Auke, List:

It implies that a necessitant can determine a necessitant, an existent, or
a possible; an existent can determine an existent or a possible; and a
possible can only determine a possible.  That is why, in the 1903 taxonomy,
a symbol can be an argument, a dicent, or a rheme; an index can be a dicent
or a rheme; and an icon can only be a rheme.

In the hexad, signs are classified according to the purpose of the final
interpretant, the mode of being of the dynamic interpretant, and the mode
of presentation of the immediate interpretant; and I believe that the *logical
*order of determination for these three trichotomies is If-->Id-->Ii.  For
If and Id, a temperative can be a usual, a percussive, or a sympathetic; an
actuous can be a percussive or a sympathetic; and a gratific can only be a
sympathetic.  Likewise, for Id and Ii, a usual can be a relative, a
categorical, or a hypothetic; a percussive can be a categorical or a
hypothetic; and a sympathetic can only be a hypothetic.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 6:27 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

> Sorry, nasty typo : But, does this imply that a Neccesitant determines a
> Possible?
>
> Op 14 april 2020 om 11:55 schreef [email protected]:
>
> Jon Alan,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Constrains" refers to the rule of determination-- -"It is evident that a
> Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a
> Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481).
>
> But, thus this imply that a Neccesitant determines a Possible?
>
> Auke
>
> Op 14 april 2020 om 2:42 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <
> [email protected]>:
>
> Auke, List:
>
> I am not sure that I understand your objection.  In my current view, the
> final and normal interpretants are one and the same--whatever the sign 
> *necessarily
> would* signify under ideal circumstances; namely, in the ultimate opinion
> after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.  This indeed does not
> entail that it is "inescapable," because it may never *actually *have
> that effect; it is "final" in the sense of a final cause, not something
> that comes last in a series.  "Nature" in this context means *purpose *for
> the final interpretant, *mode of being* for the dynamical object or
> interpretant, and *mode of presentation* for the immediate object or
> interpretant; in each case belonging to one of three
> universes--possibles, existents, or necessitants (EP 2:478-490, 1908).
> "Constrains" refers to the rule of determination--"It is evident that a
> Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a
> Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2020 at 6:03 PM < [email protected]> wrote:
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> In other words, the nature of the final interpretant constrains the
> possible natures of the dynamic and immediate interpretants, just as the
> nature of the dynamical object constrains the possible nature of the
> immediate object.
>
> Jon,
>
> That is quite some statement, I wonder whether Trump would agree, look at
> his deeds. And, I mean this in a very real sense. It was not just a joke
> that Peirce also wrote: we have to choose between mamon and god. At most,
> it is our duty to find the final interpretant, it is not an inescapable
> end. Nature of ...? What means nature here? Without nature and with normal
> instead of final, I could consider to agree. But then we are only at the
> level of the legisign aspect ( the involved sign aspects included of
> course) or, in other words, dealing with habits of interpretation.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
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