fact is, Peirce argues, that every individual has blind spots and
limitations, and is inevitably ignorant of some matters and mistaken
about others. For this reason, serious scientific inquiry is the work of
many people over many generations, and the long-run consensus of the
community of inquirers is a far better guide to truth than any
individual’s intuition...
[Note by JFS: This is a very strong reason for looking at developments
during the 20th and 21st c. Many researchers rediscovered ideas that
are similar to Peirce's. Some support Peirce's conclusions. Others
clarify points that were unclear or tentative in his day. And many
of them repeated the serious mistakes that Peirce had criticized.]
Peirce’s own argumentation is in striking conformity to the pattern
he recommends: think, for example, of the mesh of arguments
(phenomenological, logical, ontological) supporting his universal
categories, or of the multiform reasoning behind his distinctive
form of empiricism, his repudiation of nominalism, or his theory
of inquiry. Moreover, his many cables of argument are themselves
interwoven, giving his philosophy as a whole its architectonic
character...
[Note by JFS: This is a good basis for evaluating the importance
of various writings. Any chain that appears once is less reliable
than a cable that runs through many MSS.]
Peirce’s metaphors are as remarkably various as they are philosophically
rich. But while deploying several different metaphors, as he often does,
is sometimes simply a way of exploring a question from many angles, when
one metaphor suggests one approach or conception and another suggests a
different and perhaps incompatible approach or conception, this can
create a tension. When both of two apparently-competing metaphors seem
apropos, the apparent conflict must, somehow, be resolved; and such
clashes often mark a point where Peirce realizes that some earlier
formulation of an idea stands in need of amplification, refinement,
modification...
I could go on — perhaps by observing how often, of late, as friends and
correspondents ask me about the recent fashion for talk of “alternative
facts” and “post-truth,” I find myself quoting Peirce by way of reply.
“You certainly opine that there is such a thing as truth. Otherwise,
reason and thought would be without a purpose”; and “[e]very man is
fully satisfied that there is such a thing as truth, or he would not ask
any question.” And for that matter, I add, neither would he make any
assertion—including, of course, the assertion that ours is an era of
post-truth. But spelling all this out, which would require a whole new
paper of its own, is obviously not a task to be undertaken here.
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