List,
I would like to preface these comments by remarking that, and
especially over the past year or so, I have received more than a few off
List emails saying that some participants here, as one person put it "seem
to be deeply habituated to pushing Peircean plug-in quotes buttons to outdo
each other [and that these] same people [seem] more interested in Peircean
Correctness than open discussion." As I myself no doubt have been guilty of
at least overdoing the Peirce quotes in some of my posts, I've decided
to begin a practice of strictly limiting such quotations in this and in all
future messages, and in this case to only one. And I would most certainly
encourage more "open discussion: in the forum.
I think that I perhaps have a somewhat different understanding of the
origins of the categories and the universe than others on the List. I don't
know if it is possible to reconcile those different views, but I will at
least attempt taking a stab at it here and, perhaps, in future posts on the
topic.
I base my understanding of the origin of the categories and the
cosmos principally on the Blackboard metaphor in the lecture titled, "The
First Rule of Logic" in Peirce's 1898 Cambridge Conference Lecture
series, [pages]. A relevant excerpt from it is here: CP 6.203.
I read the Blackboard metaphor as meaning something along these lines:
Before the existence of time and the universe as we know it, there was a
state of vague potentiality, a boundless, undefined continuum. The
Blackboard represents this primal continuum. I have previously referred to
this as a kind ur-continuum (so, primal 3ns before the universe and
its form of 3ns were).
All that we consider 1nses (all the Platonic ideas) are there only
potentially, not yet having been realized as any particular character. 1ns
may be necessary in order for there eventually to be a universe, but it's
'expression' is, at this stage of the origin, but pure potential (Of
course, all this 'occurs' before there is time in *this* universe, even as
the language here quasi-necessarily employs temporal terms such as 'occurs'
'first', 'then', 'eventually', etc., ).
This primal continuity, with all its potentiality, is akin to a clean
blackboard, and represents a state of infinite possibilities without
distinct points or dimensions, where 'everything' (every character and
every determination) is but pure potential. The blackboard represents this
ur-continuum as encompassing an indefinite number of dimensions. In this
primordial state, nothing is yet determined.
To begin the process of defining his potential, a "line" appears (in this
lecture Peirce has himself writing on the blackboard, while I'll frame the
metaphor more generally). This represents a discontinuous proto-event
introducing a contrast or distinction within the continuum. This brute
occurrence represents the first appearance of 2ns.
But the line may not 'stabilize', may not 'stay' on the Blackboard (it can
instantaneously be 'erased', disappear). So its appearance represents only
the first step toward the emergence of a definiteness, a particular
character (that only should it 'hold'). For only when it stays on the
Blackboard does it represent a Platonic idea, i.e., a character. But if it
does, it is itself a kind of continuity, for it is derived from the
underlying general potentiality. Peirce writes that the continuity of the
Blackboard makes everything appearing on it also continuous.
The chalk line on the blackboard represents a boundary between two
contrasting surfaces: one black, one white. This boundary represents a kind
of interaction between these two continuous surfaces, signifying the
'pairedness' between contrasting 'elements', the white surface representing
1ns, the *boundary* between black and white representing the relationship
between 1ns and 3ns. So 2ns appears in the passage through this pairedness
of contrasting elements, that is, in their 'defining' each other.
Now, when a particular character gains stability and consistency ('stays'
on the Blackboard), a 'habit' is established. As more lines appear, they
create new forms and patterns, symbolizing new habits and tendencies
emerging from initial chance occurrences (again, out of what Peirce calls
elsewhere a Platonic world of ideas). Some of these habits (perhaps,
better, 'proto-habits') eventually gain stability and consistency. But,
again, I want to emphasize that this process of habit formation is rooted
in the original continuity which is inherently general and continuous. As
stated above, this pre-temporal state can be imagined as a "before" that is
not bound by our usual understanding of time.
Space and time and matter and evolutionary logic -- that is to say,
a universe -- emerges from the interaction of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. (As I've
occasionally noted in the past, I am not a big fan of the Big Bang theory
-- actually, theories.)
