Jon, List,you Jon, when you first mentioned that you were studying Anselm's ontological argument, I wondered if you weren't going to plunge us into some long, intricate foray into Medieval scholasticism. You have, of course, done nothing of the sort.
Regarding today's post you wrote: "I recognize that some of this is repetitive from my previous posts, but I hope that it is helpful by showing how some of the different pieces fit together." It is indeed extremely helpful and, well, for me the frosting on the cake of your persuasive Peircean argument for *Ens Necessarium*. OK, so there is a candle on top of the frosting on your argumentative cake being this quotation: CSP: To explain anything is to show it to be a necessary consequence. To say that the total real is a consequence of utter nothing without substance or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is to suppose a necessary something whose mode of being transcends reality. At the risk of simply rephrasing what you wrote, I'd like to try to summarize your argumentation to see if I have finally fully understood it. If I have, I hope my summary too will be helpful in List members fully grasping your argumentation. For me, it ultimately proved very helpful that you developed your argumentation through the ontological arguments of Anselm and Leibniz, Anselm proposing that if God can be conceived as "that than which nothing greater can be thought" then God’s existence is *logically possible*. However, this logical possibility alone does not establish that God's being is metaphysically possible (let alone necessary). So Leibniz reasons that God’s reality needs to be shown as *metaphysically possible*, and if this can be demonstrated, then God’s reality would follow as necessary by modal necessity (I'm a little hazy on that point, so that a bit of clarification would be helpful). Purely logical arguments being insufficient to confirm metaphysical necessity, Liebniz ultimately invokes the PSR to argue *cosmologically* for God’s necessity. Peirce goes even further in arguing that the totality of existence by mere chance or brute fact is absurd. The only alternative is a p*rinciple governing all phenomena, *one whose mode of being transcends even the three categories and three Universes of phenomena, and this is, of course, *Ens Necessarium*. So, God, as *Ens Necessarium*, is shown to be not only logically conceivable but metaphysically necessary. And if God’s being is metaphysically necessary it is as well necessarily *real*, for it alone can explain the "co-realit\y" and interdependence of all three universes without the (irrational) acceptance of unexplained facts (I think I should have included more quotations above). Please let me know if this 'gets it' in a nutshell, so to speak. Finally, as you wrote: JAS: God's mode of being is utterly unique, the three universes encompass "all the phenomena there are," but God is *not *a phenomenon; rather, God is "the Principle of all Phenomena ... the author and creator of all that could ever be observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or *Logoi*" (R 339:[295r]). QED Thanks, Gary R On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 1:09 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List: > > There are indeed various kinds of modality--alethic, deontic, doxastic, > dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc.--each with its corresponding kinds of > possibility and necessity since "possibly" is equivalent to "not > necessarily not" and "necessarily" is equivalent to "not possibly not." > Anselm's ontological argument demonstrates that the reality of God as "that > than which nothing greater can be thought" is conceivable, i.e., *logically > *possible. The longstanding debate is then whether this is sufficient to > establish that the reality of God is also *metaphysically *possible, from > which it would follow that the reality of God is metaphysically > necessary by virtue of the *nominal *definition of God as *Ens > necessarium*--in Peirce's words, "that which would Really be in every > possible state of things whatever" (R 339:[295r], 1908). > > As I have discussed previously, this amounts to a conditional > proposition--if God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real. Leibniz > recognized that in order to have a *real *definition of God, it must be > shown that God *is *possibly real, from which it would follow that God is > necessarily real; and in accordance with the uncontroversial modal axiom T, > it would then follow that God is *actually *real. Leibniz's initial > strategy, also adopted centuries later by Gödel, was to demonstrate that > maximally possessing every positive attribute--conceiving God as *Ens > perfectissimum*, a perfect being--is not self-contradictory. However, > this again only establishes that the reality of God is *logically *possible, > not *metaphysically *possible. Leibniz ultimately relied on the principle > of sufficient reason to formulate a *cosmological *argument for the > latter, echoed centuries later by Peirce. > > CSP: To explain anything is to show it to be a necessary consequence. To > say that the total real is a consequence of utter nothing without substance > or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is to suppose a necessary > something whose mode of being transcends reality. (R 288:91[178], 1905) > > > The reality of God is not only possible, but necessary to explain "the > co-reality of the three universes" (R 339:[293r]) because otherwise, it > would have to be considered an inexplicable brute fact, which a scholastic > realist can never accept--"It is one of the peculiarities of nominalism > that it is continually supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable. That > blocks the road of inquiry" (CP 1.170, c. 1897). However, it is a mistake > to conceive God as 3ns; instead, God transcends *all three* categories > and their corresponding universes. As I said on Saturday, God's mode of > being is utterly unique--the three universes encompass "all the phenomena > there are," but God is *not *a phenomenon; rather, God is "the Principle > of all Phenomena ... the author and creator of all that could ever be > observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or *Logoi*" (R 339:[295r]). > > Again, when discussing existence vs. reality, it is important to be clear > about whether we have in mind *logical *existence (being within the > universe of discourse) or *metaphysical *existence (reacting with other > things in the environment). Existential Graphs are *logically *existential, > such that they can be used to reason about members of *any *of the three > universes--as well as God, the One being that transcends them. This > includes not only the *real*, whatever is as it is regardless of what any > individual or finite group thinks about it, but also the *fictive*, > whatever is as it is solely because an individual or finite group thinks > about it that way. Hamlet does not "exist" as the Prince of Denmark in the > *actual > *world, only in the imagined world of Shakespeare's play, but it is a > real fact in the actual world that Hamlet "exists" as the Prince of Denmark > in that fictional world. > > I recognize that some of this is repetitive from my previous posts, but I > hope that it is helpful by showing how some of the different pieces fit > together. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 4:33 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and >> existence: There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a >> thirdness-one. Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety >> of reality, this includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety >> of reality, existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness >> variety of reality, so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the >> world, which is primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the >> existence-aspect of God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. >> So God exists, somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it >> may bring together theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded >> for not false. >> >> Best regards, Helmut >> >> On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or >> let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it >> might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: >> Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or >> energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. >> Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would >> work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly >> understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. >> Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and >> real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness >> doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that >> interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a >> secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant >> (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I >> got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). >> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, >> >> I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are >> different kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, >> depending for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or >> something that not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but >> reluctantly suspect, that it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If >> A then B"? or "No A without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, >> depends on whether A exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What >> for is God necessary? For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or >> for logic, which doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, >> but does not necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential >> graphs", and nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, >> but not for merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would >> mean, that you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality >> of A". I find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed >> to say: "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is >> forbidden?? >> >> Best regards, Helmut >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
