John, List: JFS: The principle of charity in philosophy does *not* require the listener/reader to assume that the statements by the speaker/author are true.
Where have I claimed otherwise? Specific examples, please. JFS: For the arguments I objected to, I showed that a charitable interpretation of what Peirce wrote led to a conclusion that was different from a charitable interpretation of what you wrote. Different readers can and often do disagree about what constitutes a charitable interpretation of someone else's writings. Naturally, a *different* interpretation of what Peirce wrote leads to a different conclusion, and the burden is then to *support *one's own interpretation (or refute someone else's) with arguments. That is one reason why the secondary literature has become so extensive. JAS: We (supposedly) agree that it is inappropriate to make sweeping judgments about who is (or is not) capable of understanding Peirce's writings and discussing them intelligently. We (apparently) disagree about who among us has been guilty of doing exactly that. JFS: I never said that you were incapable of understanding Peirce. It is not about me individually, it is about "sweeping judgments" like the following. JFS <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00125.html>: You cannot understand anything Peirce wrote unless you repeat the kind of disciplined testing that he did in developing and revising his theories. JFS <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00129.html>: As Peirce said, it's indeed wonderful that different people have very different ways of thinking. But in order to understand any of them, we must recognize their background in order to understand how and why they came to their conclusions. While certain kinds of experiences and familiarity with Peirce's biography are certainly *helpful *for understanding his writings, absolute statements like these set an unreasonably high bar that no one has the authority to impose on others. Rather than dismissing someone else's interpretations because of *who* is giving them, the appropriate response when there is disagreement is to make a better argument. JFS: A list moderator has a right to admonish participants about making inappropriate statements. But a moderator has an obligation to quote the statement(s) explicitly and state exactly why they are inappropriate. Gary R. did <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00115.html> exactly that regarding Edwina's <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00110.html> comments <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00112.html> that theorizing is "an irrelevant exercise" undertaken only by people who "prefer the isolation and comfort of what [she calls] 'the seminar room' ... far, far, far from the real empirical objective world." JFS: But Gary R made a blanket statement about my ability to interpret Peirce without stating a single example where my statement was wrong or inappropriate. He also made a blanket statement that your arguments were superior to mine. Where has Gary R. made any such "blanket statements"? Specific examples, please. JFS: On several occasions, he said that he agreed with you and not with me. But he never explained why any particular point I made was wrong. Presumably he agreed not only with my conclusions, but also with the reasoning behind them, which I had already presented. Merely saying that one agrees with someone else does not impose an obligation to restate that person's arguments. JFS: But Gary R stepped way out of bounds when he made a blanket condemnation of my writings without ever showing a single example that was inappropriate. Again, where has Gary R. made any such "blanket condemnation"? Again, specific examples, please. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:09 PM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > The principle of charity in philosophy does *not* require the > listener/reader to assume that the statements by the speaker/author are > true. Its only requirement is to assume that other participants in the > discussion are rational human beings who are making meaningful statements, > which they have some reason to believe are true. But charity does not > require the listener to agree that they are true. Note the passage you > quoted: > > Wikipedia> In philosophy and rhetoric, the *principle of charity* or > *charitable > interpretation* requires interpreting a speaker's statements in the most > rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, considering its > best, strongest possible interpretation. In its narrowest sense, the goal > of this methodological principle is to avoid attributing irrationality, > logical fallacies, or falsehoods to the others' statements, when a > coherent, rational interpretation of the statements is available. According > to Simon Blackburn "it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or > rationality in the subject's sayings." > > I have never claimed that any of your statements were meaningless or > irrational. What I criticized was the strength and methods of the > argument. For the arguments I objected to, I showed that a charitable > interpretation of what Peirce wrote led to a conclusion that was different > from a charitable interpretation of what you wrote. > JAS> We (supposedly) agree that it is inappropriate to make sweeping > judgments about who is (or is not) capable of understanding Peirce's > writings and discussing them intelligently. We (apparently) disagree about > who among us has been guilty of doing exactly that. > I never said that you were incapable of understanding Peirce. But I did > criticize your method of stringing together multiple quotations from > different contexts. I did not claim that was irrational. But I did say > that the some of the critical quotations were taken out of contexts where > charity toward Peirce would give them a different interpretation. > JAS> On the contrary, Gary R. is consistently an exemplary model of the > "generosity of attitude" that he advocates as List moderator. > No. A list moderator has a right to admonish participants about making > inappropriate statements. But a moderator has an obligation to quote the > statement(s) explicitly and state exactly why they are inappropriate. > But Gary R made a blanket statement about my ability to interpret Peirce > without stating a single example where my statement was wrong or > inappropriate. He also made a blanket statement that your arguments were > superior to mine. On several occasions, he said that he agreed with you > and not with me. But he never explained why any particular point I made > was wrong. > I never complained about anybody who might disagree with me for one reason > or another. But Gary R stepped way out of bounds when he made a blanket > condemnation of my writings without ever showing a single example that was > inappropriate. > JAS> Peirce's distaste for "metaphysicians" was prompted by their > dogmatism... > I checked CP for every occurrence of 'metaphysician'. There are 71 > occurrences. I did not check every one of them. But in the great majority > of the ones I checked, his complaint was about their methods of reasoning. > The first occurrence is typical: "The demonstrations of the metaphysicians > are all moonshine." (CP 1.7) > In the second quotation (CP 1.29), he praised two of them because of their > methods of reasoning: "These two men, Duns Scotus and William Ockham, are > decidedly the greatest speculative minds of the middle ages, as well as two > of the profoundest metaphysicians that ever lived." > Methods of reasoning were one of Peirce's strongest interests from > childhood to the end. In his criticisms of philosophers, his strongest > praise and condemnation were about their reasoning. I won't claim that I > am as good as Peirce in this respect. But I do admire and try to emulate > his way of adapting the methods of reasoning in logic and mathematics to > every subject he discussed. > I won't claim that everybody must apply formal logic and mathematics to > everything. In fact, Peirce himself had a high regard for vagueness. (249 > instances of 'vague' in CP, with or without some ending.) In some cases, > he criticized vagueness. But more often than not, he recognized that a > vague statement was appropriate in the context. In fact, his pioneering > work on probability was an attempt to quantify reasoning about statements > that are not exactly true or false. > John >
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