Gary, List, GF: Peirce’s objection to Kantian metaphysics and epistemology was that for Peirce the thing-in-itself is cognizable if it makes any sense to talk about it at all. The notion of an incognizable thing-in-itself was, for Peirce, absurd.
JC: Yes, but surely there are things (and things about things) that we cannot know; or our knowledge of such things extends only so far as to permit us a glimpse of fallibility. CSP: :Direct experience is neither certain nor uncertain, because it affirms nothing -- it just is. There are delusions, hallucinations, dreams. But there is no mistake that such things really do appear, and direct experience means simply the appearance. It involves no error, because it testifies to nothing but its own appearance. For the same reason, it affords no certainty. It is not exact, because it leaves much vague; though it is not inexact either; that is, it has no false exactitude. (CP 1.148) JC: In the fashion of Bertrand Russell, we might consider a tumble glass (or any such object). We know the glass as object through experience; only insofar as we have held/seen/otherwise sensed such glasses before, or insofar as we can imagine what such an object must/might be like based on our experience of other objects which suggest a kind of iconic affinity. We can even imagine the glass's atomic and subatomic structure. But, surely, we cannot know the actual relation of this atomic-subatomic structure "in itself" - that is, we cannot know what is happening at atomic/subatomic levels as they exist beyond the scope of our perceptive faculties. We can, with the aid of science, make good attempts at imagining/inferring such processes, but does our image of these processes correspond to their actual being (every atom as it exists relative to every other atom at a given moment in time?)? I can understand how our idea/image of such processes are very real (as Peirce says, such ideas/images "really do appear" to us) in a representational sense as our conception/experience of such things (whether fancy or fact) is "real" if/when it simply "is" or "appears" in any representational state before the mind. But is there not a divide between our experience of an object at its "surface level" (touch, taste, and so on), the inference we draw of its internal structure (its atomic/subatomic composition), and then that internal structure as it actually is -- atom to atom -- which contributes to the surface (forms it, in fact) but cannot be reduced to that surface alone, being of a different order/degree of substance? Or, put differently, can we really equate our talk about the thing-in-itself (which is entirely experiential) with the internal structuring of that thing -- tumble glass in this instance -- of which we have no means of direct experience? Or, if we can somehow experience it directly, we have no means of comprehending this experience in a way which isn't then contaminated by time (by memory)? CSP: All this is true of direct experience at its first presentation. But when it comes up to be criticized it is past, itself, and is represented by memory. (CP 1.149). JC: Do we risk conflating our comprehension of our own perceptual limitations (a "real" image/appearance of an object's imagined atomic/subatomic composition) with a refutation of those limitations(the appearance to our mind surely does not coincide with the reality of the atomic/subatomic structure once we have prescinded ourselves from the equation)? Is there a risk of taking "a"/"our" reality (the atomic/subatomic representation as it appears to us) for "the" reality (as the structure must seem to an atom or particle if we grant an atoms/particles a "mind" for the purpose of thought-experiment)? By prescinding ourselves from the equation, I also mean only that the atomic relations which inhere within any object surely do so irrespective of our ideas/images about said object? This is not strictly an a priori argument as the atomic/subatomic relation is experiential, too, having to do with very real actions and reactions and so on. GF: Cognition of the thing is, of course, semiosic; but the key point for phaneroscopy is that there can be direct and unmediated experience of some ingredients of the phaneron. For instance, he says “the flow of time is conceived as continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; in any case it remains a direct experience. For experience is not what analysis discovers but the raw material upon which analysis works. This element then is an element of direct experience” (CP 7.535). In one of the 1903 Lowell Lectures he says “we have direct experience of things in themselves.” (That is even underlined in the manuscript. For the context of this and some other Peircean remarks on “direct experience”, see Peirce: selections, summaries and secondary sources (gnusystems.ca)<https://gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp>.) JC: I'm very interested in this notion of direct experience as I hadn't encountered it before. It almost seems antithetical to what I've gleaned of Peirce so far (notions of the continua and of a sign being that which stand for something to someone or some mind in respect of something else): this, to me at least, is the essence of mediation. And whilst I can conceive of degrees of mediatory structure (thinking about "coldness" as opposed to being cold; or simply being in contrast to thinking about being, this latter being a cognitive abstraction), I'm not yet familiar enough with Peirce to comprehend how "direct experience" fits within this framework. I do appreciate the resource, though. GF: The best part of this slide (for me anyway) is what he says about indeterminacy. We could say that it’s the Firstness of logic and of metaphysics. As such, it does not exist, any