Edwina, List: ET: You, JAS, are giving us only half of the quotation that defines 'Objective Idealism'.
This is patently false, since Gary R. quoted the entire passage just a couple of days ago, and I have quoted both parts of the relevant sentence throughout this exchange. ET: My interpretation of the above is that this means that Matter becomes Mind; and Mind becomes Matter. There is nothing whatsoever in CP 6.24-25--or anywhere else in Peirce's corpus, as far as I know--to warrant the "interpretation" that matter *ever *becomes mind. ET: This does NOT mean, as you insist, that Peirce's 'objective idealism' is equivalent to pure idealism ... Where have I ever suggested this, let alone insisted on it? On the contrary, I have repeatedly maintained that objective idealism is *one variety* of idealism. I suppose that I should not be surprised by your persistent misreading of my posts, given your persistent misreading of Peirce's writings. ET: It means ... as he wrote with his outline of synechism, that the psychical and physical are not distinct/separate. No, what he *actually *wrote in CP 7.570 (c. 1892) is that the psychical and the physical are not *entirely *distinct, as they would be if dualism were true--or neutralism, for that matter. Nevertheless, he acknowledged elsewhere "that *mind *and *matter *are of disparate natures"; but in accordance with synechism, "this disparateness is a mere matter of degree," such that "Either *mind *is a peculiar kind of *matter*, or else *matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind*" (R 936:3; no date). In other words, once dualism and neutralism are dismissed, the only remaining options are materialism and idealism; Peirce recognized no other alternatives. ET: Instead - as I read Peirce, he accepts that material objects exist 'outside of what you or I think of them..and therefore, not as derived from Mind. Your "therefore" does not follow, and is contrary to Peirce's own words. Matter indeed exists, contrary to *subjective *idealism, but only as "a peculiar sort of *mind*"--"mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892)--such that "the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] primordial, which is idealism." Again, Peirce elsewhere stated *explicitly *that "if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism*" (R 936:3; no date). This straightforwardly explicates what he meant by "inveterate habits becoming physical law"; i.e., *absolute *and *exact *law. ET: But- as I read Peirce, both Mind and Matter co-evolve together in self-organized complexity and neither is primordial. Again, *there is no such way to "read Peirce"*--just a predetermined view that can be maintained only out of sheer dogmatism, employing the method of tenacity rather than the method of science. It brings to mind a couple of comments that John Sowa stated several weeks ago, which I will adapt for this occasion. JFS: If [Edwina] wants to say that this is [her] own opinion, I have no objection. But I strongly object to any claim that it is something that Peirce said, meant, implied, or intended. JFS: Anyone is free to write anything about Peirce that they wish. But no one has a right to attribute anything to Peirce that does not explicitly appear in any of his MSS. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 8:57 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, Helmut, list > > 1] Your first quote [JAS's] where you quote Peirce that god is 'a Spirit, > or Mind" does not, as I interpret, mean that God is 3ns. I've never viewed > Mind as equated with 'Spirit' but as equated with Reason, Logic, Laws. > > 2] You, JAS, are giving us only half of the quotation that defines > 'Objective Idealism'. It says that "matter is effete mind, inveterate > habits becoming physical laws" 6.24. > > My interpretation of the above is that this means that Matter becomes > Mind; and Mind becomes Matter. Neither is primary, neither is derived of > the other. Neither is separate. Again - the Peircean quotation has two > parts. > > This does NOT mean, as you insist, that Peirce's 'objective idealism' is > equivalent to pure idealism, where, indeed, 'the psychical law alone as > primordial" with "the physical law as derived and special". [6.24]. It > means, as he wrote - that Matter becomes Mind and Mind becomes Matter - and > - as he wrote with his outline of synechism, that the psychical and > physical are not distinct/separate. > > 3] I see no evidence that Peirce introduced the term of 'objective' to > idealism merely to differentiate it from 'subjective idealism. > > Subjective idealism, to my understanding, privileges Mind - and considers > that all material 'things' are mental constructs. That sounds similar to > Peirce's definition of 'pure' idealism in 6.24- with the psychical as > primordial, the physical as derived [from this action of Mind]. > > Instead - as I read Peirce, he accepts that material objects exist > 'outside of what you or I think of them..and therefore, not as derived from > Mind. And rejects Materialism, which sees that the Mind has emerged from > Matter. > > His 'objective idealism, as I read it, is that double sentence, so to > speak: '"that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical > laws". That is Matter becomes Mind; Mind becomes Matter. They are NOT > separate - and therefore - Mind is NOT primordial. > > But- as I read Peirce, both Mind and Matter co-evolve together in > self-organized complexity and neither is primordial. > > Edwina > > Helmut, Edwina, List: > > HR: Well, this is just out of intuition: I would say, that "pure mind" or > "disembodied spirit" is not 3ns, but 1ns ... > > > Okay, but that is definitely not what Peirce said. > > CSP: Thus, He [God] is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular > Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to > brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed > in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a > Spirit, or Mind. (R 843:27[5]; 1908) > > > He unmistakably associated mind and spirit with 3ns, since "a singular > Existent" obviously corresponds to 2ns and "an ideal possibility" obviously > corresponds to 1ns. > > ET: I don't see that Peirce's cosmology has anything 'primordial'. > > > One more time, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of CP > 6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism; > specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as > primordial" and "that matter is effete mind." > > ET: But my understanding