Jeff, list
From what I can understand, and I'm NOT a mathematician, but the
distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very fuzzy.
I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology. But I do support and
agree with your agenda of using both mathematics and phenomenology to
function within a pragmatic interaction with the world.
Edwina
On Sat 28/08/21 11:22 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Gary F, John S, all, List,
I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim
was to clarify the business of philosophers who are doing
phenomenology as part of their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics,
or what have you.
The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of
consciousness and the continuity in the degrees of conscious
awareness with respect to various phenomena are points I accept--both
as an understanding of Peirce's position and as starting points in my
own inquiries. I'd go further an add another points Peirce makes,
which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much on the
conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of
cognition because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would do
better to focus on the clearer conception what is and is not under
self-control. One of the points I was trying to make in asking the
question was to put pressure on those who seem to think Peirce's main
aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to provide a grounding
for a philosophical theory of consciousness.
As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing
Peircean phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques
needed to make more exacting analyses of scientific observations.
Careful phenomenological analysis of the phenomena that have been
observed puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make
measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered this general
account of the business of the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like to
add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational
error and correcting for those errors.
In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of
Peircean phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians
make a distinction between inquiry in pure mathematics and the
application of formal systems to real world problems in applied
mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might be helpful to make
an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a pure theory
of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a theory
to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special
sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding.
For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure
phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied
activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources
of observational error, correcting for those errors, framing
productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations
of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible
hypotheses, and generating formal mathematical models of the
hypothetical explanations.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Jeff, Helmut, John, List,
Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not
specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think
different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to
your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness
of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during
my years of writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness
Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers
within the same discipline, use the word with different references or
different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar
with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand
their arguments involving that word.
Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness,
especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless
lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no
definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I
think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life,
there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for
that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I
won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness,
many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that
violates the principle of continuity between the various grades of
biological consciousness.
We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say
that Homo sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on
exactly where or when or how the step was made from proto-human to
human. I think the closest Peirce comes to making a firm distinction
between conscious and unconscious mentality is where he argues that
perceptual judgments are not under our conscious control, but
reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no
basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus
serves as a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and
reasoning, or between perception and conception. But if we take this
as a boundary between unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary
in the sense that (according to synechism) there is no real
discontinuity between the two.
I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining
why I don’t see a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say
in response to it.
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
On Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,
Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an
analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about
the focus on consciousness.
The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the
resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of
scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts
scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements
and frame hypotheses.
Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of
surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or
invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame
hypotheses about the principles of logic.
Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the
validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the
resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice?
If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious
experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to
be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry.
Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to
conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our
experience?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-------------------------
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