Jack, Gary F., List: JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of consciousness?
I agree with Gary F.'s response. As we discussed a few slides back, Peirce identifies not just one but three modes of consciousness that align with his categories, calling them primisense/altersense/medisense in c. 1896 and qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (the last is my shorthand) in 1909. JC: I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from "thought"? As I discuss in my "Temporal Synechism" paper, Peirce seems to have it the other way around--"logical sequence is a *simpler *concept than temporal sequence ... and can be prescinded from it accordingly" ( https://rdcu.be/b9xVm, p. 25). CSP: The idea of time must be employed in arriving at the conception of logical consecution; but the idea once obtained, the time-element may be omitted, thus leaving the logical sequence free from time. That done, time appears as an existential analogue of the logical flow. (CP 1.491, c. 1896) CSP: For we never think at all without reasoning; and if we try to do so, the attempt merely results in our reasoning about reasoning. Now reasoning takes place in Time; and so far as we can understand it, in a Time that embodies our common-sense notion of Time. (R 300:54[53], 1908) As embodied minds, our actual thinking always takes place *in *time, but we can nevertheless prescind reasoning *from *time--"the time-element may be omitted," because thought is logically possible *without *time. After all, Peirce states elsewhere, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908). JC: Also, if we say there is "more to the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? No, because we are not saying that we *cannot *access reality, just that in phaneroscopy we are not *concerned *with whether what is present to the mind is reality or figment. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 9:38 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Welcome to the conversation on the Peirce list, Jack! I hope your post > will inspire some of the other “novices” to join in as well. > > You may get a reply from Jon when he has the time, but for now I’ll just > offer my own response to one key point in your post: > > JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of > consciousness? > > GF: Thirdness is the predominant mode of *cognition* and of *semiosis*, > but not of *consciousness* according to Peirce’s usual employment of the > term: “Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories” (CP 8.256, > 1902). Secondness is felt or sensed as “dyadic consciousness” (R 300, 38) > before it is abstracted and named as a category. As for Firstness, > > CSP: Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on > the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or > had become conscious of his own existence — that is first, present, > immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, > conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must > be false to it. (W6:171, CP 1.357, 1887-8) > > GF: Description, being semiosic, is ‘contaminated’ with Thirdness; but the > pure “first” is conscious even for Adam *before he had become conscious > of his own existence*. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we > usually find in cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually > identify it with *self-*consciousness. But it’s the appropriate usage for > phaneroscopy, where direct “observation” of the phaneron has to come before > “generalization.” In the latter stage, where a “doctrine of categories” > emerges, there does seem to be a kind of “feedback loop” where the > investigator has to go back and forth between theory and observation in > order to “test” the theory, as in any positive science. But preconceptions > are not supposed to interfere with phaneroscopic “observation” proper. > > We should also address the questions you raise about time and about the > Kantian thing-in-itself, but since André addresses that one directly in the > next slide (9), I think I’ll wait until that’s been posted. > > Gary f. > > } This sentence contradicts itself—or rather—well, no, actually it > doesn't! [Hofstadter] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time > > > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY > *Sent:* 29-Jun-21 17:21 > *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide > 8 > > > > Gary, list, > > > > *GF*: That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or > Thirdness), but we can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because > Secondness is not *logically possible* without Firstness. And that’s why > there must be more to the *phaneron* than what we call *reality*, even > though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, and indeed > the *first* of the positive sciences. > > > > Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of > consciousness? That we can metaphorically arrive at ideas of firstness, > Secondness, and so on, but always from the vantage point of thirdness? I > might have this wrong, but if not it would seem to suggest a kind of > feedback loop in attempts to prescind Secondness from Thirdness or > Firstness from Secondness. > > > > Reading Jon Alan Schmidt's article, *Temporal Synechism*: *A Peircean > Philosophy of Time*, I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind > "time" from "thought"? I'm thinking of this in synechist terms (i.e., "Time > is no exception; in fact, it is 'the continuum par excellence, through the > spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum' > > (Peirce in JAS 2020: 12). The problem being that surely "time" is, in > phenomenological terms, "thought"? Kant makes time the precondition for the > possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to > merely reify its *a priori* status (along with space). And whilst we can > take time and space as *a priori* categories, it doesn't seem to me that > we can "literally" do this - that is, time and space are *a priori* for > no one even though we suppose they must, logically, be *a priori* for > everyone. We know it/each only through experience so that whilst we can > suppose that time/space exist prior to our experience of it as such, such > judgement must still be made from within that experiential prism. > > > > So, in essence, how can we usefully prescind one from the other when the > two are either mutually constitutive (dialectical) or a kind of monadic > firstness to which we have no real access (except through consciousness > which is always at the level of mediation - of Thirdness)? Also, if we say > there is "more to the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not > moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of > itself? Again, absolute novice here but I do know that Peirce in general > seems opposed to traditional "metaphysics" and "metaphysicians" which an > attribution of there being "more to the phaneron than... reality" would > suggest. > > > > This may just be a long-winded way of saying that there may be value in > disregarding too rigidly defined conceptions of temporality. > > > > Thanks > > > > Jack >
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