Edwin, List, Thank you, Edwina. You have clearly gone down this road before. Here is an interesting video that touches on much of what I was trying to decipher in our list posts today. From my perspective, I do see Object-Representamen-Interpretant in the video's scenario. It's important for me to find a way to bring Peircean understanding outside of academia, and into real world dialogue.
https://youtu.be/GITVPh7GVSE Cathy On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 1:15 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Cathy, list > > Thank you for the links. I'm aware of both authors, I have, myself, even > given conference papers on Bakhtin [one in Moscow, which showed us the > results of socialism] - but, the references to Peirce and Bakhtin, as > both stressing the importance of the dialogic interaction and the role of > the interpretant and thus, the role of dialogue, does not, in my view, mean > that Bakhtin's work is analogous to Peircean semiosis. > It lacks the triadic nature of the Sign > [Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and lacks the categories. My view is > that these two factors are essential to an analysis being aligned with > Peircean semiosis. > > Edwina > > On Tue 15/06/21 12:59 PM , Synechism Center synechismcen...@gmail.com > sent: > > List, > > In regard to Peirce, Bakhtin, and Otherness (Secondness), here are two > links to help further explore this topic. > > Semiotics between Peirce and Bakhtin (semio2014.org) > <https://semio2014.org/en/semiotics-between-peirce-and-bakhtin> > > DEED, OTHERNESS AND LOVE IN BAKHTIN AND PEIRCE (iass-ais.org) > <https://iass-ais.org/proceedings2014/view_lesson.php?id=75> > > > Cathy T. > > On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:34 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> List >> >> I have several comments >> >> 1] First, a question to Gary R and John Sowa: What is the functionality >> of putting an area of study, such as Jappy's work, into 'semeiotic' rather >> than 'phaneroscopy'? How does such a categorization affect the results of >> the study? >> >> 2] With reference to Bakhtin, I wouldn't define him as a semiotician >> but put him in the camp of semiology - and there's a huge difference >> between the two. >> >> 3] I'd have a different interpretation of Cathy's example. Since the >> semiotic interaction is dialogic, then, the sensation of the categories and >> indeed, their 'mode of being' [8.328] rests within the interaction. So, I >> don't understand how a frame and canvas is, in itself, is a hypoicon of the >> Mona Lisa. I, as the receiver n this semiotic dialogue, could only react to >> the reality of what is in front of me: a frame and canvas. >> >> My understanding of the hypoicon is that the received sensation, if a >> duplicate of X, is an image. If it represents the parts of X, then it is a >> diagram. If it is representative of X, then it is a metaphor. But in all >> cases, X must exist. In the first case, X is a frame and canvas; that is >> what my senses receive; there is no inherent potentiality to 'be' the Mona >> Lisa. >> >> My understanding is that pure Firstness is simply the sensation of X - >> and whether it is a frame or picture is not relevant. After that first >> sensation, the other categories move into their function; so, an >> interpretant in the mode of 2-1 [rhematic indexical] might see a diagram. >> And adding in the knowledge base of Thirdness, I could come up with 3-1 and >> a rhematic symbol. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Tue 15/06/21 11:26 AM , Synechism Center synechismcen...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Gary R, List, >> >> From your last post.... >> >> "CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly >> by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be >> wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as >> a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in >> itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP >> 2.276) >> >> >> The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the >> trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking of >> "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First >> Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can >> similarly be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as >> signs of 2nd firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which >> represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a >> parallelism in something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd >> firstness. >> >> CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of >> Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or >> First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly >> dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in >> their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative >> character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something >> else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903)" >> >> >> Please correct me if I am not understanding... I always try to relate >> these topics to real life, as that is my intention with trying to help a >> more general audience understand. ..... Imagine I am standing in front >> of the Mona Lisa. The 'painting' (canvas and frame), if absent of the >> image of the Mona Lisa, is a hypoicon . It is a 'container', so to >> speak, a Firstness, and a potential placement for 2nd firstness (that >> which the artist applies to the canvas), the Mona Lisa becomes a metaphor >> when I gaze at it and in my mind it represents a 16th century woman with >> knowing eyes. This activity that my mind is now engaged in is 3rd >> firstness. It is the manifestation of the original potentiality of First >> Firstness. >> >> Semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin would expand on this idea of continued >> interaction with the painting as dialogic. >> >> Am I making sense? >> >> Cathy T. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 10:44 AM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, John, List >>> >>> Jon, thank you for pointing out that Jappy's work, which John >>> referenced, is not about phaneroscopy but, rather, about semeiotic; >>> and, similarly, that the Peirce snippets John quoted also -- as I see it, >>> rather obviously -- concern semeiotic (specifically, semeiotic grammar) >>> and not phaneroscopy/ phenomenology. I'll comment only on those three >>> quotations here. >>> >>> CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the >>> categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not >>> imperatively call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). >>> >>> >>> Now this quotation is of considerable interest for several reasons. The >>> entire short paragraph as it appears in EP2 reads: >>> >>> CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories >>> but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively >>> call for any such division. For a pure icon does not draw any distinction >>> between itself and its object. It represents whatever it may represent, >>> and, whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of suchness only. >>> >>> >>> The icon/index/symbol trichotomy is introduced in Peirce's semeiotic >>> grammar (along with two other trichotomies added somewhat later, namely, >>> the qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the rheme/dicisign/argument). >>> >>> What is of interest to me here is that an icon "represent[ing] whatever >>> it may represent, and, whatever it is like [and so being] an affair of >>> suchness only," that this simplest of semeiotic structures in