The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
Gary, List, When you say that the phaneron (or any phenomenon) always has three elements, I was wondering (rhetorically), "Yes, but as defined by who?" I know this is Peirce's definition but, to play devil's advocate, if one is convinced that whatever phenomenon has only one element, then does it not really seem as if this is so (and does not that seeming - the appearance - thus make it so?). The distinction I'm making here is between "emic" and "etic" - for the person who believes the phaneron has, say, one element only, that belief must surely translate into reality? Whereas the observer who may be well-versed in Peirce sees that person's belief as an error of judgement. Or: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained by the weight of its own emphasis upon the interpretative? best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Friday, July 9, 2021 3:42 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12 *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Helmut, A phenomenon is anything that appears, or is present to the mind. The phaneron is the collective total of whatever appears or could appear or be present to the mind generically (not to a particular mind). The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. In an existing thing, Secondness is predominant, but the possibility of it, its quality, is its Firstness. Its meaning, if it has any, is its Thirdness, its function as a Sinsign, which has both existence and quality; obviously, if it exists, it must also be possible. I’m not sure where you got the idea that a phenomenon is a first. Every phenomenon has its Firstness, but we only call it a First if we prescind its Firstness from whatever Secondness or Thirdness it may have. Of course, as soon as we call it a First, it has become “objectified,” so that it is the object of a sign, meaning that it is now in triadic relation with a sign and an interpretant, and thus has taken on Thirdness. But that doesn’t change its quality. I don’t know if this helps, I’m improvising instead of quoting Peirce because I don’t know which definitions you’ve already seen. But I think a careful reading of the definitions provided in the slides should suffice, if you drop assumptions and habits such as treating every phenomenon as if it were a perceived object or a sign. (Signs are phenomena but not all phenomena are signs, only those in which Thirdness is predominant in our consciousness of them. Semiotics depends on phaneroscopy, not the other way round) Questions about specific terms used in the definitions might help, though, if you’re still confused. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien Sent: 9-Jul-21 09:48 Gary, List Now I am confused about the definition of phenomenon, and accordingly phenomenology / phaneroscopy. If secondness, reaction, is a part of its, a phenomenon is not a first. I had thought it was. But firsts don´t have parts (see previous slide), so there cannot be a second of a first. In the opinion I have had until now, a phenomenon is an appearance by the primisense. It may be a re-entry from altersense or medisense, but turned into a firstness without parts. That means, the complexity of reaction or thought is transformed into or replaced by specificness of a quale, which is the phenomenon. To say it is an icon would be wrong, because icons have parts. So a phenomenon (in my previous opinion) is a more or less specific quale. Like the intuitive feeling you may have e.g about the color red, the american history, or existential graphs, before this intuition again causes reactions (altersense) and reflections (medisense). Best Helmut Freitag, 09. Juli 2021 um 13:10 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)<https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations> site. Below the text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Secondness from the Century Dictionary Supplement. Gary f. [cid:image001.jpg@01D774AB.8E3BC3B0] Text: Secondness is the mode of being which consists in something being Second to some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless of any Law, although if may conform to a law. It is Reaction as an element of the Phenomenon. It is the mark of whatever exists or “obsists” in its actuality. __________________ Appendix: Peirce’s definition of “secondness” from the Century Dictionary Supplement (1909): secondness, n. —2. (a) The mode of being of an object which is such as it is by virtue of being connected with or related to another object or objects, regardless of any triadic relation. (b) The mode of connection or relation of such an object, with such other. (c) In a looser sense, the secundal, or relative, character which belongs to an individual object, as having such a mode of being. (CD Supplement, p. 1189)
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