Gary R, list, Apparently the list guidelines do not forbid posting an “interpretation” that flatly contradicts the text it claims to be interpreting.
Nor is there any objection to pointing out the fact that said “interpretation” does contradict the text it claims to be interpreting. But when the poster of the “interpretation” objects to anyone pointing out said fact, on the ground that all interpretations are opinions, and are therefore all of equal value and incorrigible, and thus any attempt to correct them constitutes a personal attack, I think that should be the end of the discussion. The idea that all interpretations are equally valid reminds me of Peirce’s remark in the second Lowell lecture <https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm> (where he is deriving the concept of negation from the scroll): “Let us invent a sign which shall assert that everything is true. Nothing could be more illogical than that statement, inasmuch as it would render logic false as well as needless.” The statement (expressed or implied) that all interpretations are of equal value is similar to the assertion that everything is true, except that it dispenses altogether with the notion of truth. It has the effect of rendering all “interpretations” and “opinions” needless; and of course defending an “interpretation” against disagreement with it is equally needless. It follows, I think, that once the relevant facts about an “interpretation” have been posted, any further discussion of the issue is also needless and unworthy of the list’s attention. That’s why I don’t discuss the issue in this post, and perhaps why John S. also declines to discuss it. This is only my opinion, of course, but I take the trouble to express it because I believe that some opinions do have more truth-value than others because they are more consistent with the facts of the matter. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Gary Richmond Sent: 21-May-21 01:11 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Objective Idealism Edwina, You have read a lot of personal judgment into my post which is not there. I am merely doing what JFS has just said in a different context, that the "evidence makes it very hard for anyone to claim the contrary opinion." Here the evidence is again in short. Peirce writes: ". . .the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] primordial." The psychical law alone is primordial. How else is anyone to legitimately interpret that than JFS and I have? I read your counter-argument which I found strained and unconvincing. ". . . matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." "Matter is effete mind." Again, Peirce's words are as clear as day. Indeed: ". . .matter is nothing but effete mind." And further that: ". . .matter [is] mere specialized and partially deadened mind." You can protest as much as you wish, but as you noted, John Sowa "pointed out, the term 'opinion' should not be understood as ungrounded, subjective and therefore belittled - but as a conclusion based on evidence." I don't see that I've "belittled" you at all. I simply completely disagree with you, pointing out that your opinion is NOT "a conclusion based on evidence." And I didn't "put you down" all. On what do you base that claim? To show how an opinion is a conclusion NOT based on evidence is not a put down and it is not "unprofessional." Your saying that is closer to being "unprofessional," but I won't make that judgment. But one should be careful, I think, of name-calling, especially in public. And I actually thought you knew me better than that. What? I can't strongly disagree with you without being called "unprofessional"? You keep saying that you disagree with "Jon's interpretation"--well, take that 'opinion' out of consideration and look only at Peirce's texts, something JFS has frequently claimed of late ought to be the final arbiter of his meaning. It is not you and Jon (or me) who disagree (as you claim), but you and Peirce if we are to take him at his word. Your 'interpretation' does not take him at his word. And I do not "support Jon's view"--you will perhaps notice that my "support" has been solely Peirce's texts. I support Peirce's view as expressed in his texts. Jon seems to do precisely the same, not expressing an opinion, perhaps at most at times paraphrasing a text (to introduce it) which he then quotes. As for scholars affirming Pierce's view of "objective idealism," well, I can't do it this evening, but I could point to many scholars who simply quote (as I have) Peirce and reaffirm that this is in fact his view. Now if you want to disagree with his view, then that's a very different matter which would require some argumentation on your behalf. You write that your "interpretation of this is: matter-is-mind; and -mind-is-matter. The two are interactive, entwined correlates and neither is primordial." But Peirce says that this is not the case, that mind is primordial. CSP: ". . .the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial." ET: "I think you should do me the courtesy of not treating me as an aberrant child, or a naive student, or a..whatever." GR: That statement is patently absurd. You are not some sort of intellectual victim here. All I am saying is that I very, very strongly disagree with you and support that disagreement on the evidence of the many quotations by Peirce on the matter, "this evidence makes it very hard for anyone to claim the contrary opinion." Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 11:35 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: Gary R, list And I must note that your outline is your opinion. Again, 'opinion' is equivalent to 'interpretation'; As John pointed out, the term 'opinion' should not be understood as ungrounded, subjective and therefore belittled - but as a conclusion based on evidence, ie, an interpretation of the facts. The Peircean text - can be considered the 'evidence', the 'facts. Jon's interpretation AND MINE - are based on and only on our individual reading of these texts. I object to your assertion that I am not reading the texts or 'refusing to read'. Kindly provide evidence for such a claim.. I stand by my interpretation. I reject Jon's view that 'Mind' is primordial and Matter is only derived - My reading of Peirce is that Objective Idealism - which is a term that Jon repeatedly ignores in its Textual Identity -ie he ignores the addition of the term 'objective' - but this addition means, in my interpretation, that Mind and Matter are correlates, and