Gary, Edwina, Jon S, all,

For those interested in the influence of Plato's Platonism (as compared to some 
form of modern "nominalistic" Platonism) on Peirce's pragmatism, here is a 
helpful dissertation on the topic written by David O'Hara under the direction 
of Doug Anderson:

https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/files/final_submissions/1459

Edwina, I agree that Peirce's metaphysics is thoroughly evolutionary. Plato is 
typically interpreted as hold that the forms are timeless and unchanging. I 
appreciate the fact that there are a number of important differences between 
the Plato's methods and the conclusions he draws as parts of his ongoing 
inquiries, and the theories Peirce is developing. In my own attempts to 
interpret Peirce's works, I find it helpful to think of how various 
presuppositions, argumentative strategies, and central themes, appear to draw 
on ideas that Plato developed in the dialogues.

For instance, Plato explicitly articulates the account of the form of the good, 
beautiful and true as a hypothesis. In my interpretation of Peirce's inquiries 
in the normative sciences, I take aesthetics, ethics and semiotics to involve 
three ideals that, taken together, form a unified ideal for the conduct 
inquiry--and for the conduct of life generally. I find it helpful to trace the 
development of these ideas through the writings that Peirce was reading from 
early to late, including Schiller's Letters, Kant's Critiques, Plotinus's 
Enneads and Plato's dialogues.

Peirce notes an apparent shift in Plato's views from the early to the middle 
and later dialogues. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, for example, Plato appears 
to draw an analogy between the highest form (i.e., the ideal of the good, 
beautiful and true) and certain mathematical forms taken to be fundamental. On 
this account, the highest forms appear to have a metaphysical status akin to 
idealized possibilities with the character of ordered relations.

--Jeff






T



________________________________
From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, November 3, 2024 9:54 PM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt 
<[email protected]>
Subject: Peirce on Plato

List,

I very much appreciate Jeff bringing up the topic of the influence of Plato on 
Peirce. Perhaps, like many Peirce scholars,I've been led (rightly or wrongly is 
the investigatory question) to think of Peirce as much more akin to Aristotle 
than to Plato and in some matters of logic he certainly does seem closer to 
Aristotle; and by his own admission. So I decided to do a keyword search of the 
EP and CP of 'Plato' (not Platonism, which I think is a very different matter 
with a strikingly different emphasis) in an attempt to discover for myself what 
he actually thought about Plato. I'm going to offer some of the passages I 
found to be helpful in my review -- and subsequent partial reconsideration of 
-- Plato's influence on Peirce..

Rather than present all the passages at once, I'm going to post two or three a 
day and, if I have the time this week, I'll send all my succinct summaries and 
sources of the quotations to come so that interested folk can read them in 
advance and in context should they wish to.

Remembering reading philosophy texts in my 20's and 30's in libraries or used 
book stores, in old editions which occasionally had a short precis in boldface 
small print on the upper left side of each item, sometimes each paragraph, I've 
included my own succinct summary of each quotation so that forum members can 
quickly decide if they want to read that particular item. I have little doubt 
that some of my summaries may miss the mark and need correcting. Nonetheless, 
here are today's quotations preceded by my summary.

*****

Summary of EP 2:35: Peirce argues that in Plato's later works he shifts from a 
Theory of Ideas to view eternal essences  as mathematical, not as things with 
'Actual Existence' but as having 'Potential Being'. Plato’s philosophy evolves 
to view ideas as mathematical forms with relationships akin to numbers, thus 
perhaps moving in the direction of seeing them as continuous.

The dialogue of the Sophistes, lately shown to belong to Plato's last period,— 
when he had, as Aristotle tells us, abandoned Ideas and put Numbers in place of 
them,—this dialogue, I say, gives reasons for abandoning the Theory of Ideas 
which imply that Plato himself had come to see, if not that the Eternal 
Essences are continuous, at least, that there is an order of affinity among 
them, such as there is among Numbers. Thus, at last, the Platonic Ideas became 
Mathematical Essences, not possessed of Actual Existence but only of a 
Potential Being quite as Real, and his maturest philosophy became welded into 
mathematics. EP 2:35

 Summary of EP 2:37-38: Peirce highly praises Plato’s vision of science, 
especially in so far as he corrected the Heraclitan error of "holding the 
Continuous to be Transitory and . . . making the Being of the Idea potential." 
But he also criticizes him for  overlooking two types of causation and for 
making Matter a negative, "a mere non-Being." Plato focused only on internal 
causes (form and matter) while Aristotle pointed out the need to consider 
external causes (efficient and final), and Peirce slightly modifies Aristotle's 
assessment. Peirce suggests Plato’s philosophy is fundamentally about 
relationship (3ns), but Plato misunderstood his own ideas by focusing on 
duality and dichotomy. But neglecting external causes he is also actually 
overlooking 2ns.

[I]n regard to the general conception of what the ultimate purpose and 
importance of science consists in, no philosopher who ever lived, ever brought 
that out more clearly than this early scientific philosopher [viz. Plato]. 
Aristotle justly finds fault with Plato in many respects. But all his 
criticisms leave unscathed Plato's definitive philosophy, which results from 
the correction of that error of Heraclitus which consisted in holding the 
Continuous to be Transitory and also from making the Being of the Idea 
potential. Aristotle for example justly complains that of the four kinds of 
causes Plato only recognizes the two internal ones., Form and Matter, and loses 
sight of the two external ones, the Efficient Cause and the End.Though in 
regard to final causes this is scarcely just, it is more than just, in another 
respect. For not only does Plato only recognize internal causes, but he does 
not even recognize Matter as anything positive. He makes it mere negation, mere 
non-Being, or Emptiness, forgetting or perhaps not knowing that that which 
produces positive effects must have a positive nature. Although Plato's whole 
philosophy is a philosophy of Thirdness,—that is to say, it is a philosophy 
which attributes everything to an action which rightly analyzed has Thirdness 
for its capital and chief constituent,—he himself only recognizes duality, and 
makes himself an apostle of Dichotomy,— which is a misunderstanding of himself. 
To overlook second causes is only a special case of the common fault of all 
metaphysicians that they overlook the Logic of Relatives. But when he neglects 
external causes, it is Secondness itself that he is overlooking. This 
self-misunderstanding, this failure to recognize his own conceptions, marks 
Plato throughout. It is a characteristic of the man that he sees much deeper 
into the nature of things than he does into the nature of his own philosophy, 
and it is a trait to which we cannot altogether refuse our esteem.
EP 2: 37-38

Commentary: In his introduction to "The Seven Systems of Metaphysics" in the 
1903 Harvard Lecture Series, Nathan Houser writes: "Peirce aligns himself with 
the seventh system, arguing for the reality of all three categories. . ." EP 
2:179 Note: Both Plato and Aristotle are included in this system, 
Aristotelianism being characterized as "a special development" of the Platonic 
philosophy.

The metaphysics that recognizes all the categories may need at once to be 
subdivided. But I shall not stop to consider its subdivision. It embraces 
Kantism,—Reid's philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which Aristotelianism 
is a special development.
EP 2:180

Best,

Gary R


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