John, List, All: JFS: In choosing a symbol for if-then as a logical primitive, Peirce was in good company. Frege, Whitehead, Russell, and Gentzen made the same mistake.
Thank you for finally acknowledging that you *disagree with Peirce* about the scroll for consequence being a logical primitive and negation being derived from it. Given his primary objective as a logician, that was not a "mistake" on his part at all. JFS: And for each of them, that choice made their proof procedures more complex, less efficient, and less general. For the umpteenth time, it was *not a priority* for Peirce to make his proof procedures simpler and more efficient. Please review what I already quoted from RL 231 ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00027.html), since you consider that letter to be his "best and final" complete explanation of EGs. He could not have been clearer or more emphatic about "the real purpose" of EGs, not to mention his low opinion of logicians who fail to recognize it and instead "put obstacles in the way of meeting it." JFS: In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in all contexts without any change in meaning. No, it means freely interchangeable *within a particular formal system*. In the context of classical logic, which treats the universe of discourse as *individual*, a scroll is indeed equivalent to and interchangeable with nested cuts/ovals. Nevertheless, as I demonstrated with Shafiei's example of *ex falso quodlibet* ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00019.html), the same classical EG with nested cuts/ovals can have multiple natural-language translations, which is not the case when scrolls are employed instead. After all, does someone really *mean *exactly the same thing when saying "if A then B" as when saying "not both A and not-B"? Peirce certainly does not think so. CSP: For in reasoning, at least, when we first affirm, or affirmatively judge, the conjugate of premisses, the judgment of the conclusion has not yet been performed. There then follows a real movement of thought in the mind, in which that judgment of the conclusion comes to pass. Now surely, speaking of the same A and B as above, it were absurd to say that a real change of A into a sequent B consists in a state of things that should consist in there not being an A without a B. For in such a state of things there would be no change at all. (R 300:49[48], 1908) In the context of intuitionistic/synechistic logic, which treats the universe of discourse as *general*, we can derive nested cuts/ovals from a scroll but not vice-versa. This is consistent with Peirce's explicit statements that it is ultimately inaccurate to analyze a consequence as a composite of two negations (R 300, 1908) or to evaluate a conditional proposition as true merely because its antecedent does not happen to be realized (R 490, 1906). In fact, he elaborates on the latter point in alternate drafts of the same letter to F. A. Woods where he goes on to call his original description of EGs his "most lucid and interesting paper," criticizes his account of them in "Prolegomena" as "far the worst I ever perpetrated" with its "nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry," and expresses skepticism about "the universal validity of my '4th permission.'" CSP: A conditional judgment can produce no other relevant psychical effect than to produce a habit. Consequently if the condition is *singular *and is not actualized, the proposition, strictly speaking, has no meaning, since a habit that can never produce any action is a nullity. It is therefore nonsense to speak of what would have occurred in an *existential*, i.e. *single*, case that did not happen. The reader would be reading about fairy-land. All such suppositions must therefore be translatable as having an abstract and general meaning or they mean nothing. But further, though a *habit *(original or acquired), a “would-be” is a *real*, yet if it is never the motive of a deed, it has no practical value. (RL 477:8, 1913 Oct 14) CSP: A conditional proposition,--say "if A, then B" is equivalent to saying that "*Any *state of things in which A should be true, *would *(within limits) *be *a state of things in which B is true." It is therefore essentially an assertion of a *general *nature, the statement of a " *would-be*." But when the antecedent supposes an *existential *fact to be different from what it actually is or was, the conditional proposition does not accurately state anything; and if it conveys any meaning, i.e. if it is calculated to produce any state of mind, in a person who trusts in it, it must be that it establishes a *habit* in that mind, using the word "habit" in the original sense, as meaning only that the person or the thing that has the habit, *would *behave (or usually behave) in a certain way *whenever *a certain occasion should arise. But if this occasion did in actuality *not *arise, such habit of thought as the conditional proposition might produce would be a nullity pragmatistically and practically. ... But unless there is some *general *antecedent to be gained in a reasonable manner, a conditional proposition with a singular antecedent known to be false, is worse than a puerility. It is downright nonsense, a series of words without meaning.(RL 477:11-12&15, 1913 Oct 14) In classical logic, a conditional proposition signifies an *actual *state of things, such that the antecedent and consequent are individual/singular/existential. That is why excluded middle is maintained. By contrast, in synechistic logic, a conditional proposition signifies a *general *state of things, such that the consequent describes what *would *be realized if the antecedent *were *to be realized. That is why excluded middle is *not *maintained. This is different from intuitionistic logic, where the standard interpretation of a conditional proposition is that having a constructive proof for the antecedent entails also having a constructive proof for the consequent. There is also obviously a connection with Peirce's pragmatism, which I am still in the process of working out. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 11:25 PM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS and Jerry LRC, > > JAS> Indeed, his "only" comments in favor of the scroll are in numerous > passages from his extensive writings about EGs between late 1896 and June > 1911. > > That is indeed true. In choosing a symbol for if-then as a logical > primitive, Peirce was in good company. Frege, Whitehead, Russell, and > Gentzen made the same mistake. And for each of them, that choice made > their proof procedures more complex, less efficient, and less general. > > O. H. Mitchell gets the credit for informing Peirce of that point, and I > have been writing an article with examples from all of the above. I'll > send a copy to the P-list in the next few days. > > JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in > all contexts without any change in meaning. > > JLRC> Really? > > Yes, indeed. As Casey Stengel used to say, "Ya could look it up." > > John >
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