Peirce elsewhere argues as if 1ns arises 'first'. But this is not the case
in the Cambridge lecture under consideration where the ur-continuity is the
locus of the emergence of 1nses, literally the locus of every specific
character and every thing which* will* exist in *some* universe. Is that
ur-continuity Nothing? Well, as has been repeatedly noted in these
discussions, if it is, it is the nothing of pure potential (and not, as
Peirce contrasts it with, the 'nothing' of negation).
I'll conclude with but one quotation which I hope might help both
reconcile two seemingly different views ( being,1ns 1st v 3ns 1st) as well
Peirce's use of the expression "Platonic ideas" (for it is fairly certainly
that he was much less a Platonist than an Aristotilian).
In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of evolution
at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that locus in
the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic
world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too.
And among the things so resulting are time and logic.
The very *first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a
Freedom, or Chance, or Spontaneity*, by virtue of which *the general vague
nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite
qualities.* The second element we have to assume is that there could be
accidental reactions between those qualities. The qualities themselves are
mere eternal possibilities. But these reactions we must think of as events.
Not that Time was. But still, they had all the here-and-nowness of events.
CP 6.200
In such a manner "the *general vague* nothing-in-particular-ness" becomes
every quality, every relationship, *everything* that exists and evolves in
some possible universe, even such an actual universe as ours (but leaving
room, I think, for hypotheses regarding other possible worlds).
In our universe 3ns involves 2ns and 1ns, while 2ns involves 1ns. This is
to suggest that the involutional evolution of *our* universe seemingly took
a categorial vectorial path different from that of the categories 'before
time was'.
And none of this, as Gary Furhman just well argued, requires an *Ens
Necessarium*.
Best,
Gary R
On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 3:44 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Helmut, List
>
> Comments on your questions,,
>
> 1] Yes, my reading of Peirce is that the term of ‘God’ means Reason,
> Reasoning, Logic, Mind. See 6.218 ’there is no principle of action in the
> universe but reason’….but, this reasoning is not deductive but also
> inductive and abdutive, ie, open. This is the result of, as you note, that
> ALL THREE Categories were existent from the beginning.
>
> Therefore reasoning or logic is necessary - since it enables continuity
> and the formation of habits of generality..Without habits - what would
> result? That is - a universe operative only in Firstness and/or Secondness
> - would result in: Entropy.
>
> What is meant by the term of ‘god’? In In 8.211-212, he compares it with
> ’Nature’ - andNature is an evolving, rational expression of Mind as
> Matter.The concept that ‘Matter is effete Mind’ [6.25] is basic to Peirce’s
> objective idealism [6.24]; Note that 6.268 ‘where all mind partakes of the
> nature of matter’..and so on. See an extensive analysis; 6.277.
>
> In 6.502, Peirce uses the analogy of “a mind’ for the meaning of ‘god’. I
> have no problem with such an analogy - and reject the anthropomorphic
> images [again, I’m an atheist so….]…and reject the concept of god as
> causal. Again, I consider Peirce’s insistence that all three categories
> emerged together - to be a key infrastructure in his concept of the role of
> reason in the operation of the universe. .
>
> And Peirce’s outline of nothing [see 1.412 and 6.217 is not the ’nothing
> of negation [6.217…”There is no individual thing, no compulsion outward nor
> inward, no law”…andn “nothing necessarily resulted [6.218\.
>
> 3. I’m not sure what you mean by ‘capitalism’. My understanding of the
> term is that it means that the actions of the Investment and Production of
> goods and services are in the control of the individual, the private
> individual. Rather than the collective or State.
>
> The benefits of capitalism is that this enables diversity and novelty of
> innovation [ which can only be done by free-thinking, curious individuals];
> it enables an economy whose goods and services are linked to local
> realities [ local environment of land and plants/animals, local needs,
> …rather than top-down one-style fits all ]. It enables multiple sites of
> production - and - importantly, if one individual’s enterprise fails - only
> he fails - not the whole collective. The emergence of capitalism in the
> 15th 16th century and the concomitant development of the middle class
> enabled an explosion of population growth in Europe - and a concomitant
> increase in health and well-being - and - eventually, a need to expand to
> the ’new world’ because of this population growth [ see Braudel F,
> histories].
