Dear Gary, Jack, list,
There have been many really good notions floating about in the past few days- most of which I’d prefer to be silent about. However, given how much this particular notion can be of use to us, I feel compelled to bring attention to it. To the extent that we prefer not to be hypocrites, and I mean hypocritical in the sense of, it is better to remember to do as we preach, and not merely as a political tactic of flinging accusations given we are all blameworthy, I find your selection of this following Peirce statement to be extremely pertinent to our oft-called plea for improving list-relations. Here is what you quoted: *CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all you.’ * *If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. * *In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure than, * *without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. * *Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, * *the vulgarest delusion of vanity. * *In the second place, all men who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)* Now, what is phaneroscopy such that we are being concretely reasonable under such circumstances? Let us remind ourselves of this moment every time we fail, for we will do so, again and again, because this is *us*. With best wishes, Jerry R On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:33 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted > Peirce’s Logic Notebook: > > CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, > explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the > *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, > it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, > it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the > interpretant of *that *sign. (R 339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2) > > I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term > “Intentional Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce > introduced three or four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them > for different analytical purposes, so that they might well overlap in their > reference to a given situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on > the *communicative* function of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he > seems to be more focused on, well, logic (as semeiotic). The > Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one for > logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless. > > Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own > internal contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the > case in verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant > as Peirce defines it can be internal *both* to the sign itself and to the > utterer, so that it is an Immediate Interpretant *as well as* an > Intentional Interpretant. The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign > can also be part of the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less > intuitive sense of what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign. > > If a semiosic process is *continuous*, as you have argued in another > thread, then the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of > analysis: they are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On > the psychological side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between > *people* are likewise indeterminate and arbitrary: > > > > CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all > you.’ If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of > wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, > and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you > would believe. Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, > for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, > all men who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a > measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors > are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894) > > > > Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a > continuous semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would > communication between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism > also has a phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early > work (long before he started using the term “phenomenology”): > > > > CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some > feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a > sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the > occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us > is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being > a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a > manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we > ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. (EP1:38) > > > > The rainbow is *at once* a sign of realities “without us” *and* a > “phenomenal manifestation of ourselves.” Our perception of it is both > objective and subjective. For a synechist semiotician, then, there should > be no problem seeing an Intentional Interpretant as *also* an Immediate > Interpretant internal to the sign. The “boundaries” between signs, like > those between organisms and their environments, are permeable by nature. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 23-Oct-21 19:10 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for > interpreting texts > > > > Gary R., List: > > > > I fully agree. > > > > GR: If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can > never be perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that > serves as a *standard* for assessing actual interpretations. > > > > Again, the ultimate standard for different *dynamical* interpretants of a > particular sign, including a text, is its *final *or *normal* > interpretant, which is final in the sense of a final cause and normal in > the sense of normative. Peirce defines it as the "effect that would be > produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought" > (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908); "that which *would* finally be decided to be > the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far > that an ultimate opinion were reached" (CP 8.184, EP 2:496, 1909); and "the > effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances > should permit it to work out its full effect ... the one Interpretative > result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is > sufficiently considered" (SS 110-111, 1909). > > > > Hence, my own shorthand is that the final interpretant is the *ideal aim* of > interpretation, how the sign *necessarily would be* understood after > infinite inquiry by an infinite community. > > > > GR: In the view of some on this List and off, this goal in the case of a > written text is always properly discerning *the* *author's intended > meaning* (intentional interpretant) as expressed in the text (immediate > interpretant). > > > > In other words, the goal of every sincere inquirer when reading a text is > to translate the immediate interpretant (as written) into a dynamical > interpretant (as *actually *understood) that closely approximates the > final interpretant (as *ideally *understood). Notice that these are all > correlates of the *sign*, not independent determinations of its utterer > nor its interpreter. In particular, the immediate interpretant is *internal > to* the sign. It is thus the sign *itself *(the text) that mediates > between the object and the interpretant, not the reader as a > "representamen" or "mediative node." > > > > I understand the rationale for associating the author's intended meaning > with the intentional (or intended) interpretant, but Peirce abandoned this > particular term less than a month after writing about it to Lady Welby. > > > > CSP: There is the *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of > the mind of the utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a > determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the *Communicational > *Interpretant, > or say the *Cominterpretant*, which is a determination of that mind into > which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that > any communication should take place. This mind may be called the *commens*. > (EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9). > > > > CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, > explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the > *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, > it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, > it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the > interpretant of *that *sign. (R 339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2) > > > > Based on the latter remarks in the Logic Notebook, I have argued > previously that the intentional interpretant must instead be the dynamical > interpretant of a *previous *sign of the same object, such that the > utterance of *this *sign is *its *dynamical interpretant. Likewise, an > interpretant that is somehow determined by the interpreter (what Gary F. > calls "internal context") rather than by the sign itself ("external > context") "is in no sense the Interpretant of *that *sign." Which > interpretant, then (if any), is the author's intended meaning? Is it the > final interpretant? > > > > GR: For anyone who makes the interpreter the mediator, rather than the > sign being that, there are only various individual readings, none of which > is more or less valid than any other. > > > > Indeed, and this is effectively a form of nominalism because there are > only *actual *(dynamical) interpretants of any given text, with no ideal > (final) interpretant that *really *governs them. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sat, Oct 23, 2021 at 5:20 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List, > > > > To incorrectly, in my opinion, define 'representamen' as 'the mediative > node' -- for example, as the 'function' that transforms 'input' into > 'output' -- effectively assigns the role of mediating between the object > and interpretant to the* interpreter* rather than to the *sign*. > > > > This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing > as an objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In > terms Gary Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the* internal > context **of *the interpreter *govern over* the *external context *that > is *shared* with the utterer. > > > > If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can never be > perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that serves as a > *standard* for assessing actual interpretations. > > > > In the view of some on this List and off, this goal in the case of a > written text is always properly discerning *the* *author's intended > meaning* (intentional interpretant) as expressed in the text (immediate > interpretant). For anyone who makes the interpreter the mediator, rather > than the sign being that, there are only various individual readings, none > of which is more or less valid than any other. > > > > Such a version of semiotics is not a *normative *science at all as It > provides no basis for evaluating any particular reading as a *better* > interpretation > of a text, or even a *mis*interpretation of the text. And who would > honestly deny that misinterpretations of texts do indeed occur? And who > would seriously argue that any and every interpretation is as good as any > other? > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
