Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall.
I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4 Gary F., list, Nice summary of pheneroscopy. But that was not the issue. The issue was whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. best, Auke Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> : Auke, Gary R, list, For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on. The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. I hope this helps … Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36 To: Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4 Gary, List I wrote: Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. -- You wrote: “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. -- In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or single minded would have been a better choice. But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I did apply it to the excercize. The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.” -- yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in (trutfunctional) propositions? best, Auke Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> : Helmut, Auke, list, I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would have such an effect on her. Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete: [[ Jon, CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition. CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the mind's creation. This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina: CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905) And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality. In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]] GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903). GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual thinkers does not appear in the direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the differences between individual minds and treats all possible minds as one mind. CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. (CP 1.284, 1905) CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905) GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.” Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57 To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> List, the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop. I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch into essentialism. Best Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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