BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Michael
Thank you for your very astute and kind post.
As you point out -
" Continual reminders to cite examples surely needn't be taken as
demeaning, as long as one is not implying theoretical work being
done is
short of intrinsic value: but it loses its value TO us without
examples, "
I am not saying that theory is irrelevant - for after all, we not
merely cannot think without theories/beliefs, but I submit we can't
even exist without generalization and rules [which are, after all,
what theories are all about].
But my point is - not merely that we cannot evaluate a theory
without an example - but- as Robert Marty pointed out [in your lost
email and elsewhere] - we require specificity, we require
individuation [2ns] - or we move into the clouds-in-the-sky of
Hegelianism - which denies the autonomy and actuality/reality of
2ns.
Again, it's not merely that our theories must be viewed as fallible
and thus, open to examination, but this fallibility should have built
into it [in my view] the fact that it must be operative in the real
world. I acknowledge that some prefer the abstractions of theory
while others prefer the specificity of actualization - but- neither
should react with disdain to requests for either more theory or more
specificity.
You wrote: "The public currently seem to be taught to idealise,
nominalise and reify altogether, hence superficial and misguided
evaluations". Exactly. Abstract ideas, detached from specific
reality, become nominalized 'Truths' - which the public almost has to
accept since they have no means of evaluating them. We get this type
of situation all the time from 'experts'.
Again, thank you for your very thoughtful and kind post.
Edwina
On Wed 13/05/20 6:27 PM , [email protected] sent:
John, Jon, Edwina, Gary, Robert et al,
The way "all these issues" is mentioned, implies this is a periodic
happening and you've evidently survived them all so I am reassured.
I for one don't see any principle except in things. Thus I was
pleased
to know of Peirce as a chemist, coastal surveyor and linguist.
Qualities and dynamics superpose themselves like layers; then we
have
the situation where the whole of the sciences seems like the part
and
vice versa; leading to the almost mindblowing "topology" rightly
needed
in our diagrams.
(I'm told Windelband and Rickert distinguished between individuating
and
non-individuating sciences, with various branches of biology spread
in
between.)
Continual reminders to cite examples surely needn't be taken as
demeaning, as long as one is not implying theoretical work being
done is
short of intrinsic value: but it loses its value TO us without
examples,
if we haven't a secret untalked-of stock of them, triggered by
terminology or notations. Example giving was done to good effect
yesterday over the street cry.
Didn't Peirce point out theory needs metaphor or other concretes to
make
sense - i.e metaphor, an imagined relation (in the laboratory atop
our
shoulders), is itself a concrete. One can have signs of signs.
Halliday cites Shannon and Wheeler as referring to matter as a
special
case of meaning. While extreme materialists make claims for "what",
a
more realistic answer could be "where" (in some sense) and "is" (in
some
sense), also "how conveying". Speculative work on dimensions and
the
quantum is no less concrete. Deductive experimenting is sometimes
touted as the only component of science whereas induction and
abduction
(similar territory to Newman's "notions") has always been equally
vital
for hypothesis-forming (and usually around 200 years prior). The
force
of deduction is more specific than that of induction.
Words allude, but we get meaning from words when several of the
allusions intersect. Hence meanings in Peircean theoretical terms
and
notations are easier to convey when accompanied by illustrations.
The public currently seem to be taught to idealise, nominalise and
reify
altogether, hence superficial and misguided evaluations deplored by
John. Hegel seems to have insisted on an ineluctable monolith as
the
only reality, and I get the impression mimetics is usually portrayed
similarly. Extreme materialists disallow tentative hypotheses. By
contrast Gilson described methodical realism, while Popper proposed
propensity fields (which I call "happening places"). Newman
extolled
"degrees of" inference, which is how partial knowledge can be made
highly useful.
I wish to ask whether, when we are discussing the interrelation
between
theory and concretes, we have been idealising / reifying /
nominalising
the very components in our discussion, after the habit of Ockham,
Hume
and Hegel; and whether double checking this will improve the present
generosity discussion. Who was urging the dehegelising of Peirce
only
this morning (I can't organise my e-mails)?
What do list members think regarding this? Please add Peirce's
terms /
notations to points I've mentioned.
Michael Mitchell
ex-translator
U.K.
- - -
On 2020-05-13 19:17, John F. Sowa wrote:
> Jon ,
>
> ... And since Gary R takes your side in all these issues ...
> Some are more inclined toward and adept at abstract theory,
> others prefer to pursue concrete applications, and others (like
Peirce
> himself) can do both.
>
> But the point I was making is that if you want to understand
Peirce,
> you must read his writings as coming from someone who spent a
lifetime
> doing both.
>
> Unfortunately, the various collections (CP, W, and NEM) ...
emphasize
> the results of his thinking, but they skip the details about his
> practice.
>
> Examples: His father taught him Greek, Latin, and mathematics
from
> early childhood. He was doing chemistry experiments from the age
of
> 8, and he worked his way through the kinds of experiments a
college
> student would be doing. He read his brother's logic textbook,
cover
> to cover, when he was 12. And he published a pioneering book in
> astronomy in his first full-time job at the Harvard observatory.
>
> None of us can redo our early childhood experience. But when we
read
> any theoretical statement by Peirce, we must remember his
background,
> his criteria for evidence, and his 60+ years of empirical/critical
> methods
>
> As Peirce said, it's indeed wonderful that different people have
very
> different ways of thinking. But in order to understand any of
them,
> we must recognize their background in order to understand how and
why
> they came to their conclusions. Otherwise, the evaluation is
> incomplete or superficial at best, misguided or false at worst
>
> John
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