of objective idealism is that neither Mind nor > Matter are primordial and that neither is independent, but that both > co-emerge together when the Universe began. > > > Peirce recognized no such option. Either mind and matter are "two > radically different kinds of substance" (dualism), or they are "both > primordial" (neutralism), or one of them is primordial relative to the > other. Synechism rules out the first two options, leaving only materialism > and idealism as viable alternatives. > > CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of > disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness > is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar kind of matter, or > else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is it? If mind is nothing > but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is > much to be said,--we are landed in materialism, and nominalism is not > much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but > effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act > with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of > learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. > (R 936:2-3; no date) > > > From this quote, there can be no reasonable doubt that Peirce considered > the view that "matter is nothing but effete mind" to be idealism--he said > so explicitly, with no qualification whatsoever. Again, he called it > objective > idealism in CP 6.25 in order to distinguish it from subjective idealism, > which denies the reality of matter altogether. > > ET: My reading of Peirce is that there is nothing primordial; neither > Matter nor Mind. > > > There is no such "reading of Peirce," just a predetermined > "interpretation" that can be maintained only out of sheer dogmatism, > employing the method of tenacity rather than the method of science. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 7:01 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Helmut, list >> >> I'd agree with you - I don't see 'pure mind' or 'disembodied spirit' as >> 3ns. Thirdness, in my understanding, emerges WITH Matter and is not >> separate from its existence. And yes, possibility/1ns is a state and >> outside of time. >> >> With regard to the concept of a primordial Mind - with which I disagree >> and which I don't interpret Peirce as accepting [while JAS concludes that >> Peirce does accept a primordial Mind] - I don't see that Peirce's cosmology >> has anything 'primordial'. >> >> As Peirce wrote - "we start with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the >> nothing of negation - it is boundless freedom" 6.217 >> >> And "The initial condition, before the universe existed was not a state >> of pure abstract being. On the contrary - it was a state of just nothing at >> all" 6.215. I'd even read this as pre-Firstness! >> >> And his outline, in this section and in 1.412, which both describe the >> same development of the universe, as an action moving from this 'Nothing' >> to 'something, as a "general indefinite potentiality became limited and >> heterogeneous" 6.199. >> >> That is -3ns did not 'pre-exist' so to speak and there is no primordial >> 'Mind' [3ns]. Instead - the beginning is that "general >> vague nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand >> definite qualities 6.200. The potentiality/chaos was a state of freedom, >> chance - which as Peirce outlines THEN developed habits of continuity. So- >> habits/3ns/Mind - is not an a priori mode but one that develops as Matter >> develops. >> >> My reading of Peirce is that there is nothing primordial; neither Matter >> nor Mind. As he says- before the universe began - there was 'nothing, >> zero'. I don't interpret him as does JAS, who sees Peircean objective >> Idealism as the psychical as primordial with the physical as derived from >> this. >> >> But my understanding of objective idealism is that neither Mind >> nor Matter are primordial and that neither is independent, but that both >> co-emerge together when the Universe began. >> >> And, again, Peirce explains his synechism where he will "not admit that >> physical and phenomena are entirely distinct - whether as belonging to >> different categories of substance of as entirely separate sides of one >> shield but will insist that all phenomena are of one character, though some >> are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular." >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sat 03/08/19 5:53 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent: >> >> Jon, list, >> >> Well, this is just out of intuition: I would say, that "pure mind" or >> "disembodied spirit" is not 3ns, but 1ns: Possibility. Possibility is a >> state, not a process, so it does not depend on time. Maybe even not on >> space? But a 3ns includes 2ns, reaction, and reaction is a process in time >> and space. >> On the other hand, one might argue, that a possibility includes the >> foreseeing of reactions. So it ideationally includes it, and is based on >> 3ns, so to say, that there cannot be a 1ns without a 3ns. >> So maybe you are right, that there must be a "pure" mind which is 3ns. >> But how can it be pure, if 3ns includes 2ns? Which is not pure, but brute? >> To solve this paradoxon, there are two ways: Either that there never has >> been a beginning, as the buddhists say, or there is and has always been a >> God preceeding everything. But that would just be a regress, not an >> explanation. God cannot be explained.Trying to explain God would be >> blasphemy anyway for belief, so what only remains regarding this topic is >> belief. Belief, I guess, is that what cannot be talked about, and >> Wittgenstein said that it should be shut up about. Not that I agree, I am >> against thinking bans. >> I think that it is reasonable and good to believe in God, but impossible >> to use God for argumentation. >> Likewise, I think it is futile to discuss about whether mind and matter >> are depending on each other, or there can be a mind without matter. It is >> the same question like that, whether the buddhists or the theists are >> right, or whether there has been a God preceeding the universe or not. You >> just can not know, and never will know, so the discussion is not leading >> anywhere. and: What would be the benefit, if the discussion would come to >> an end? None. Even the question whether we exist on after death does not >> depend on it. >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> >>
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