List,
Jerry Chandler's contribution today at 2.54 hours in "To put an end" is
an ideal example of what you three (and I) are talking about; focus is
merely post by post, and all members are (I assume) pitching in to help
all the other members at each instant. Jerry cited chemistry.
(Linguistics is more similar to chemistry than some imagine.) Likewise
when we are helping people grapple with Robert's arguments we can
tentatively suggest examples rather than demand them of someone who
hasn't got them yet. All of our understanding is partial (varying
uniquely per individual) and no morally inferior for that.
This then is the constructive complement to apparent puristic
vigilantism - which I always assumed wasn't intended. A small piece of
work on notations and special terms is valuable because it is just that
- and I hope the "apparent purists" won't claim it as any kind of be-all
or end-all, however much we can admire degrees of soundness in it.
Statements and counterstatements are, in substance, questions, though we
sometimes forget that!
Categories are indeed categories, but they are often relatively
relative. Peirce drew his drawings on flat paper; but I expect he saw
four or five dimensions at once. To me all things are "in" both visible
and invisible "spectrums", are on inclining intersecting "planes"
carrying changing shades of "colour" . . . Like Auke I'm heavily into
continuums (but that's just me).
Diagrams which we are often sent resemble crystals; clay is crystalline,
as is freezing water growing across our panes; so are RNA / DNA. A
wonderful ramification tree was circulated. What is in the conceptual
is so often mirrored in nature. This is why the conceptual is just as
concrete as the material. Imagination (at all levels) is the laboratory
atop our shoulders. Spontaneous collaboration enhances the results of
each. I assure all list members that the work of all of you cheers me
up no end (that you all "take an interest" and don't "dumb down" what is
around me) in these ghastly times.
I think Kant's synthetic a priori reflects the epistemological /
neurological fact that one fairly easily perceives five of something; on
top of which elaborations are done mentally as well as by additional
layers of perception (e.g two fives). Did Russell and Black have
opposite views of which "came first", logic and maths?
I'm plotting a series of posts - in very slow time - in which I shall
with your permission spring on you a phenomenon, idea or scheme, shall
fossick in Commens and in previous List posts etc for some (perhaps)
proper words, and shall ask you to further "peirceanise" it! My posts
shall be essentially phrased in question (enquiry) format.
Michael Mitchell
linguist - UK
On 2020-05-17 14:31, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
John and Auke
I think Auke has made a key comment - which is not merely the method
of discussion and analysis, but the focus. As he noted, there can be
two areas to focus on:
Area 1] Peirce's text can be read as inspiration for semiotic
research. In this case semiosis is the dynamical object, or some
aspect of it
Area 2] But they [Peirce's texts] also can be used to decide
debates. In this case Peirce's presumed view on semiosis is the
dynamical object
These are two very different areas of research - BOTH of which
legitimately rest within the framework of the Peircean corpus of work.
A problem, as I see it, is that this list is indifferent to the first
area - and indeed, some on the list seem to consider that such
interests are secondary areas of semiosis [setting up a notion of
purity vs impurity re Peirce]. . And the vigilante focus on what is
the correct interpretation of the Texts leads to emotional assertions
of 'correct' vs 'incorrect' [too many occurrences to offer as
examples].
I wonder if the 'solution' is - and here we might bring in
Methodology- but could the solution be the Market approach - which
accepts both areas and leaves the forum open to discussions by the
population - with the Moderator remaining strictly neutral - ie, Let
the Market Decide - knowing that a Market is dynamic and never fully
conclusive.
And, the population itself must acknowledge that the Market is open
to both areas. And the Method of Argumentation is not Who Grabs the
Consumer Fast and Most [ ie with the loudest voice and most prolific
goods from The Text] but is also highly sensitive to what is going on
in the rest of the world. This brings in Area 1- where research in
other fields which use the conceptual infrastructure of Peircean
semiosis [without the text!] can inform the textual analysis of Area
2.
Edwina
On Sun 17/05/20 8:13 AM , [email protected] sent:
John,
I agree with your broadening up the seeming dichotomy to an open
ended diversity. But I suggest to go all the way; also within a
science we find different angles on the same subjectmatter.
Semiotics not being excluded.
But, I think there is a second current to be aware of in our
discussions. Peirce's text can be read as inspiration for semiotic
research. In this case semiosis is the dynamical object, or some
aspect of it. But they also can be used to decide debates. In this
case Peirce's presumed view on semiosis is the dynamical object.
This dichotomy probably can be best looked at as a continuum on
which each of the listers score somewhere at some point in their
dealing with peircean semiotics (or Peirce's semiotics of course).
Best,
Auke
Op 17 mei 2020 om 0:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
Robert and Auke,
I agree with the points you made. But I believe that a good way
to put an end to the "false debate" is to broaden the dichotomy to
an open-ended diversity. Every branch of the sciences (i.e.,
every branch in Peirce's 1903 classification) has methods that are
specialized for the subject matter. For that reason, I changed
the subject line to "Methodology" -- Methodeutic would be an
acceptable term, but Peirce's discussion of that term has too few
examples to support all the issues that need to be considered.
For example, the methods for studying linguistics, archaeology,
chemisty, astronomy, and medicine are radically different. But
they do have a common foundation: observation, induction,
abduction, deduction, testing, and repeat.
Although the theorems of mathematics are determined by deduction,
mathematical discovery is just as empirical as any other science.
For example,
Euler: "The properties of the numbers known today have been
mostly discovered by observations... long before their truth has
been confirmed by rigid demonstrations."
Laplace: "Even in the mathematical sciences, our principal
instruments to discover the truth are induction and analogy."
Paul Halmos: "Mathematics this may surprise or shock some
is never deductive in its creation. The mathematician at work
makes vague guesses, visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps
to unwarranted conclusions. He arranges and rearranges his ideas,
and becomes convinced of their truth long before he can write down
a logical proof... the deductive stage, writing the results down,
and writing its rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the
real insight arrives; it is more the draftsmans work not the
architects. *
* Halmos, Paul R. (1968) Mathematics as a creative art, _American
Scientist_, vol 56, pp. 375-389.
There is, of course, much more to be said.
John
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