Dear Jack, Jerry, list, as to the "do these two requests induce the same sort of questions as the things you are now talking and thinking about
in an *efficient* manner?".. *meh*.. perhaps not.. with best wishes, j On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 2:56 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > Jerry, List, > > *JR*: Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits, that > the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same? > > Immediately, yes. I see the resemblance clearly. It puts me in mind of > Plato's Meno - the slave whom Socrates "uses" to "prove" the power of > non-recollectional learning (perhaps we would call it something like > generative inference as opposed to the more behaviorist tradition which > predates generative grammar). It's been a while since I read that passage > but what I took away from it was that once one discerns a relationship > within a formal pattern - a structural relationship - one can abstract > basic elements involved in that pattern in order to generatively infer what > might logically be but which is not yet objectively known. This is a kind > of contact paradox -we "establish the existence of an unperceived object" > by means of contact with/perception of an object which (indexically) points > to the said unperceived object indirectly. > > The question, then, is whether the object is in fact "fully" unperceived > or if it exists "pre hoc" (*abductively*, in the realm of the "about to > be" but not yet "realised" or "effected", as C. W. Spinks has characterized > the abductive function) (1983: 195-208). "Effect" is perhaps the better > term in line with what JAS has just pointed out with regard to efficiency > and habit - are abductive hypotheses akin to formal abstractions which > exist like *possible* pathways we establish, perhaps *somatically*, below > the threshold of consciousness, as a result of polysemy? Thereby, contact > with one aspect of a given object might allow us insight/knowledge > regarding the structural conditions/formal properties of (as yet) > unencountered objects. > > I'm afraid I have more questions than answers! But I do sense a > significant overlap between your line of inquiry and mine (the contrast > between the two definitely induces the same order of heuristic to my mind, > there is something structurally equivalent between your query and mine, to > my mind). > > I hope to clarify my position within the week as it is still very much up > in the air, and, in truth, off the beaten track of what I'm supposed to be > doing (which is why I've thrown it to the "floor"!). > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, October 4, 2021 7:58 PM > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All > Semiotic, No Puzzle) > > > Dear Jack, list, > > > You have raised some very interesting points that invite reflective > propositions from the audience who, > > as you say, “Would be very interested to receive any variety of response > to this > > - preferably those which ardently disagree with me!” > > > I must say I do not ardently disagree with you, for it seems to me we are > interested in similar things. > > And as far as similar things go, > > I have recently sent out a letter, which I’m afraid went unnoticed, > > inquiring about a similar question. > > > I wonder if you can help me, > > since the similarity will become obvious once we place the two requests > next to one another: > > > *The goal of an inference is * > > *to establish the existence of an unperceived object,* > > *and if we did perceive that object, * > > *we would have no need to infer it; * > > *however inference *necessarily* regards an object * > > *that has already been perceived.* > > > Does anyone know what this means and who wrote it? > > I am *certain* there is Wisdom in it but not sure why. > > (Sep 10, 2021) > > —- > > *Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by > knowing which we know something more.* > > > What does Peirce mean by "a sign is something by knowing which we know > something more"? > > (Oct 4, 2021) > > > Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits, > > that the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same? > > > But then this would suggest, > > if we analyze the one to one correspondence, that an inference is like a > sign. > > > And since our habit is not to look like an expert who knowingly ignores > what we have *already* acknowledged, > > such as what definition of ‘normative inference’ means > > (that is, has Peirce ever spoken on what inference is? > > I mean, it seems we would remember something like that and would be able > to tell us.), > > do these two requests induce the same sort of questions as the things you > are now talking and thinking about > > in an *efficient* manner? > > > With best wishes, > Jerry R > > On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 1:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jack, List: > > Good stuff, thanks. I would just like to clarify one other thing from your > earlier post. > > JRKC: It also refers back, in a roundabout way, to the discussion we had > here last week regarding Peirce's position on the existence of god (insofar > as object-sign-interpretant implies that the object itself belongs to some > universe-external position ... > > > Peirce's conception of object-sign-interpretant only implies that the > (dynamical) object is external to, independent of, and unaffected by any > sign that it determines. Hence, an object that is "universe-external" is > only necessary if we also accept the distinct premiss that the entire > universe is a sign, i.e., "a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, > 1903). However, Peirce also claims that "if any signs are connected, no > matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign," calling this a > theorem of "the science of semeiotics" but unfortunately not providing a > proof (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). Therefore, in order to *avoid *the > conclusion that there is a "universe-external" object that determines the > entire universe, one must either *reject *this particular theorem or *deny > *the further premiss that the entire universe is "composed exclusively of > signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 12:41 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > The only way to know something at all, and therefore the only way to know > something more, is by means of signs; and in accordance with Peirce's > pragmatism, the ultimate meaning of any acquired knowledge consists in > self-controlled habits of conduct, by which those signs have a real effect > on the external world > > Thanks for that reply, Jon, it was quite succinct. The linkage you make > (from Peirce) between efficiency and habit is very interesting. I know the > centrality of habit to Peirce's doctrine (if we may call it doctrine) and > am currently expanding my own knowledge regarding all its significances. > For instance, that Peirce considers habits to be, in much greater extent, > creative forces instead of constraints (though he acknowledges that they > necessarily constrain, too): > > "Some undisciplined young persons may have *come to think of acquired > human habits chiefly as constraints; and undoubtedly they all are so in a > measure*. *But good habits are in much greater measure powers than they > are limitations* . . .” (MS 930: 31) > > Your summary here dovetails quite nicely with much of what Pierre Bourdieu > has to say about habit, too ("*habitus*" in his formulation, carried over > from Marcel Mauss). Those "self-controlled habits of conduct... which... > have a real effect on the external world" are very apt in relation to > *habitus* though Bourdieu would deviate slightly insofar as he doesn't > necessarily consider habit to be "self-controlled" but often, in his > schema, it can resemble what Engels called "false consciousness". The > interesting part, though, is that Bourdieu locates in *habitus* the same > order of generative principle which Peirce seems to have discerned and > which Chomsky, too seems to place in recursion insofar as recursion is > understood as a regularity which can/does produce/generate differences in > structural form. > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, October 4, 2021 5:36 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All > Semiotic, No Puzzle) > > Jack, List: > > JRKC: Doesn't this depend on how we define "inefficient"? > > > Peirce prepared the entry for "efficient" in the *Century Dictionary*. > > *efficient*, *a*. and *n*. *I*. a. *1*. Producing outward effects; of a > nature to produce a resuit; active; causative. > *2*. Acting or able to act with due effect; adequate in performance; > bringing to bear the requisite knowledge, skill, and industry; capable; > competent: as, an *efficient *workman, rector, or commander. > > > In this context, it seems to me that Peirce is not using "efficient" in > the second sense of "doing more with less," but rather in the first sense > of having a *real effect* on the external world. As he says right before > the previously quoted sentences, "It appears to me that the essential > function of a sign is to render inefficient relations efficient,--not to > set them into action, but to establish a habit or general rule whereby they > will act on occasion" (CP 8.332, 1904). In other words, according to the > physical doctrine (nominalism/materialism/determinism), the *only *relations > that have a real effect on the external world are "the continued > rectilinear velocities with the accelerations that accompany different > relative positions of the particles." By contrast, Peirce's view is that > signs and semiosis enable *other *relations to have a real effect on the > external world that would otherwise be impotent to do so. As he writes > elsewhere ... > > CSP: But everybody who looks out of his eyes, and is not blinded by a > metaphysical theory, well knows that thoughts and other signs may bring > about great physical effects that are not, as such, signs. During a battle > an aide de camp may ride up to one of the commanding generals, and utter a > few words. As long as they are audible, it makes no difference how much or > little physical energy the waves of sound carry. The consequence is that in > a few minutes a great charge of cavalry takes place, tremendous, terrific; > and hundreds of men pass the gates of death. (R 318:169-170[14-15], 1907) > > > As for a sign being "something by knowing which we know something more," > Peirce goes on to state in the succeeding sentences, "With the exception of > knowledge, in the present instant, of the contents of consciousness in that > instant (the existence of which knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought > and knowledge is by signs. A sign therefore is an object which is in > relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, > in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, > corresponding to its own relation to the object" (CP 8.332). The only way > to know something *at all*, and therefore the only way to know something > *more*, is by means of signs; and in accordance with Peirce's pragmatism, > the *ultimate *meaning of any acquired knowledge consists in > self-controlled habits of conduct, by which those signs have a real effect > on the external world. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 10:35 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Or, essentially, my own (perhaps idiosyncratic) interpretation of the > passage which began this thread is that Peirce seemed to realise that in > “accessing" (perhaps being determined by) one object (whether > dynamic/immediate) we often find a *kind of novelty with which we are > already, in some respect, acquainted* (we merely abstract formal elements > of one “sign” to form abductive hypotheses regarding the possible formal > elements of other, “future”, signs). And this convergence of multiple > objects combined with, or predicated upon, abductive leaps in relative to > the iconicity/aniconcity of structural patterns -- affinity/dissonance > of/between internal relations -- is what draws, again, to my mind, clear > parallels with Chomsky’s poverty of stimulus. > > We abstract from parts internal structural relations which metonymically > correspond to a broader structural pattern which indexes the existence of > the "whole" - this kind of abstraction combined with abductive application > (fallible theses regarding the internal applicability/affinity of/between > patterns) is what unites Peirce, Chomsky, and Bourdieu (even though Chomsky > is a resolute Cartesian and the others reject such a position out of hand). > > Would be very interested to receive any variety of response to this - > preferably those which ardently disagree with me! > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, October 4, 2021 3:54 PM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]>; > [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All > Semiotic, No Puzzle) > > Edwina, List, > > Thanks for you reply! > > An inefficient interaction provides no information; it's just brute > action/reaction. > > Doesn't this depend on how we define "inefficient"? Because Peirce sets > the dyadic (action/reaction) up as the most efficient - "...nothing ever > happens but the *continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations > that accompany different relative positions of the particles*. *All other > relations*, of which we know so many, *are inefficient*." > > Taking up the colloquial definition of the term -- or its antonym at least > -- we can contrast efficiency with waste. It seems to me that all > interaction -- especially that which babies/children engage in -- is > extremely "inefficient" insofar as they are subject to so much > signification that they do not possess the means of understanding/knowing. > And, aside from that, the fact of polysemy and diagrammatic relations would > seem to posit that all interpretations of anything whatsoever are > inefficient as they mediate one, or at any rate, a limited number, of sides > of what is a many-sided phenomenon. > > Then there is language (and sociality itself) which can be considered > "inefficient" - if we simply wanted to convey denotational information, we > would never have conversations in the style that we do. As Roman Jakobson > notes, there is a spectral quality to language and the phatic/poetic > functions are always present but can be attenuated relative to more > denotational utterances -- the point, though, is that what some consider > "inefficient" others consider "efficient". The two Oxford (or was it > Cambridge?) dons who conversed with each other solely thought mathematical > problems written on sheets of paper delivered back and forth between their > lodgings by intermediaries -- so much so that the death of Ramanujan (whom > one of these two had brought to England) was discussed between the two only > as what seems to most of us a "throwaway" comment immediately followed by > an extensive list of mathematical proofs and hypotheses (it was actually > quite a poignant inclusion if you consider it from the angle that these two > men never spoke in English at all, for the most part). > > So -- and I know this is deviation -- what is "efficient" in matters > "social" is itself a matter of perspective. > > The other point - of the operation of semiosis at it would appear in > itself - is a very salient one, I think. It also refers back, in a > roundabout way, to the discussion we had here last week regarding Peirce's > position on the existence of god (insofar as object-sign-interpretant > implies that the object itself belongs to some universe-external position: > and here I wonder, only speculatively, if we cannot draw comparisons > between "grammar" and "phaneron"). Obviously "grammar" is part of the > phaneron, but Peirce's description of the phaneron, to my mind, and perhaps > mine alone, resembles some distinctions as made by Saussure in relation to > *langue > *(the total[izing] grammatical whole which logically precedes the > utterance in order of necessity) > *. * > > Again, this is all very much a speculative mishmash of ideas resulting > from a thesis overflow, but children are never directly exposed to such > irregular constructions as “go-ed” because adults, acquainted with > linguistic ideology pertaining to what Bourdieu terms “standard” know that > such forms are grammatically “incorrect” (are possessed of negative > cultural capital) and consequently do not reproduce them. > > How then do we account for the continual reproduction (in staggering > statistical frequency across all social classes) of such forms if not by > admitting an *a priori* capacity or faculty for apprehending structural > patterns (within linguistic forms) and thereby abstracting elements from > said patterns in order to apply them, *generatively*, to new > constructions which include, but are not limited to, such > over-irregularized constructs as “go-ed”? Again, the argument I am making > here is not necessarily in favour of *all* which is implied under the > banner of “universal grammar” – I possess neither the competence nor the > interest to engage in interlinguistic analysis for the sole purpose of > supporting or detracting from said hypothesis. My point is merely that the > fundamental part of Chomsky’s theory – the *a priori* capacity for > discernment of structural patterns within linguistic forms – seems sound > even if one wishes to dispense with the rest of the baggage associated with > Chomskyean theory re UG. > > Best > > Jack > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. 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