that neither is primordial but are correlates of each other. And I object to your put-down of me; I consider that such an attitude towards another scholar is unprofessional - your claims that my interpretation is 'unreasonable' and a 'misinterpretation'. The fact that I disagree with Jon does NOT also mean that my interpretation is 'unreasonable' and a 'misinterpretation'. It means ONLY that Jon and I disagree. The fact that you support his view, does not also mean that you have the right to call my view 'unreasonable' and a 'misinterpretation. Nor can you say that this issue is 'beyond dispute''; nor that it has been decided 'for decades'. There is no evidence of this. Your quotation of "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial".....left out the rest of the quote".."which is idealism'". But Peirce did NOT choose 'idealism'. He chose OBJECTIVE idealism - and neither you nor Jon take notice of this FACT. There is a reason, obviously, for his addition of this term of 'objective' - and his explanation is: 'that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws". And MY interpretation of this is: matter-is-mind; and -mind-is-matter. The two are interactive, entwined correlates and neither is primordial. Equally I reject Jon's claim that 'something has to be primordial' - which is rather similar to Anselm's and Aquinas' ontological argument for the existence of god. Peirce didn't say this! Again, I think you should do me the courtesy of not treating me as an aberrant child, or a naive student, or a..whatever...but consider that I have the scholarly capacity to reason, to read the texts [and have been doing so for many years] - and can make up my own opinions/interpretations. The fact that you and Jon disagree with me - is fine with me, but neither one of you has convinced me that my view is an incorrect reading of Peirce. Edwina On Thu 20/05/21 11:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> sent: Edwina, Jon, List, Obviously you are not reading -- apparently refusing to read -- Peirce's texts on this matter of objective idealism with their intended meaning, as clear as anything could be. I would hope that those List members following this exchange would consider for a moment of clarity just what Jon has put into boldface: *the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism. *The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. *But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. *I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. This is decidedly not a matter of your opinion vs Jon's, but of what Peirce clearly states vs. your very obvious and, frankly, unreasonable misinterpretation of his clear meaning. Why you persist in this is beyond my ken. And I don't know why Jon keeps trying to convince you of that which is really beyond dispute and has been for decades for any reputable Peirce scholar I know of with the exception of you alone; perhaps I'm missing someone who holds your view, in which case, please let us know who that person is. John Sowa has written that he doesn't want to sound in on this, but I can't see how he could reasonably agree with your idiosyncratic take on 'objective idealism'. So, one last time (at least for me): ". . .the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] primordial." ". . . matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." ". . .matter is nothing but effete mind." ". . .matter [is] mere specialized and partially deadened mind." That is not Jon's opinion, but Peirce's view. There's nothing ambiguous here. Your view is a misinterpretation of Peirce's clear meaning. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 10:02 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca%20> > wrote: JAS, list We've been through this debate many times before - and neither of us, obviously, is going to change their 'opinion'. The reason I say 'opinion' is because you are, I feel, misusing what we mean by the term. By 'opinion', we mean our individual interpretation of the Peircean text. And quite frankly, that is all that any one of us can do. Nothing more. Again: 'interpretation' is a 'synonym for 'opinion'. Don't give it the derogatory addition that implies an opinion is a priori or subjective or ungrounded. An opinion/interpretation is ALL we can arrive at when reading Peirce's texts. We cannot prove that our interpretation is exactly 'what Peirce meant' - for, again - our reading of the Peircean text is: an interpretation, ie, an opinion. That's basic semiosis, after all! The quotation of: "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws' [6.24] is, in my interpretation/opinion, quite clear. You will notice that the first phrase is: matter-is-mind; while the second phrase is: mind-is-matter. This shows, to me, that neither mind nor matter are primordial; and as well, that neither is independent, but that both, as I said, emerge and function as correlates, together. Additionally, there is nothing in this or other texts that says that mind is primordial nor that matter is 'derived', ie, secondary. To say that matter is 'deadened mind' does not imply that mind is primordial, but that - the nature of matter is 'stable habits'. Peirce's definition of neutralism isn't that both Mind and Matter are primordial, but that they are independent of each other. Again, my interpretation/opinion is that he does not consider that they are independent of each other; he does not consider either one as primordial, but considers that they are correlates and emerge and function together. That's why he uses the term of Objective Idealism. Not idealism. But objective idealism, which includes matter. Furthermore - you may feel that 'by definition', some one entity has to be primordial - but this is an assumption without empirical or even logical evidence. I don't read this in Peirce's texts. It's rather similar to Aquinas 'Five Arguments for the Existence of God' -which are a posteriori rationalizations. We'll have to leave it at that - each of us has our own interpretation/opinion of the Peircean texts - equally grounded in texts. Edwina On Thu 20/05/21 8:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent: John, Edwina, List: ET: This is one of the best, if not the best, outlines of Peirce's 'Objective Idealism' that I've seen. [6.24]. I agree that John Sowa's outline in this case is excellent, but it is obviously describing Peirce's extreme scholastic (three-category) realism rather than his objective idealism. For a comprehensive exposition