Edwina, List Edwina: I am aware that some on this list say that, for example, we can only 'know' or 'read' exactly what Peirce wrote. But this assumes both that the text 'has' or 'carries' a meaning and that there is a direct transfer of the meaning of the text from Site A to Site B. Such a direct dyadic transmission denies the process of semiosis. Semiosis is triadic and therefore interpretive; it sees the text as developing its meaning within a process; of first a Dynamic Object and then an Immediate Object. Already, some deviation might occur. This processing of the text within two 'Object sites' by the mediative or analytic node of the Representamen transforms that Object/Text into several Interpretants!
I agree completely. Similar to Barthes' argument in Death of the Author in that there is always a degree to which the reader "writes" the text as he/she reads it; actively constructs rather than passively receives, and this is due to the mediatory nature of "meaning". Mathematics seeks to avoid this but not even mathematics is entirely free of it as different mathematicians can approach the same problem from drastically different angles (using different varieties of math and methodologies, even). Isn't Peirce's point that science/scientific inquiry has a teleological substance to it so that over time meaning tends to converge? At any rate, the Bible is sufficient proof that these schisms of interpretation may never be resolved (the existence of so many denominations which prove that even those of a mind to rigidly adhere to a "common" text nonetheless produce idiosyncratic interpretations, and I don't see how it can be otherwise - we may agree on the majority of what a text means, but it will never be an identical agreement). Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Saturday, August 7, 2021 12:50 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read... *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. List I think that's an interesting question from Gary F - how do we distinguish between the actual and the imagined world. It's not that easy; we know this from the morass of misinformation that we, daily, live in. Whether it's 'witches and a flat earth' to ...whatever political ideology...it's extremely difficult. This is because we do not function within a dyadic but a triadic cognitive process. I am aware that some on this list say that, for example, we can only 'know' or 'read' exactly what Peirce wrote. But this assumes both that the text 'has' or 'carries' a meaning and that there is a direct transfer of the meaning of the text from Site A to Site B. Such a direct dyadic transmission denies the process of semiosis. Semiosis is triadic and therefore interpretive; it sees the text as developing its meaning within a process; of first a Dynamic Object and then an Immediate Object. Already, some deviation might occur. This processing of the text within two 'Object sites' by the mediative or analytic node of the Representamen transforms that Object/Text into several Interpretants! Therefore - how Person A interprets the Peircean text and how Person B interprets it - can differ. Is there ONE valid way to interpret the text? Possibly - but it takes a community-of-scholars to arrive at that conclusion. Not just one person vs another person. It's the same with the actual vs imaginary world. Eventually, the community will acknowledge that the earth is actually not flat; that witches do not actually exist...and so on. Edwina Note to John S; you mixed up quotes from me and Jack. Minor quibble. On Sat 07/08/21 12:13 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent: Jon AS, Edwina, Jack, Gary F, List, JFS: The simplest and clearest definition [of the adjective 'mathematica'l': "Anything that can be completely specified by a definition stated in any branch of mathematics." JAS: That is not a definition, it is a tautology. No. Jack asked "what is meant by 'mathematical' here?" For phaneroscopy, the adjective must allow any branch of mathematics that may be useful for analyzing any kind of experience. It's important to state that. JAS: For Peirce [mathematics] is the science which draws necessary conclusions... That is Benjamin P's definition. It's an excellent characterization of the subject, but it doesn't provide guidance for a phenomenologist. Immediately before Peirce discussed phenomenology in 1903, he defined mathematics by its three main branches: formal logic; discrete math; continuous math. Edwina: My comparison to "grammar" follows from a similar understanding of this as a "process of setting up relations and interactions between units". I.e., what is an abstract logical process? The closest I can get to something which fits that description is "grammar" Grammar would be a good way to characterize the combinations of elements in a linear language. But Peirce said that diagrams are closer to the original patterns in the experience. Jack: Therefore- my interpretation of the above is that mathematics is essentially an abstract logical process; not an actual measurement process. But a process of setting up relations and interactions between units. Yes. And Peirce went beyond linear grammars to diagrams in two or more dimensions. Existential graphs are the most common diagrams he used, but he also mentioned his wish for the technology for stereoscopic patterns in three dimensions plus motion. He would have loved today's systems for virtual reality. Gary: According to Peirce, “The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description” (EP1:227, W5:164, CP 3.363, 1885). As we have all repeated many times, mathematics itself does not and cannot distinguish between the actual world and a world of imagination. If this distinction is necessary for science, including logic, and it cannot come from mathematical principles, where does it come from? Phenomenology / phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in order to classify and determine the elements of experience. But as Peirce said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external sensation, from imagination, or from memories. The distinctions necessary for science or for any action in and on the world would come from normative logic: speculative grammar or stechiology; critic; and methodeutic. John
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