more than a qualisign or God exists. In Peircean terms, existing things are real, but not all realities exist. Metaphysically, existence is the Secondness of reality. But firsts and thirds can be real too. JC: Yes, the indeterminacy aspect seems highly interesting. I've been reading a lot about indeterminacy in general so am delighted to see that Peirce devotes significant portions of his CPs to a nuanced consideration of it. I really need to go away and consider a lot of these arguments, though, as so much of it is very new to me and I don't want to through suggestions/objections out scatter-gun style as some of the above almost definitely is! Best Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of [email protected] <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, July 1, 2021 6:32 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 9 *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Jack, in connection with slide 9, I’d like to respond to a couple of remarks from your first post. JC: if we say there is "more to the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? GF: I don’t think so. Anyway, I’m pretty sure that Peirce’s objection to Kantian metaphysics and epistemology was that for Peirce the thing-in-itself is cognizable if it makes any sense to talk about it at all. The notion of an incognizable thing-in-itself was, for Peirce, absurd. Cognition of the thing is, of course, semiosic; but the key point for phaneroscopy is that there can be direct and unmediated experience of some ingredients of the phaneron. For instance, he says “the flow of time is conceived as continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; in any case it remains a direct experience. For experience is not what analysis discovers but the raw material upon which analysis works. This element then is an element of direct experience” (CP 7.535). In one of the 1903 Lowell Lectures he says “we have direct experience of things in themselves.” (That is even underlined in the manuscript. For the context of this and some other Peircean remarks on “direct experience”, see Peirce: selections, summaries and secondary sources (gnusystems.ca)<https://gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp>.) JC: Kant makes time the precondition for the possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to merely reify its a priori status (along with space). And whilst we can take time and space as a priori categories, it doesn't seem to me that we can "literally" do this - that is, time and space are a priori for no one even though we suppose they must, logically, be a priori for everyone. GF: I don’t quite follow your argument there, but as far as phaneroscopy is concerned, André says flatly (and rightly, in my opinion) that Peirce’s categories are not a priori. The best part of this slide (for me anyway) is what he says about indeterminacy. We could say that it’s the Firstness of logic and of metaphysics. As such, it does not exist, any more than a qualisign or God exists. In Peircean terms, existing things are real, but not all realities exist. Metaphysically, existence is the Secondness of reality. But firsts and thirds can be real too. Gary f. } It is only when a myth is accepted as an imaginative story that it is really believed in. [Northrop Frye] { https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of [email protected] Sent: 1-Jul-21 10:04 To: [email protected] Subject: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 9 Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)<https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site. Gary f. [https://attachments.office.net/owa/jack.cody.2015%40mumail.ie/service.svc/s/GetAttachmentThumbnail?id=AQMkADFiNTJkNWFkLTI4MWUtNDVkYi1iOGUyLTM5MjVjMTQwMWQzZgBGAAADDVzm3zuQiku3AtaWjbbfRAcAD3Jz9tLvdU6uUdH%2Fzu8GAwAAAgEPAAAAD3Jz9tLvdU6uUdH%2Fzu8GAwAF4m%2Bt4gAAAAESABAAEcL4%2FxqLd02CaNv6mYMi4A%3D%3D&thumbnailType=2&token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjMwODE3OUNFNUY0QjUyRTc4QjJEQjg5NjZCQUY0RUNDMzcyN0FFRUUiLCJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJ4NXQiOiJNSUY1emw5TFV1ZUxMYmlXYTY5T3pEY25ydTQifQ.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.IEZ--PglbwDa9L5oOkMH9XVJ6Otb7t4OLkMIuLdnwUnk5I00PNULjx1xhgxlMMAIORgirBs_qwUrI3-LhPVe1uonneHoZB-K9OfWg3iLvH4CCRQdDwj7-wZXgU09K3YQ5lVJkyR1Z9hJQh9t9-t_wO7J7mKNQZ-M9eJ-l-q4rn7tb73DjAMQIliNVgx-DfJt18O2Ebhcf5ZINwIvEZxobjWKJj4acAihA-M9-H_dxPKQEixpQ9kbt-7yAabO4oTJcrJ6XC3iXg5I3c4n9GOlTD5VELQqH-Iw60GZwxFUlh9iIgY-gnt_3ny63sUwSfnGA5CMBXMwE7McTFno4c52kA&X-OWA-CANARY=BtM-9AyCk0aUQtG2k7vqnvDL1vpWPdkYJLBuJakQIjQcAF4sag50CoLza6YMkWsR5R9r1E1WiAo.&owa=outlook.office.com&scriptVer=20210621003.08&animation=true] Text: WHAT CATEGORIES ARE NOT >From the start, Peirce's categories are NOT the result of any sort of >transcendental deduction à la Kant. They are not a priori. They are not >general concepts, not classes of predicates, and they do not form a list of >general questions to ask about some object. WHAT CATEGORIES ARE They constitute the *structuring agency* that generates, notably, predication, representation, signification and, more generally, explanation: the *stages* through which, eventually, any synthetic judgment of any form in any modality gets expressed out of an experiential encounter of (or logical reaction to) something's indeterminacy. *Indeterminacy* is a dynamic metaphysical and logical condition that calls for its own cancellation. It is not a static inert state but a process that energizes its own determination. Any form of indeterminacy can occasion its own chain of transformation. Peirce's three categories structure that process – for instance, from the unpredicated or unexplained to the predicated or explained.
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