Gary F, list
I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to
my use of the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the
USE of the term of 'percept' is out of context'?
And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"
My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of
the sign' is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of
mediated interpretation.
Edwina
On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,
Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does
not need to define the word “percept” for William James, who was
well acquainted with both the word and its object. It is part of his
explanation of the difference between psychology and phenomenology.
The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of
“the business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not
yet acquainted with it. There are several definitions to suit
different occasions. In order to become acquainted with the dynamic
object of the sign (the actual practice of phenomenology), we have to
approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming that Peirce’s
definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same thing,
the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This
is necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their
objects, nor can one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent
vagueness of words. That’s why it is a trap to take any definition
of a science or practice as fundamental.
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L
; Gary Richmond
Cc: Jon Awbrey
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré
List
I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just
lifted from a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with
James, the difference between psychology and his phenomenology.
Therefore, the definition of 'percept' given below is out of context.
Edwina
On Tue 24/08/21 10:31 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [1]
sent:
JA, JC, List,
JA: . . .I do remember having
long discussions on the List about what used to be
a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
the very data of the senses, are signs.
CSP: Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for
phenomenology. CP 8.300 1904-10-03 Letters to William James
Best.
Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
BEAUTY AND TERROR
JUST KEEP GOING
NO FEELING IS FINAL”
― RAINER MARIA RILKE
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 10:03 PM Jon Awbrey wrote:
Dear Jerry,
Not sure about all of that, but I do remember having
long discussions on the List about what used to be
a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
the very data of the senses, are signs.
Regards,
Jon
On 8/24/2021 7:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> List:
>
>> On Aug 24, 2021, at 11:39 AM,
>>
>> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy,
not semeiotic.
>
> This sentence is a remarkable example of how emotional rhetorical
thrusts generate the thoughts that make no sense in the language of
CSP.
>
> Units of thoughts have units of meaning. These two concepts are
inseparable.
>
> In the engineering sciences, especially the epistemology and
ontology of pragmatic necessities, the connections between
phaneroscopy and semiotics are essential to ethical actions.
>
> The graphic diagrams that illustrate the iconic forms of
engineering work connect, necessarily, the semeiotic with the
phaneroscopy. Indeed, the connections of symbols with the indices of
the diagrams derived from semiotic and phaneroscopy could be a
central thesis of engineering sciences.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
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