Jon A, list,
I was curious about what was omitted by the ellipses in your quotation from
Peirce’s Lowell Lecture VII of 1866, and when I turned back a page for the
context, decided it might be worthwhile to post the whole passage from
W1:465-67 without omissions. For two or three reasons … first, because in this
passage Peirce claims to “here announce the great and fundamental secret of the
logic of science”(!). Second, because of the way he connects information with
implication. And third, because it uses as an example an issue which continues
to roil the U.S. (and many other nations, including mine) — especially in the
past week or two.
(Those who are allergic to long Peirce quotes can stop here.)
[[[ Extension × Comprehension = Information
which means that when the information is increased there is an increase of
either extension or comprehension without any diminution of the other of these
quantities.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, as it is true that every increase of our knowledge
is an increase in the information of a term— that is, is an addition to the
number of terms equivalent to that term— so it is also true that the first step
in the knowledge of a thing, the first framing of a term, is also the origin of
the information of that term because it gives the first term equivalent to that
term. I here announce the great and fundamental secret of the logic of science.
There is no term, properly so called, which is entirely destitute of
information, of equivalent terms. The moment an expression acquires sufficient
comprehension to determine its extension, it already has more than enough to do
so. We all know how deceptive a word or phrase may be. That is why there are so
many syllogisms afloat. The middle term serves to lead our minds to
conclusions, by its false implication. All careful reasoners know what dangers
lie in such syllogisms as these: The Negro is a man and Every man should vote
therefore The Negro should vote. Observe, I do not criticise the conclusion.
That may be very very true. I only say that the question would arise whether
the Negro is not merely a man for the purpose of zoölogy, for the purpose of
religion, but whether he is also a man for the purpose of politics. In short
the question is whether every man is a man. Not that the word man has two
meanings but that it has very much implication and that the truth of all that
implication is not agreed to by both parties. This is a type of the commonest
of all fallacies— and I have selected this particular argument as an example of
it both because it is one which all of you must have heard urged and also
because it turns on the word man which has of all words the most implication
because of all things in the universe this is the one of which we all know the
most.
We are all, then, familiar with the fact that many words have much implication;
but I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies
some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol has an
equivalent term— or one which has become identified with it,— in short, has an
interpretant.
Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a
representation is something which stands for something. I will not undertake to
analyze, this evening, this conception of standing for something— but, it is
sufficiently plain that it involves the standing to something for something. A
thing cannot stand for something without standing to something for that
something. Now, what is this that a word stands to? Is it a person? We usually
say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would be a little
more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind— to his memory. It
is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular remembrance or
image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? Plainly, the one which
is the mental equivalent of the word homme— in short, its interpretant.
Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant or identified
symbol. Conversely, every interpretant is addressed by the word; for were it
not so, did it not as it were overhear what the word says, how could it
interpret what the word says. There are doubtless some who cannot understand
this metaphorical argument. I wish to show that the relation of a word to that
which it addresses is the same as its relation to its equivalent or identified
terms. For that purpose, I first show that whatever a word addresses is an
equivalent term,— its mental equivalent. I next show that, since the
intelligent reception of a term is the being addressed by that term, and since
the explication of a term's implication is the intelligent reception of that
term, that the interpretant or equivalent of a term which as we have already
seen explicates the implication of a term is addressed by the term. The
interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence,
since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to something,
every symbol— every word and every conception— must have an interpretant— or
what is the same thing, must have information or implication. ] W1:465-67 ]]
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
Sent: 15-Jun-20 09:29
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] (Interpreter → Interpretant) and (Possible → Actual)
Edwina, Auke, Jon Alan, List ...
Just to remind folks of two very old and ever recurring themes:
1. Peirce's locus pragmaticus on the transformation from talking about
interpretive agents, whether individuals or communities, and whether
animal, vegetable, or mineral, to talking about interpretant signs
can be found here:
Inquiry Driven Systems • C'est Moi
<https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi>
https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi
<QUOTE>
I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some
proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol has an
equivalent term — or one which has become identified with it, — in short, has
an interpretant.
Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a
representation is something which stands for something. … A thing cannot stand
for something without standing to something for that something. Now, what is
this that a word stands to? Is it a person?
We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would be a
little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind — to his
memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular
remembrance or image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? Plainly,
the one which is the mental equivalent of the word homme — in short, its
interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is its interpretant
or identified symbol. …
The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical.
Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to
something, every symbol — every word and every conception — must have an
interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication.
(Peirce, CE 1, 466–467).
</QUOTE>
2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena,
we are always proceeding hypothetically and tentatively, and the modality
of all mathematics, in its own right, is the possible, since mathematical
existence is existence in the moderate sense of “what's not inconsistent”.
In the idiom, “it's would-be's all the way down”, and the usual scales of
modality are flattened down to one mode, Be ♭. It's not until we take the
risk of acting on our abduced model that we encounter genuine brute force
Secondness.
Regards,
Jon
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