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Aug 27, 2024, at 2:40 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> as I said, I find the term "habit" at least as due to investigating its
> anthropomorphicity. The term "nothing" though I don´t see for
> anthropomorphic at all. (Sorry for my bad English, maybe I confuese "to"
> with "as" and "for"). Anyways, when we speak of "nothing" in a theological
> context, it becomes complex, I think:
>
> 1-- Is God logic/word, like John wrote (Bible) at the beginning of his
> gospel?
>
> 2 -- Or does God have to, like all creatures and all inanimate nature,
> obey to logic, because logic is absolutely inevitable, and the one primary
> ens nessecitarium? I think that is e.g. the position of Omri Boehm, in
> whose view ethics too derive from logic, as I think to have understood).
>
> I´m am against Hegel, but must admit, that he wrote a fine description,
> how everything evolved from nothing. BUT: I agree with Edwina (if i
> understood right), that this is not an evolution, as all three categories
> must have been there from the start.
>
> Well, I am sort of an agnostic, somewhere between panentheism and theism.
> I guess, even between theists, there are different ways to define the
> concept "God". And certainly the concept "nothing": Might well be, that it
> merely exist for concept in capitalism? (Sorry for that, Edwina, but I just
> felt like this). I just wanted to say, that maybe point 2 is true, and in
> that case, maybe there never has been "nothing". I think, the buddhist say
> so, I am not a buddhist, but this their point is worth of taking it into
> the discourse as possibility (type due to not knowing).
>
> But with Anselm of Canterbury, we might say, that if we can imagine
> "nothing", there must be, or have been, nothing. But I would doubt that we
> can imagine nothing (besides of being broke). It is a nonsentic term. Maybe.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Dienstag, 27. August 2024 um 03:50 Uhr
> *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
> *An:* "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
> *Cc:* "Peirce-L" <[email protected]>, "Edwina Taborsky" <
> [email protected]>
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] CSP: "A man could not have any idea that was
> not anthropomorphic," was, Ens necessarium
> Gary, R, List
>
>
> I certainly agree that Peirce was not an ‘orthodox Christian’ - and think
> that this term - and the term of ’theism’ needs to be clarified within
> Peirce’s [not someone who is not Peirce] - understanding.
>
>
>
> I think Peirce's outline of the categories is a basis for understanding
> some of what these terms means - since the operation of the categories must
> include such concepts as the origin of the universe, of evolution and
> adaptation - as well as the societal roles that we understand that religion
> plays.
>
>
>
>
> Therefore I also disagree with JAS’s assertion that ’something cannot
> come out of nothing’ - and thus, his claim that an "there must have been
> *something
> else* real that produced all observable phenomena (contingent being)”.Such
> a comment could only be made when one is thinking within and only within
> the mindset of Secondndess - which requires kinetic linear causality.
>
>
>
>
> But Peirce’s explanation of the universe as it developed from Nothing
> [1.412] isn’t an analysis based within Secondness but explains how ALL’
> THREE categories emerged within this realm of Nothing. As such, these
> three modes together produce, within their capacity of self-organization
> and self-creation - our universe. That is how I understand Peirce’s
> writings - which is quite a different understanding from that of JAS - and
> , as I’ve noted, there’s no point in our discussing these issues - as we
> are both ’settled’ in our interpretations [and thus, alas, both do indeed,
> can superficially be said to block the way of inquiry].
>
>
> As for anthropomorphic images - our species ’thinks’ only in symbols, and
> so - it is an easy analytic mode - but there are other images and symbolic
> means to explain these issues - even including mathematics! - but the
> anthropomorphic ones tend to align our identities with ‘more powerful
> forces than our individual selves - and are helpful to clarify our moral
> and ethical rules. But - I think they can be misleading and dangerous
> …especially when set up within beliefs held by ’tenacity’ and ‘authority’ .