of Peirce's relevant views, including how his realism and idealism are fully consistent with each other, I highly recommend Robert Lane's recent book, Peirce on Realism and Idealism (https://books.google.com/books/about/Peirce_on_Realism_and_Idealism.html?id=yKpCDwAAQBAJ). ET: That is, neither the psychical law [Mind, Form] nor the physical law [matter laws] are primordial or fundamental, and most certainly are not independent of each other, but are correlates and emerge in space-time together, each functioning with the other. Please provide "an exact quotation by Peirce" in which he explicitly defines "objective idealism" such that "neither the psychical law ... nor the physical law ... are primordial," or even acknowledges that there is any such option. Otherwise, in accordance with John Sowa's recent methodological assertions (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-05/msg00045.html ), it is just an opinion and cannot be claimed as "what Peirce meant" or "what Peirce intended." There is certainly no such quotation in CP 6.24-25, which I provide below. Instead, Peirce states that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws," thus unambiguously affirming that mind and psychical laws (i.e., habits) are primordial, while matter is a particular kind of mind and physical laws are derived and special. According to his cosmology, the overall evolution of our existing universe proceeds only in this direction, from less determinate to more determinate, which is presumably why he never says anything like "mind is enlivened matter, physical laws becoming changeable habits" or even "mind and matter are correlates, psychical habits and physical laws emerging in space-time together." Moreover, by definition something has to be primordial--if neither mind nor matter, then what? Peirce rules out the alternative that they are both primordial, which he calls "neutralism." In short, (Peircean) objective idealism is indeed not (Platonic) pure idealism, and it is also not (Berkeleyan) subjective idealism nor (Hegelian) absolute idealism, but it is still a form of idealism as straightforwardly entailed by the term itself and confirmed by the other two passages quoted below. Although some have complained about my penchant for including such lengthy excerpts in my posts, I assume that there will be no such objections in this case since what is at issue are Peirce's views as expressed in his own words, not whether they are correct. CSP: The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken-- (a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name neutralism; or, (b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as primordial, which is materialism; or, (c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism. The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason--an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable. Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial. The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. (CP 6.24-25, EP 1:292-293, 1891; bold added) CSP: Either mind is a peculiar kind of matter, or else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in materialism, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. (R 936:3, no date; bold added) CSP: I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, EP 1:312, 1892; bold added) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: John, list You wrote:" Re mathematics: It's not necessary to accept Plato's claim that the mathematical forms are more fundamental than physical things. An Aristotelian position is more acceptable: mathematical forms represent possibilities that exist in space-time only when embodied. That is Peirce's assumption: Mathematics is the totality of all patterns of what is possible." This is one of the best, if not the best, outlines of Peirce's 'Objective Idealism' that I've seen. [6.24]. Pure idealism is indeed Platonic - with the view that 'mathematical forms [ideal] are more fundamental than physical things. Peirce, who was an Aristotelian, instead chose objective idealism, where the form/ideal is not more fundamental or primordial but represents only possibilities that exist as those laws - only when embodied in physical matter, ie, in space-time. That is, neither the psychical law [Mind, Form] nor the physical law [matter laws] are primordial or fundamental, and most certainly are not independent of each other, but are correlates and emerge in space-time together, each functioning with the other. As he said, 'matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws' 6.24. That is -the physical is effete psychical; the psychical functions as physical laws. Neither are fundamental or primordial and neither can exist without the other. Edwina On Thu 20/05/21 12:36 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net <mailto:s...@bestweb.net> sent: Avril, As I said in my note, I believe that Mario Bunge's view that an ontology based on systems is quite good. I also agree with the quotations you cited in your note. But one thing that is missing from most discussions of ontology is a definition of 'reality' that specifically includes mathematics and the laws of nature. It's impossible to develop science (or even a common sense that is adequate for modern life) without mathematics and an assumption that there are laws that govern everything we perceive, act upon, and are acted upon. Re mathematics: It's not necessary to accept Plato's claim that the mathematical forms are more fundamental than physical things. An Aristotelian position is more acceptable: mathematical forms represent possibilities that exist in space-time only when embodied. That is Peirce's assumption: Mathematics is the totality of all patterns of what is possible. Re laws: Our universe is not random. The laws that govern it are real. And the laws must be extended to include the habitual or instinctive behaviors of all the varieties of things -- including living things -- in it. C. S. Peirce defined reality as that which is as it is, independently of anything we may think of it. That implies (1) mathematics is that aspect of reality that specifies what is logically possible; (2) actuality is that aspect of reality that occupies space-time; and (3) laws are that aspect of reality that govern the ways in which actuality develops or evolves. If you add this to Mario B's ontology, you would have an excellent top level. Without it, all you get is a special-case microtheory. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
