Jon, list,
“The object in view”? Which object is that?
A turn back to basics:
Semiosis is a kind of triadic action. Peirce (CP 5.472-3, c. 1906) explains
that the difference between ‘dynamical, or dyadic, action’ and ‘intelligent, or
triadic action’ is that the latter involves the use of means to an end. In
dyadic action, A causes B, and if B later causes C as a separate event, we
simply have another dyadic action with no intrinsic relation to the first. But
in triadic action, A causes B because B has a systemic tendency to be followed
by C, so that A is the system's way of getting to C by means of B. (Or we might
prefer to say that it's a single continuous process rather than a series of
single events, the division into A, B and C being somewhat artificial.) Living
systems have flexibility, and thus viability, because a variety of B-type
actions (differing in details) can bring about C. Consciousness additionally
confers the ability to choose which variant of B to employ in a given
situation, enabling a measure of self-control.
[[ All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical,
either takes place between two subjects,— whether they react equally upon each
other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,— or at any
rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on
the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of
three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between
pairs. ] EP2:411 (MS 318, 1907)]
The actions of a life form, being intentional at some level of intelligence or
complexity, are essentially triadic because they involve signs mediating
between events and actions in such a way that the interpretant action (the
‘dynamic interpretant’) is determined by some purpose or habit, although it is
also caused by some dyadic action. For that dyadic aspect of causality as
opposed to the triadic, Peirce often uses the Aristotelian terminology of
efficient cause as opposed to final cause. However, genuine triadic sign-action
involves both kinds of causation. The dyadic action between object and sign is
essential to the sign-function we call indexical, as Peirce goes on to explain:
[[ For the acceleration of the pulse is a probable symptom of fever and the rise of
the mercury in an ordinary thermometer or the bending of the double strip of metal in
a metallic thermometer is an indication, or, to use the technical term, is an index,
of an increase of atmospheric temperature, which, nevertheless, acts upon it in a
purely brute and dyadic way. In these cases, however, a mental representation of the
index is produced, which mental representation is called the immediate object
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#immedob> of the sign; and this object does
triadically produce the intended, or proper, effect of the sign strictly by means of
another mental sign; and that this triadic character of the action is regarded as
essential is shown by the fact that if the thermometer is dynamically connected with
the heating and cooling apparatus, so as to check either effect, we do not, in
ordinary parlance speak of there being any semeiosy, or action of a sign, but, on the
contrary, say that there is an “automatic regulation,” an idea opposed, in our minds,
to that of semeiosy. ] CP 5.472-3 (MS 318, 1907)]
The functioning of a thermostat is not considered semiosic ‘in our minds’ because no
‘mental’ action connects the dyadic action of the environment upon the thermometer with the
dyadic action directly affecting the heating or cooling apparatus. Yet there is mentality
involved in the action of a thermostat because it was designed to work as a negative
feedback <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm#cyber> device. It works automatically,
meaning that there is no present experience of mental action in its functioning; but we
could say the same of our own automatic (purely habitual) actions, things we do
“unconsciously.” On a longer time scale, though, habit formation is a mental process, and
if we adopt Gregory Bateson's definition of ‘mind,’
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#stxst> we can say the same of evolution. Thus all
warm-blooded animals have evolved to regulate their own temperature by means of internal
processes of which they are not usually conscious. The thermostat is just a mechanized
version of that type of process, externalized from our bodyminds, but still within the
mental processes of nature and culture, just as our habits are.
Returning to Peirce's ‘ordinary parlance,’ we say that mental sign-action does occur when
someone reads a thermometer and interprets the reading as an index of a fever, or of an
overheated or underheated space. The actual response of the reader will then be more
intentional (i.e. mental) than automatic, and will thus be the completion of a ‘triadic
action’ (CP 6.332, c. 1909). In the case of an index, though, the dyadic action of the
object upon the sign is essential to the possibility of the sign conveying any information,
or actually functioning as a sign. We might think of a thermometer which can be (but has
not been) read as a “potential” sign, but as a sinsign
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm#sinleg> , we assume that it exists whether anyone
reads it or not. Likewise, we may call an uninterpreted index simply an ‘index’ even though
it is not presently functioning as a sign. The same goes for a ‘symbol’ – which indeed must
involve an index, for as Peirce told us (EP2:193
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#qarg> ), ‘every symbol must have, organically
attached to it, its Indices of Reactions’; and the same goes for every argument, since
every argument is a symbol.
The <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xtn.htm#Truth> truth of a sign depends on the dyadic or
real relation between the sign and its dynamic object. A true proposition must involve
‘action of brute force, physical or psychical,’ of the dynamic object upon the sign, so
that the relation between the two is ‘real,’ i.e.
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snc.htm#srd> surd – no sign can express or describe it.
‘Relations are either dicible or surd. For the only kind of relation that could be
veritably described to a person who had no experience of it is a relation of reason. A
relation of reason is not purely dyadic: it is a relation through a sign: that is why it is
dicible’ (EP2:382-3).
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
Sent: 3-Aug-20 08:00
To: [email protected]; Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [Peirce's methodology
Auke,
Exactly!
We interpret texts
in relation to
the object in view.
Regards,
Jon