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> .
>
>
>
> On Aug 26, 2024, at 8:14 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> While Jon has shown that Peirce considered himself to be a theist "[b]y his
> own abundant and unambiguous testimony" in the near exhaustive group of
> quotations which he supplied. I would only add that, in my view, Peirce was
> a *peculiar* sort of theist, and certainly *not* an orthodox one.
> Indeed, as he wrote, he was "very far from being an orthodox Christian."
>
> "I am very far from being an orthodox Christian; but as I see deeper into
> the creeds than the men who merely mouth them, and see them in a different
> way, I see more clearly their preciousness" (In a letter to William James
> dated November 25, 1902)
>
> I would suggest that this passage reflects Peirce's nuanced and personal
> interpretation of the creeds (and not only the creeds), differing from more
> conventional understandings and beliefs held by many -- if not most --
> others in his congregational circle(s). [I had earlier noted that from my
> youth I too have 'translated' the myths, rituals, and Christian creeds
> into ideas that were also anything but orthodox and conventional, such as
> my conception of the Cosmic Christ. I think it likely that others,
> perhaps many others, have done something like that (or how would one ever
> arrive
> at such a concept as the Cosmic Christ?)]
>
> As for Peirce's views, as remarked, Jon has convincingly and, as he sees
> it, *decisively* argued that Peirce was a theist, although he adds that
> Peirce presents his theistic position as "but a highly plausible
> hypothesis."
>
> JAS: In the state of things logically antecedent to the three universes
> (and corresponding categories), which was utterly devoid of any phenomena
> whatsoever, there must have been *something else* real that produced all
> observable phenomena (contingent being), namely, that which is real in *every
> possible* state of things (necessary being). He presents this as neither
> a hard fact nor a mere opinion, but a highly plausible hypothesis, and
> elsewhere directly addresses the charge of anthropomorphism.
>
> CSP: I have after long years of the severest examination become fully
> satisfied that, other things being equal, an anthropomorphic conception,
> whether it makes the best nucleus for a scientific working hypothesis or
> not, is far more likely to be approximately true than one that is not
> anthropomorphic. ... [A]s between an old-fashioned God and a modern patent
> Absolute, recommend me to the anthropomorphic conception if it is a
> question of which is the more likely to be about the truth. (CP 5.47n, EP
> 2:152, 1903)
>
>
>
> Jon is saying that Peirce's views are both theistic *and* anthropomorphic,
> and these two are conjoined: "[Peirce] even explicitly endorses
> anthropomorphism in conjunction with theism."
>
>
> CSP: To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in
> particular if it implies *theism*, I am an anthropomorphist.
>
>
>
>
> GR: But regarding anthropomorphism, Peirce tellingly writes elsewhere:
>
>
> If I were to attach a definite meaning to “anthropomorphism,” *I should
> think it stood to reason that a man could not have any idea that was not
> anthropomorphic*, and that it was simply to repeat the error of Kant to
> attempt to escape anthropomorphism (emphasis added). MS [R] 293:1-2; NEM
> 4:313 1906-7
>
> Here Peirce says that he considered it "reasonable" to believe that all
> our ideas are necessarily anthropomorphic. However, as both Peirce and
> Schiller were pragmatists, their anthropomorphism involves -- to some
> smaller or greater extent -- their understanding that we humans naturally
> understand the world and concepts, including God, through our own
> experiences and characteristics. Thus, when thinking about God, people
> quasi-necessarily ascribe human qualities, emotions, and intentions to the
> divine. Further, Peirce's and Schiller's anthropomorphism seems tied to
> their both being pragmatists in the sense that understanding God in human
> terms makes the concept of God more relatable and meaningful than the
> abstractions of the Enlightenment and, in particular, German Idealism.
> Finally, an anthropomorphic God is one with whom humans can seemingly have
> a personal relationship.
>
>
> Jon concludes that "It would be disingenuous for any purported Peirce
> scholar to claim otherwise [than that Peirce was a theist and an
> anthropocentrist in his conception of God].
