Jon AS, list, Your final paragraph (referring to the particular/material categories) reinforces a remark I made Wednesday concerning ADT’s slide 48: “Peirce indicates in a couple of texts that the “material categories” could be picked out phaneroscopically as well as the “universal categories,” but that he didn’t have much success at making a list of them, so he chose to focus on the formal elements of the phaneron instead (CP 1.284).” Here are the texts I had in mind, both from around 1905:
CSP: [[My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking. I know very well that there are other categories, those which Hegel calls by that name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with any list of them. We may classify objects according to their matter; as wooden things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification according to structure is generally more important. And it is the same with ideas. Much as I would like to see Hegel's list of categories reformed, I hold that a classification of the elements of thought and consciousness according to their formal structure is more important. ] —CP 8.213 ] CSP: [[I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter. The two most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of every department have found classifications according to structure to be the most important. ] CP 1.288, R 295 ] A similar text appears in Lowell Lecture 3 <https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1525> . The two papers from R.K. Atkins, by the way, are dated 2012 and 2013, so presumably the “broadening” he proposes there (which would include the material categories) is incorporated into his 2018 book Charles S. Peirce’s Phenomenology. I’m just getting started on the two papers though. Gary f. } I do not think much of a man who is no wiser today than he was yesterday. [Lincoln] { <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 1-Oct-21 21:25 Robert, List: I have refrained from commenting on this up until now because it is indeed mostly unobjectionable, and my remarks on it would largely repeat what I have already said on-List. Unfortunately, it reflects a characteristic adversarial stance that is unwarranted since no one here (including Bellucci) is "in favor of an extreme minimization of mathematics or even its exclusion," nor are we seeking to "maintain a mistrust towards mathematics and mathematicians." Instead, like Peirce, we are simply distinguishing phaneroscopy from mathematics, which does not entail disconnecting or separating phaneroscopy from mathematics. Phaneroscopy depends on mathematics for principles, but it is not controlled by nor reducible to mathematics. In particular, an absolutely essential difference between them is that phaneroscopy is a positive science, while mathematics is a strictly hypothetical science. This is perfectly consistent with Nathan Houser's conclusion that is favorably quoted (twice) and which no one is disputing. NH: These categories, though abstractable (prescindable) from experience, are mathematical conceptions. Thus, firstness, secondness, and thirdness constitute an important link between the a priori world of mathematics and the contingent world of experience, at which juncture we find the ground of phenomenology. (https://www.academia.edu/4253972/The_Form_of_Experience, p. 21) On a more agreeable note, I appreciate the suggestion that phaneroscopy should draw from not only formal logic as the first branch of mathematics, but also its other two branches that have to do with discrete series and continua. This is consistent with something that Richard Kenneth Atkins highlights in his two papers on "Broadening Peirce's Phaneroscopy" (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/pluralist.7.2.0001, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/pluralist.8.1.0097 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/pluralist.8.1.0097)--the> ), namely, that the universal/formal categories are discrete and extensive, while the particular/material categories are continuous and intensive. I might share more in the future as I further digest them. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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