Jon, List,
You quoted Peirce, then asked 4 questions:
CSP: In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of *being
thought* and *really being* does not exist in the case of deity. ... That
an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions to unity is
admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such unless it were
regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a hypothesis of a
real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state of Cognition,
its truth is constituted thereby.
These statements prompt several questions in my mind.
1. What exactly does Peirce mean by "bring our general conceptions to
unity"?
2. In what sense is "an ideal of a God" *required* for this, such that "a
hypothesis of a real God ... is required in every state of Cognition"?
3. Was this really uncontroversial in the mid-19th century, i.e., "admitted
on all hands"?
4. Even if so, is it still uncontroversial today? (I suspect not.)
I'm away from my downtown apartment and, so, my desk and library, and I
will be for about a week. Consequently I can't read the 6th Lowell lecture
just now. So, my question and comments may turn out to be off base (or
obvious).
My question is: Does it in any way change the direction of our thinking if
we make this one editorial change in the Peirce quotation above?
CSP: In defence of the argument, it may be said that the distinction of *being
thought* and *really being* does not exist in the case of deity. ... That
an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions [*of God*]
to unity is admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such
unless it were regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a
hypothesis of a real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state
of Cognition, its truth is constituted thereby.
Then the four questions might be reflected on in that light: that Peirce is
not talking about "our conceptions" generally, but specifically of our
conceptions of God. So:
1. What exactly does Peirce mean by "bring our general conceptions [*of God*]
to unity"? [See below.]
2. In what sense is "an ideal of a God" *required* for this, such tha "a
hypothesis of a real God ... is required in every state of Cognition" [*of
God*]? [See below.]
3. Was this really uncontroversial in the mid-19th century, i.e., "admitted
on all hands"? [Perhaps what everyone ("all hands") might have agreed upon
was that *an ideal of God* (such as *Ens Necessarium*?) is required before
other general conceptions (attributes/properties) of God might then be
brought to unity?
4. Even if so, is it still uncontroversial today? (I suspect not.)
[Those who today believe in God might even in our age hold something like
Perice's view. That is, before one can consider God's possible attributes
or properties (traditionally, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence)
that a hypothetical ideal God (such as is argued for in the N.A.) is
needed. For Peirce God must be *thought of*, first, as *Ens Necessarium*,
and that is God's *real being *(the thought and the reality are one)*.
*Everything
that we might subsequently postulate about God's being would then be
unified in that idea. As you wrote regarding the two kinds of definitions:
"in a *nominal *definition, the copula only means *would be*, while in a
*real *definition, it also means *actually is*." So, for Peirce the
*real *definition
of God is: *Ens Necessarium*.
Now, again, I don't have that Lowell lecture at hand, nor can one access
the PDF in your earlier post you linked to in the Peirce Archives, so I'm
not certain of the context of your short quotation. Yet it seems to me that
for Peirce the ideal of God as *Ens Necessarium* is logically the unifying
idea that represents the reality that is God.
Or perhaps I'm just redundantly stating the obvious. (I've been assuming
that your take on the quotation was more general than mine.)
Best,
Gary R
On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 10:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Suteerth, List:
>
> Thanks for your response. FYI, my middle name is Alan (not Allen), and
> List protocol is that we "reply all" to any post to which we are
> responding, or (my personal preference) simply reply and then change the
> "To:" line to [email protected]. Either way, the "Subject:" line is
> then unchanged in everyone's e-mail inboxes, and the posts are properly
> threaded in the online archive (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/
> ).
>
> I am inclined to agree that "reducing our concepts to unity" likely means
> "explaining diverse things using one idea." As for the definition of "God,"
> we have discussed in various recent threads--perhaps before you joined the
> List--that Peirce's was ultimately *Ens necessarium* (CP 6.452, EP 2:434,
> 1908), "that which would Really be in any possible state of things
> whatever" (R 339:[295r], 1908).
>
> Taken together, his much earlier texts that I quoted in my previous post (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-10/msg00046.html) seem to
> imply that "a hypothesis of a real God" corresponds to "the conception of
> *being*" as "that which completes the work of conceptions of reducing the
> manifold to unity," especially in conjunction with this passage that he
> wrote in between.
>
> CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of
> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of
> being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an
> explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation,
> is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is
> One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake
> of an identical being. (CP 1.487, c. 1896)
>
>
> In summary, Peirce appears to be saying that it is impossible to unify the
> observed variety of the universe--i.e., "bring our general conceptions to
> unity"--without the ideal conception and explanatory hypothesis of a real
> God as *Ens necessarium*, the One root of all being, "the Principle of
> all Phenomena" and "the author and creator of all that could ever be
> observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or *Logoi*" (R 339:[295r]). If that is
> right, then it answers my first two questions, but I remain interested in
> seeing what others have to say about all four of them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 1:29 PM suteerth vajpeyi <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> I am certainly not that well read in religious literature but I can still
>> put forward a conjecture.
>> What is meant by reducing our general conceptions to unity ?
>> By reducing our concepts to unity, peirce may mean explaining diverse
>> things using one idea. So we explain the multitude of the qualities,
>> relations and representations of dogs, cats, humans, apes, elephants,
>> giraffes etc. by bringing them all under one concept- the concept of a
>> mammal. How in the world is the idea of a god required for this? For that
>> we must try to define god. God is the ultimate ideal of all degrees of
>> truth, goodness and admirable-ness in the universe. That is why we worship
>> god. Ideals are required for all types of unification of ideas. For that we
>> must show that ideals are required for all the three peircean categories of
>> thought. Thirdness or thought requires a basic reference to truth.
>> Secondness or action requires a basic reference to the good and feeling
>> requires reference to admirableness. In other words, if thought, action and
>> feeling are to be able to fulfil their functions they must conform to
>> ideals. Finally goodness, truth and admirableness in an infinite degree all
>> united in one god/deity help to guide all the things we are capable of
>> doing that is thinking, acting and feeling.
>> I really have no clue about the non-controversial nature of this doctrine
>> so I cannot answer your third and fourth questions.
>> P.S. this is not decisive content. I can only hope that it helps to churn
>> thought in you and others with the result that better ideas are put forward.
>>
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