relation to >>> the sign's object may, nonetheless, "undoubtedly be divided according to >>> the [3] categories" is, on the face of it, a somewhat startling notion. So >>> at some point in the slow read I'd like to take this up. The crucial >>> distinction may be -- and as Joe Ransdell and I (and some others) discussed >>> it on the List many years ago -- that between 'a pure icon' (does >>> Peirce even regard a pure icon as really possible?) and 'iconicity' as, >>> perhaps, the second passage John quoted suggests. >>> >>> CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly >>> by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be >>> wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as >>> a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in >>> itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP >>> 2.276) >>> >>> >>> The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the >>> trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking of >>> "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First >>> Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can >>> similarly be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as >>> signs of 2nd firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which >>> represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a >>> parallelism in something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd >>> firstness. >>> >>> CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of >>> Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or >>> First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly >>> dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in >>> their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative >>> character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something >>> else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903) >>> >>> >>> Whether or not one agrees with the details or the terminology or even >>> the whole of the above trichotomic analysis (which, again, I'd rather >>> postpone to much later in the slow read while, in fact, John didn't place >>> his post in a slow read thread), yet, these quotations all refer to >>> applications of the categories discovered in phenomenology to another >>> science, viz., semeiotic, specifically, to the first branch of that >>> science, semeiotic grammar. >>> >>> This tendency to conflate the application of the phenomenological >>> categories -- and, perhaps, the application especially to semeiotic -- with >>> the categories themselves is, in my view, one of the principal reasons why >>> the slow read of De Tienne's slideshow presentation of phaneroscopy/ >>> phenomenology, seems timely and important. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> “Let everything happen to you >>> Beauty and terror >>> Just keep going >>> No feeling is final” >>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> [image: Blocked image] >>> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> Virus-free. >>> www.avg.com >>> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> >>> <#m_-8804769278326127534_m_-1501539394370053589_m_-4935300386291183038_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> >>> >>> On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 8:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> John, List: >>>> >>>> I have corrected the subject line since the cited writings by Jappy and >>>> quoted statements by Peirce are not about phaneroscopy at all, but about >>>> speculative grammar as the first branch of the normative science of logic >>>> as semeiotic. Jappy himself recognizes this in the very first chapter of >>>> his book. >>>> >>>> TJ: In his earlier writings, Peirce had made the categories, of which >>>> there were five in the mid-1860s, dependent upon logic. By 1903, he had >>>> created a new science to deal with this part of the system, which he called >>>> ‘phenomenology’* and which was now independent of logic, presupposing only >>>> concepts provided by mathematics. (p. 15) >>>> *Later to be titled ‘phaneroscopy’, which studies the ‘phaneron’. (p. >>>> 190 n. 9) >>>> >>>> TJ: For the moment, we note simply that the normative, as opposed to >>>> the formal, mathematical aspect of logic – in other words, the philosophy >>>> of representation – subdivides by the architectonic principle into three >>>> branches, the first of which as we saw above, being speculative grammar. >>>> This Peirce defines as the general theory of the nature and meaning of >>>> signs and, since logic is a classificatory science, speculative grammar >>>> determines, among other things, whether a sign is an icon, an index or a >>>> symbol (CP 1.191, 1903). (p. 17) >>>> >>>> >>>> Jappy's paper further clarifies that phenomenology/phaneroscopy >>>> provides the framework for classifying signs in the 1903 taxonomy, but >>>> that task itself clearly falls within speculative grammar. It is important >>>> not to conflate the two by treating the latter as if it were a branch of >>>> the former, since it also depends on esthetics and ethics as Peirce clearly >>>> maintained. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jun 13, 2021 at 11:21 PM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> (For some mysterious reason, the content of my previous note >>>>> disappeared.} >>>>> >>>>> As background reading material about phaneroscopy, I recommend some >>>>> important papers by Tony Jappy. Unlike many publications that talk only >>>>> about abstract issues, Tony J illustrates the abstract analysis with >>>>> specific examples of paintings and other images. >>>>> >>>>> "Two Peircean approaches to the image: hypoiconicity and semiosis" by >>>>> Tony Jappy: https://www.academia.edu/40389448 >>>>> >>>>> For a book by Jappy with many more examples, see Peirce's 28 classes >>>>> of signs and the philosophy of representation, >>>>> https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/45654/625766.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Jappy has published more articles on phaneroscopy and related issues, >>>>> but these two references are a good place to start. >>>>> >>>>> John >>>>> _________________________________ >>>>> >>>>> Some quotations by Peirce, which Jappy discusses: >>>>> >>>>> Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; >>>>> but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively >>>>> call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). >>>>> >>>>> But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by >>>>> its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be >>>>> wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as >>>>> a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in >>>>> itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP >>>>> 2.276) >>>>> >>>>> Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of Firstness >>>>> which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or First >>>>> Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly >>>>> dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations >>>>> in >>>>> their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative >>>>> character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something >>>>> else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903) >>>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >>>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of >>>> the message and nothing in the body. More at >>>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of >>> the message and nothing in the body. More at >>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> >> >> >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
