Gary F, John S, List
It is worth noting that Richard Smyth, who is a respected Peirce scholar, makes the same point in his monograph Reading Peirce Reading that John S has raised. In fact, he points out that the distinction between the phenomenological and nomological phases of inquiry was fairly well established in the sciences of physics and astronomy, and that Peirce may have been influenced by Herschel's phenomenological work in astronomy. For my part, I think the point is important for understanding the business of the Peircean phenomenologist--especially when it comes to the application of the "pure" theory of the formal elements in experience to scientific questions in the normative sciences, metaphysics and the special sciences. The main difference between the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic and the idioscopic sciences is that the former is focused on the analysis of observations made as part of our common experience, while the latter is focused on specialized observations that are often made with tools such as telescopes and microscopes. As Peirce notes, the fact that we are so familiar with common experience makes the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic sciences especially difficulty. This is due to the fact that we wear glasses colored by deeper assumptions, and it can be quite challenging to see the phenomena afresh--with the eyes of an artist. In both cases, the practice of phenomenology is done for the sake of making more exact analyses of observations of reproducible phenomena--which is done for the sake of identifying and correcting for observational errors, determining the appropriate form of measurement, framing questions, developing informal diagrams of the problems, formulating competing hypotheses, articulating formal models, etc. Figuring out what might gained from the more exact analyses of the phenomena that have been observed for the sake of these abductive activities is no small feat. That, at least, is what I see Peirce doing over and over again in his inquiries in logic, metaphysics. He often begins by pointing out that other philosophers have been mislead by an inadequate analysis of the phenomena in question--or have failed to pay attention to features in our experience that are clearly relevant to the question at hand. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 5:26:00 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in reference to “The division of any science which is concerned with the description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or theoretical explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell and Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a non-philosophical context. I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a close reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this science to “phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of that he was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have to accept that what you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or when I am using them in any philosophical context. I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of John F. Sowa Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16 To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide Jon AS, Gary F, List, We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science. The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science depends on principles from the sciences that precede it. But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the Comte-Peirce classification. I recall that Gary F said that the dependencies in the development seemed to be circular. And I agree. In their daily work, everybody, including professional mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any way from any source. Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath. But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original discovery, is independent of any features from its origin. Its principles then become available for any science of any kind. JAS: I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis agrees with the actual facts or not. But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and phenomenology from the people who develop and use them. All people have all their knowledge available at all times. Peirce was a polymath. At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while analyzing experience. But in the next moment, he could use normative principles to evaluate the results. Then he could apply those results to a problem in physics. For a case study, see his Photometric Researches, or the excerpts I posted at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf JAS: I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of imagination and the logical world of mathematics. Yes. Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception. Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination. A chess expert can play a good game blindfold. And mathematicians can do the algebra or the geometry in their heads. GF: John says, “The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses.” But we have previously agreed that in Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from those below. Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf. Peirce published that book in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences. On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light (as it really is). On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton and Maxwell. In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that other scientists had derived by their observations. Summary: All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived from our experience (by formal or informal methods). Much of that experience includes communications from other people who derived their knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in communications with other people who ,,, When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing experience. John
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