Jon, List, Thanks for that explanation, Jon.
Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the sign" (EP 2: 480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify" this? Again, I'm mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his semeiotic as not corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along these lines?). The point is that if we take experience (conscious or somatic) to be a series of signs comprised of impressions from immediate objects, and immediate objects as one side of dual relationship in which dynamic objects (the object as it exists beyond the immediacy of the sign) comprise the other side, what uses do people think we can make of the dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been rebuffed many times over, but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the two objects) I am always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in itself (with the distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can experience the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's noumena and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?). Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his theory as much as possible, adding parts when needed. Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts) Jack, List: There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries are somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance with the purpose of a particular analysis. I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects (immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual (quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or methodeutic), the third branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic. Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered sign token with the same tones can have different dynamical interpretants--the one sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any particular (quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind. As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that "speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. For the general distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the final interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary, the perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics, p. 327). However, he also points out that in Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the divisions based on perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both associated with the dynamical interpretant--its nature and its relation to the sign, respectively. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term "token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant? JAS: I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is a sign token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be capable of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of conforming to a type that has an immediate (internal) interpretant. Interesting analysis. I know that in Peircean theory possibility/potentiality suffices so that a sign may exist regardless of whether or not it is interpreted (or interpreted at specific "levels" - say indexical, or symbolic), but in the most pragmatic sense I wonder if we aren't splitting hairs by dividing utterance from interpretation? That is, if we move away from the utterance as discrete act (if only theoretically) and focus instead upon interpretation, upon the one token refracted five different ways within five different (quasi-)minds, this seems to me to be more in line with practical "reality" (though it may diverge from Peircean orthodoxy). I wonder, that is, if we should suspend the purely theoretical criteria of the sign having only to be "capable of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant..." if only because in practice insofar as we know anything it is via interpretation. Again, I know Peirce's theory is much more general than human interpretation, but I wonder what your thoughts would be regarding a perspectival rendering of said theory solely within the performative/practical domain? Best Jack
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