List:

I do not ascribe my beliefs to Peirce, I scrupulously quote *his own*
statements.

It is standard practice to put any words added within a quotation in square
brackets, which *signals *that they are not in the original text.

In Peirce's speculative grammar, the sign, object, and interpretant are *not
*"informational sites where information is processed." He *never *describes
them that way.

As I observed before, Peirce also never states nor implies that a sign
has *three
*objects. The key to understanding his different references to objects in
CP 8.314 (EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14) is in its very first sentence.

CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e. the Object as
represented in the sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather
the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign
*cannot *express,
which it can only *indicate *and leave the interpreter to find out by
*collateral
experience*.


As Peirce repeatedly confirms elsewhere, a sign has only these *two *objects,
immediate and dynamical. Accordingly, in his first example later in the
same paragraph, the "Object, as expressed" is not some third object, it is
the *immediate *object. Likewise, for any sign that has a real (not
fictive) object, it is not some third object, it is the *dynamical *object.
Peirce confirms all this in his second example later in the same paragraph.

CSP: I reply, let us suppose: "It is a stormy day." Here is another sign.
Its *Immediate Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this
is common to her mind and mine,--not the *character *of it, but the *identity
*of it. The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity *of the actual and
*Real *meteorological
conditions at the moment.


Again, there is no third object.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 2:21 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:

> List, JAS
>
> I’ll continue to disagree with you - I do think that you post your own
> beliefs -[ and I don’t see what is wrong with this!]  for example, where
> you ascribe to god,   ‘creating and writing on the blackboard.  My only
> complaint is when you ascribe your beliefs to Peirce.
>
> And you ignore the definition of Peirce that God means ‘Mind’. [6.502]
> Indeed, you tried to denigrate this quotation by adding your* own term *of
> [merely] ..in brackets, before the word ‘mind’ - without informing us that
> this addition was your own. Peirce didn’t write ‘[merely] mind’. He said -
> ’the analogue of a mind..is what he means by “God”. And, “the
> pragmaticistic definition of *ens necessariium* would require many pages;
> but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied spirit or* pure
> mind”*  [6.490 my emphasis].
>
> So what if I use the term of* nodes* to describe the informational sites
> where information is processed? That’s a red herring tactic. What’s your
> problem with that? I didn’t declare their use as Peirce’s!  But- these
> terms do, in my view, help to clarify what is going on within the semiosic
> triad. ..which is an active processing of hard data from an external site
>  into an interpretation.
>
> And most certainly, there is a basis for Peirce explaining that there are
> three objects!! He specifically details them in 8.314 - which quotation I
> already gave, where he refers to the “This is a sign, whose Object, as
> expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the
> impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window
> curtains”.  See the difference?
>
> This third Object, which is external and not necessarily sensed - is
> “There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our
> opinions about them; …5.384. The Real Object [the weather] only became the
> Dynamic Object when Peirce looked at it.
>
> That is, I consider that you err in assigning the term of ‘Dynamic Object
> to these external  ‘Real things’ with which we are not, at the time,
> semeosically interacting. .  I consider that the term of Dynamic Object is,
> as Peirce outlines, that first *contact *of external stimuli into the
> senses. …which the semiosic triad will ‘indicate [8.314] …via the actual
> *acceptance* of stimuli. The actual acceptance of stimuli is The
> Immediate Object - “the Object as represented in the sign” 8.314.
>
> To give an example - if a dog is running around in he woods - there are
> lots of ‘Real Objects’..which the dog doesn’t interact with. But they are
> real!  BUT - if it stops and sniffs the air, then - it has interacted with
> a Real Object, by ‘connecting, semiotically, with it - and thus, accepting
> the external stimuli which is coming from that Real Object. That Real
> Object is now, a Dynamic Object..because it is *connected *to the dog’s
> senses. BUT - not all the data of that external object can be sensed by the
> dog..so..what IS sensed and semiotically worked on, is the Immediate
> Object. It is this internal data - just a part of the full informational
> content of the Dynamic Object and just a part of the full informational
> content of the Real Object - that forms the Immediate Object, and it is
> this IO data that is transformed by the mediative laws of the Representamen
> into the various Interpretants.
>
> Edwina
>
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