>
>
> That may be so as far as it goes, although stated in a rather hubristic
> way. But as I see it there is *much* more to be said about the
> *character* of Peirce's theism, his *un-orthodox Christianity*, and his
> anthropocentrism which holds that *we can have no ideas which are not
> anthropomorphic. *
>
>
> But for me, perhaps an even more important consideration is that there is
> most certainly *very much* more to inquire into as to how his metaphysics
> might be used -- and, indeed, is being used -- to explore metaphysical and
> religious positions *other than theistic and anthropocentric ones*.
>
>
> As I previously remarked, I do not want to get into religious metaphysical
> discussions with Jon, now for several reasons.
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2024 at 6:14 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> Again, self-organization is not self-creation. Nothing comes from nothing.
>>
>>
>> CSP: I show that logic requires us to postulate of any given phenomenon,
>> that it is capable of rational explanation. Now, I say that the co-reality
>> of the three universes 1st of Ideas, 2nd of Occurrences (existent things
>> and actual events), 3rd of powers to bring two substances into relation to
>> each other, (and I will call powers of this sort *Reasons*) must,
>> accordingly, be supposed capable of rational explanation. (R 339:[293r],
>> 1908 Aug 28)
>>
>>
>> The first sentence is Peirce's version of the Principle of Sufficient
>> Reason (PSR), and the second is its application to the three universes (and
>> corresponding categories). There is no legitimate "understanding of Peirce"
>> in which he treats them as somehow self-generating or otherwise
>> inexplicable, especially since he would have considered that to be a
>> paradigmatic example of blocking the way of inquiry (CP 1.139, EP 2:49,
>> 1898). Instead, he goes on to suggest a rational explanation for them,
>> which I have quoted previously.
>>
>>
>> CSP: Cosmology or the explanatory science of the Three Universes shows
>> then plausibly at least how the Three Universes were produced, from an
>> antecedent state. But their Phenomena are all the phenomena there are. The
>> task of Cosmology is therefore to show how all phenomena were produced from
>> a state of absolute absence of any; and logic requires that this problem
>> [is] to be solved. But it must suppose something to be in that antecedent
>> state, and this must be that which would Really be in any possible state of
>> things whatever, that is, an *Ens Necessarium*. This Ens necessarium
>> being, then, the Principle of all Phenomena, must be the author and creator
>> of all that could ever be observed of Ideas [1ns], Occurrences [2ns], or
>> *Logoi* [3ns]. (R 339:[295r], 1908 Aug 28)
>>
>>
>> This is Peirce's version of the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument, which
>> follows from the PSR. In the state of things logically antecedent to the
>> three universes (and corresponding categories), which was utterly devoid of
>> any phenomena whatsoever, there must have been *something else* real
>> that produced all observable phenomena (contingent being), namely, that
>> which is real in *every possible* state of things (necessary being). He
>> presents this as neither a hard fact nor a mere opinion, but a highly
>> plausible hypothesis, and elsewhere directly addresses the charge of
>> anthropomorphism.
>>
>>
>> CSP: I have after long years of the severest examination become fully
>> satisfied that, other things being equal, an anthropomorphic conception,
>> whether it makes the best nucleus for a scientific working hypothesis or
>> not, is far more likely to be approximately true than one that is not
>> anthropomorphic. ... [A]s between an old-fashioned God and a modern patent
>> Absolute, recommend me to the anthropomorphic conception if it is a
>> question of which is the more likely to be about the truth. (CP 5.47n, EP
>> 2:152, 1903)
>>
>>
>> He even explicitly endorses anthropomorphism in conjunction with theism.
