John, List, All:

JFS: In choosing a symbol for if-then as a logical primitive, Peirce was in
good company.  Frege, Whitehead, Russell, and Gentzen made the same mistake.


Thank you for finally acknowledging that you *disagree with Peirce* about
the scroll for consequence being a logical primitive and negation being
derived from it. Given his primary objective as a logician, that was not a
"mistake" on his part at all.

JFS: And for each of them, that choice made their proof procedures more
complex, less efficient, and less general.


For the umpteenth time, it was *not a priority* for Peirce to make his
proof procedures simpler and more efficient. Please review what I already
quoted from RL 231 (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00027.html), since you
consider that letter to be his "best and final" complete explanation of
EGs. He could not have been clearer or more emphatic about "the real
purpose" of EGs, not to mention his low opinion of logicians who fail to
recognize it and instead "put obstacles in the way of meeting it."

JFS: In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in
all contexts without any change in meaning.


No, it means freely interchangeable *within a particular formal system*. In
the context of classical logic, which treats the universe of discourse as
*individual*, a scroll is indeed equivalent to and interchangeable with
nested cuts/ovals. Nevertheless, as I demonstrated with Shafiei's example
of *ex falso quodlibet* (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00019.html), the same
classical EG with nested cuts/ovals can have multiple natural-language
translations, which is not the case when scrolls are employed instead.
After all, does someone really *mean *exactly the same thing when saying
"if A then B" as when saying "not both A and not-B"? Peirce certainly does
not think so.

CSP: For in reasoning, at least, when we first affirm, or affirmatively
judge, the conjugate of premisses, the judgment of the conclusion has not
yet been performed. There then follows a real movement of thought in the
mind, in which that judgment of the conclusion comes to pass. Now surely,
speaking of the same A and B as above, it were absurd to say that a real
change of A into a sequent B consists in a state of things that should
consist in there not being an A without a B. For in such a state of things
there would be no change at all. (R 300:49[48], 1908)


In the context of intuitionistic/synechistic logic, which treats the
universe of discourse as *general*, we can derive nested cuts/ovals from a
scroll but not vice-versa. This is consistent with Peirce's explicit
statements that it is ultimately inaccurate to analyze a consequence as a
composite of two negations (R 300, 1908) or to evaluate a conditional
proposition as true merely because its antecedent does not happen to be
realized (R 490, 1906). In fact, he elaborates on the latter point in
alternate drafts of the same letter to F. A. Woods where he goes on to call
his original description of EGs his "most lucid and interesting paper,"
criticizes his account of them in "Prolegomena" as "far the worst I ever
perpetrated" with its "nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry," and expresses
skepticism about "the universal validity of my '4th permission.'"

CSP: A conditional judgment can produce no other relevant psychical effect
than to produce a habit. Consequently if the condition is *singular *and is
not actualized, the proposition, strictly speaking, has no meaning, since a
habit that can never produce any action is a nullity. It is therefore
nonsense to speak of what would have occurred in an *existential*, i.e.
*single*, case that did not happen. The reader would be reading about
fairy-land. All such suppositions must therefore be translatable as having
an abstract and general meaning or they mean nothing. But further,
though a *habit
*(original or acquired), a “would-be” is a *real*, yet if it is never the
motive of a deed, it has no practical value. (RL 477:8, 1913 Oct 14)

CSP: A conditional proposition,--say "if A, then B" is equivalent to saying
that "*Any *state of things in which A should be true, *would *(within
limits) *be *a state of things in which B is true." It is therefore
essentially an assertion of a *general *nature, the statement of a "
*would-be*." But when the antecedent supposes an *existential *fact to be
different from what it actually is or was, the conditional proposition does
not accurately state anything; and if it conveys any meaning, i.e. if it is
calculated to produce any state of mind, in a person who trusts in it, it
must be that it establishes a *habit* in that mind, using the word "habit"
in the original sense, as meaning only that the person or the thing that
has the habit, *would *behave (or usually behave) in a certain way *whenever
*a certain occasion should arise. But if this occasion did in actuality *not
*arise, such habit of thought as the conditional proposition might produce
would be a nullity pragmatistically and practically. ...
But unless there is some *general *antecedent to be gained in a reasonable
manner, a conditional proposition with a singular antecedent known to be
false, is worse than a puerility. It is downright nonsense, a series of
words without meaning.(RL 477:11-12&15, 1913 Oct 14)


In classical logic, a conditional proposition signifies an *actual *state
of things, such that the antecedent and consequent are
individual/singular/existential. That is why excluded middle is maintained.
By contrast, in synechistic logic, a conditional proposition signifies
a *general
*state of things, such that the consequent describes what *would *be
realized if the antecedent *were *to be realized. That is why excluded
middle is *not *maintained. This is different from intuitionistic logic,
where the standard interpretation of a conditional proposition is that
having a constructive proof for the antecedent entails also having a
constructive proof for the consequent. There is also obviously a connection
with Peirce's pragmatism, which I am still in the process of working out.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 11:25 PM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon AS and Jerry LRC,
>
> JAS> Indeed, his "only" comments in favor of the scroll are in numerous
> passages from his extensive writings about EGs between late 1896 and June
> 1911.
>
> That is indeed true.  In choosing a symbol for if-then as a logical
> primitive, Peirce was in good company.  Frege, Whitehead, Russell, and
> Gentzen made the same mistake.  And for each of them, that choice made
> their proof procedures more complex, less efficient, and less general.
>
> O. H. Mitchell gets the credit for informing Peirce of that point, and I
> have been writing an article with examples from all of the above.  I'll
> send a copy to the P-list in the next few days.
>
> JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in
> all contexts without any change in meaning.
>
> JLRC> Really?
>
> Yes, indeed.  As Casey Stengel used to say, "Ya could look it up."
>
> John
>
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