Gary R., LIst: Again, only the second and third trichotomies classify signs according to the nature of their *relations*. The first--whether qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) or tone/token/type (1906-8)--is according to the nature of the sign *itself*. The second--icon/index/symbol in every taxonomy, and I agree that these are matters of degree, not sharp distinctions (EP 2:306-307, 1901)--is according to the nature of the sign's *relation* with its (dynamical) object. The third--rheme/dicent/argument (1903) or seme/pheme/delome (1906-8), where the latter are "much widened" generalizations of the former (CP 4.538, 1906), not the other way around--is according to the nature of the sign's *relation *with its (final) interpretant.
Personally, I prefer tone/token/type over qualisign/sinsign/legisign, not only for the alliteration but also because a quality *in itself* cannot really be a sign--it can only *present *itself, it cannot *represent *something else. As Peirce acknowledges, it must be *embodied *in a token/sinsign (CP 2.244-245, EP 2:291, 1903) as "an indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice" (CP 4.537), which affects the dynamical interpretant of that individual token/sinsign but is not a "separate" sign in its own right. On the other hand, I have come to prefer name/proposition/argument over seme/pheme/delome. Although technically these refer only to symbols, as Peirce acknowledges, every delome is a symbol (argument) and every proposition--"a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object" (EP 2:307)--can be "affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed" (EP 2:312). Moreover, he defines "seme" as "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538), which is pretty much the role of a proper name. All that said, my growing conviction that the entire universe is a semiosic continuum--a whole that is ontologically prior to its parts (top-down), not an assemblage of them as its basic units in the reductionist sense (bottom-up)--has diminished my interest in classifying its constituent signs, whose boundaries are again at least somewhat (though not entirely) arbitrary. In my view, we prescind those "discrete" signs with their objects and interpretants from the *continuous *flow of semiosis as artifacts of analysis, i.e., creations of thought. CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images. Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates predicates. Subjectal [hypostatic] abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are creations of thought. (NEM 3:917, 1904) CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906) CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens rationis*), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are *entia rationis* (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295, 1906) Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jul 3, 2023 at 6:31 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, > > I tend to concur with some of your analysis, Jon. Certainly it is > essential to remember that in the 1903 classification of signs that the > three trichotomies are, or perhaps more accurately, *represent* > *relations*. But it's equally important to remember that they are not, > shall we say,* living relations* themselves, those occurring only in > actual semioses (which can, however, be semeiotically analyzed). > > JAS: [Peirce] later clarifies that they are for the sign itself > (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its *dynamical *object > (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its *final *interpretant > (seme/pheme/delome). > > I'm not sure that Peirce's later terming the relations to the sign to > itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign) by, in my view, less 'scientific' but, > perhaps, more 'evocative' terms (tone, token, type) in itself constitutes > an across the board *clarification.* This matter has, however, not gotten > extensive discussion in the literature, at least to my knowledge. Suffice > it to say that there are those who see the changes as more or less > principally changes in terminology. > > I myself remain a bit conflicted about the matter. For there seems to me > to be a kind of technical specificity to the earlier terminology lacking in > the more 'poetic' later terminology. For example, 'qualisign', "a quality > which is a sign," specifies the very character of the object of that > relationship, while 'tone' merely 'evokes' it. Much the same might be said > of sinsign, "a single sign," which becomes 'token' in the later > terminology. Thus, 'sin-, or 'single sign,' seems to gel more with Helmut's > comment ("An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before"). > Finally, legisign, "a law which is a sign," seems to me both more specific > and more inclusive than the later 'type'. > > Meanwhile, if one is familiar with the earlier terminology, then > the latter terminology immediately brings the earlier one to mind, while > the alliteration of the three 't's' in the latter terminology is quite > useful as, for example, a mnemonic device in teaching or explaining > semeiotic grammar. Nevertheless, while there seems to be *no difference* > that I can see between the two sets of terminology as regards the sign > itself, yet, and as Jon wrote, the latter terminology" clarifies that the > icon/index/symbol concerns "the relation of the sign to its *dynamical * > object*,*" or, in other words *constrains* the use and meaning of > icon/index/symbol to the *dynamical* object and, *therefore*, *not* to > the immediate object. That seems to me to be an interesting and important > distinction. > > Similarly, the trichotomy rheme/dicent/symbol recast as seme/pheme/delome > as specifying the relation of the sign to its *final interpretant* seems > to me to be an *addition* to the earlier, apparently more generalized(?) > rheme/dicent/argument trichotomy. However, I have not myself found much use > of this trichotomy, i.e., seme/pheme/delome, nor, for that matter, much > discussion of it in the literature: it seems to me something of possible > interest in the development of a fuller, rich taxonomy. However, in my view > the mixing of the two trichotomies such that they overlap to some extent > (*vide > supra*, the sign itself, for prime example), but not completely, needs > further clarification if it isn't to become an obstacle, rather than an > aid, to a fuller, more complete and useful taxonomy and tool for semeiotic > analysis. > > JAS: "The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the > interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their > relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and > three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate)." > > As I see it this is more a mathematical -- and less phaneroscopic -- > analysis of the characters of the three categories. In my view, after > practicing phaneroscopy (the pure *opening* to and *observation* ofthe > phaneron), one may *retrospectively* looks back at pure mathematics to > find these essentially *valental relations* to be phaneroscopically > *present*, *while pure phaneroscopy initially finds only qualities, > actions/reactions, and signs* which can then -- after this backwards > glance at this valental branch of pure mathematics -- be analyzed > trichotomically (as 1ns/2ns/3ns). This is not to suggest that the 3 -- and > *only* three, following the reduction thesis -- categories aren't present > from the get go. But one cannot assume trichotomy in the categorial sense > to be an essential character of the phaneron since observing categorial > characters requires a kind of abstraction, not allowed within pure > phaneroscopic practice. > > JAS: I agree that real semiosis is a *continuous *process, such that our > demarcation of *individual *signs with their objects and interpretants is > at least somewhat arbitrary. > GR: And I'd add to 'arbitrary', for the taxonomies we've been discussing, > 'abstract'. De Tienne, in his paper, "Iconocopy," did make an initial stab > at identifying objects in the phaneron in terms of their 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns, > this being done either within a distinct branch of phenomenology (as I see > it} or, as De Tienne puts it it in his subtitle, "between phenomenology and > semeiotic." [Note: De Tienne has not further followed this line of > thinking.] > > JAS: In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is > that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the > object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure > index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the > closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing > attention to something else. > > GR: And similarly, there are no pure icons, but only signs which are > *iconic*. In semeiotic (or speculative, or theoretical) grammar, sign > classifications necessarily abstract much of what is intrinsically > relational, while an adequate, scientific terminology for doing analyses of > specific 'moments' of semiosis seems to me to be scientifically essential. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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