>>
>>
>> CSP: To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in
>> particular if it implies *theism*, I am an anthropomorphist. But the God
>> of my theism is not finite. That won't do at all. (CP 8.262, 1905 Jul 23)
>>
>>
>> By his own abundant and unambiguous testimony, Peirce believed that God
>> as *Ens necessarium* is "Really creator of all three Universes of
>> Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434, 1908). It would be disingenuous for any
>> purported Peirce scholar to claim otherwise.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>> On Mon, Aug 19, 2024 at 10:54 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
>>>
>>> an engineer, who makes a machine that replicates and develops
>>> automatically, is a worse engineer than one, who creates a situation, where
>>> parts self-organize to replicating, self-organizing, self-developing
>>> machines. So with the analogy to God, i would say, the less of His actions
>>> you can see, the better and more effective His creativity is. If people (as
>>> it is the case, I think) cannot see any direct divine action, but can
>>> explain more and more with science, His creativity is the best I can think
>>> of. But God is not falsifiable, so, according to Popper, not a valid
>>> hypothesis. But, differently from other hypotheses, it always will be
>>> possible to claim an intelligent (personal) principle behind any
>>> phenomenon, how scientifically analysed it ever might be, and it is
>>> justified, i think, to call that "God", or "Ens nessecarium".
>>>
>>> To the term "habit" I think, that this is not the end of inquiry. It
>>> just is an anthropomorphic term, extracted from our way of learning. Ok, we
>>> see the development of relations, that reminds us of our own
>>> habit-formation, in nature, but nature doesn´t work like our brain.
>>>
>>> To claim pure energy as a starting thing, I am not sure of that, and
>>> neither of the big bang. I have read, that astronomers have detected a big
>>> galaxy, only 300 million years after the presumed big bang. They call that
>>> unlikely. So maybe, an universe, when it becomes too big, calves, like a
>>> big soap-bubble that splits. And in every calf-bubble-universe, it looks as
>>> if there has been a big bang, but it hasn´t. At least this may be a
>>> possibility, so the theory of a primordial pure energy is not the only
>>> possible theory.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Helmut
>>> 19. August 2024 um 00:59 Uhr
>>>
>>> "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
>>> *wrote:*
>>>
>>> List, JAS
>>>
>>> No-one suggests that self-oganization is not ‘without reason’. The
>>> reason for the self-organization of a system is to preserve energy by
>>> forming it as instances operating within organized habits. [matter is
>>> effete mind]... Peirce’s focus onThirdness or ‘Mind’ is quite clear on its
>>> function in this manner - and since the categories operate within
>>> self-organization, then obviously, Reason is a vital part of a CAS [complex
>>> adaptive system].
>>>
>>> I disagree that ‘ens necessarium’ - that state of Nothing [which I also
>>> call pure energy..not free energy but pure energy] - and which is the
>>> ‘absolute absence of phenomena’ [ ie, the absence of the three
>>> categories]…is also ‘“*the transcendent and eternal* ‘author and
>>> creator’ . Such an anthropomorphic transformation of the actions of the
>>> Categories on pure energy isn’t necessary, in my view. In fact, I consider
>>> it a dangerous step - for establishing an agential Author of the universe
>>> leads to the institutionalization of this mindset - and we’ve seen the
>>> problems in world history with such actions - where belief becomes held
>>> within Tenacity and Authority..
>>>
>>> In my understanding of Peirce - All that this ens necessarium is, is
>>> the primal source of energy-to-become finite. What makes it such? The three
>>> categories, which are clearly outlined in 1.412. Again - not God - but
>>> the three categories, one of which includes Reason. How does
>>> energy-as-matter function within the world? Within the adaptive networking
>>> of agapastic integration as operative within the three categories ie, there
>>> is no agential plan.
>>>
>>> What is a fact? It is a unit-of-meaning within Secondness; ie, it is
>>> explicit, finite, with testable perimeters. “Facts are hard things which do
>>> not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or
>>> I or any man or generations of men may opine about them” 2.173. I don’t
>>> think that a belief , an opinion, can be declared as also a FACT. And
>>> therefore - I view the definition of ens necessarium as analogous to God -
>>> as an opinion, not a fact and is based on a false premiss [ an apriori
>>> belief in a god].
>>>
>>> JAS - I don’t think you and I are going to get anywhere in this
>>> discussion - and don’t see the point of its continuation. You have your way
>>> of reading Peirce and I have my way -
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
