Hi Jon, List,
Thank you for sharing your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatism. The focus of your inquiries is on the interpretation of Peirce's attempt to offer a proof of pragmatism around 1908. I tend to think the later writings often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof borrows by way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what might have been added to the later argument by way of additional premisses. Are any of the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of pragmatism missing in your reconstruction of the later argument? If so, might the addition of those premisses make the argument stronger? Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 7:14:39 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism List: About 18 months ago, I posted my sketch of what Peirce might have had in mind for his "proof" of pragmatism using Existential Graphs (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00086.html). Some lively exchanges on Twitter over the holiday weekend prompted me to revisit it, and I thought that the following slightly updated summary might be of interest. In Peirce's terminology, it is in the form of an argument, "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief," rather than an argumentation, "an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908). Any feedback or discussion would be welcome, as always. 1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only mode of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some stones possess the character of hardness." 2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the character of hardness." 3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to individual habits of expectation described by indicative judgments--"If this stone possesses the character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it will resist scratching." 4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of clearness) is a general mental habit described by a subjunctive conditional--"If I were to rub any diamond with a knife, then it would resist scratching." 5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub this stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it were a diamond, then that would be a matter of course." 6. A general mental habit manifests in self-controlled conduct described by a practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a relevant intention as the minor premiss--"I desire a stone that possesses the character of hardness, so I shall obtain a diamond." Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 (abduction/retroduction), but #6 (prescription) is the ultimate meaning of an intellectual concept in accordance with the maxim of pragmatism as clarified by Peirce's various reformulations of it, which I present and discuss in my Transactions paper on the subject (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787776). For example, consider how he contrasts his view with that of James in the first complete draft of his introductory article: CSP: The most prominent of all our school and the most respected, William James, defines pragmatism as the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a concept expresses itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or of experience to be expected. Between this definition and mine there is certainly a slight theoretical divergence ... These examples bear out James’s definition of pragmatism, which I have never denied is true of the logical meaning. My slight objection to it is that it seems to be true also of the existential meaning. Intellectual concepts are general or derivatives of generals, and therefore their meanings must be general. The general forms of psychic action besides concepts themselves are desires and habits. Desires are previous to the existential realization, while habits result from repeated such realizations. If, in place of James’s "experiences to be expected," we substitute the habits which must result from those experiences,--must result, I mean, if the defined concept be intellectual, but not if it be existential or emotional,--we finally extract, I think, the very quintessence of the logical meaning. (https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e51310, pp. 4&9, 1907) Incorporating Peirce's amendment into James's definition, pragmatism is the doctrine that the ultimate meaning of an intellectual concept expresses itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in the habits that must result from experiences to be expected--not those experiences themselves, nor the expectation of them. Rather than a new diagrammatic system that I was tentatively calling "Synechistic Graphs," I now suspect that what Peirce needed for #4-5 was "a Delta part [of Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals" (RL 376, R 500:2-3, 1911)--perhaps his 1909 Logic Notebook version using heavy lines to denote possible states of things, which I outlined in May (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2022-05/msg00003.html). #6 would then require a way to represent intentions and imperatives, which is presumably why Peirce proposed tinctures in 1906, but he abandoned them along with cuts in favor of simple shading for negation in 1911. Is there a viable alternative? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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