Gary f, Jon, List, Thank you for your comments which suggest to me that Peirce's understanding of 'consciousness' was rather nuanced. However, in doing a string search of the CP I found one concept that seems to run through the surprising -- to me -- large number of pages Peirce devoted to consciousness, namely, that "To be conscious is nothing else than to feel." CP 1.319
"The whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling, as truly as the whole of space is made up of points or the whole of time of instants." CP l.317. "Whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists . . . . It is needless to point out that, from the very nature of an infinite series, it cannot be a present modification of consciousness." CP 8.288 This is not to say that there aren't various 'intensities' of consciousness (e.g. vivid, intense, waning, etc.), nor forms or modes of consciousness beyond 'immediate consciousness' [which itself "takes time," that is, there is no "instantaneous consciousness" -- see below]; that is, there can be consciousness *of* something. As applied to 2ns it is principally a consciousness of resistance, applied to 3ns it is principally a consciousness of thought, of semiosis occuring. "It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant [rather, a moment, for the 'instant' is a mere abstraction. GR] of time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought." CP 1.377 In several places he explicates especially the "dual" sense of consciousness, that of the 'inner' and 'outer' worlds. "To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer world -- the world of those causes that are exceedingly compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, with general disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon only slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular effort -- and of the inner world, apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to direct effort of various kinds with feeble reactions; the interaction of these two worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world upon the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the operation of habits." CP 5.493 His comments on the relationship between consciousness and time (and continuity, which I won't discuss here) are particularly interesting, For example: "But yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time [which he elsewhere refers to as a tripartite 'moment'); for if it did not, we could gain no knowledge of time, and not merely no veracious cognition of it, but no conception whatever. We are, therefore, forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time." CP 6.110 In another place he goes on to suggest that consciousness not only takes time, but "relates to a process": "This conception of consciousness is something which takes up time.. And if consciousness has a duration, then there is no such thing as an instantaneous consciousness; but all consciousness relates to a process. CP 7. Continuing the idea that consciousness is essentially 'feeling', Peirce notes that even protoplasm can be said to feel, and that there can be no mechanism to account for this, strongly suggesting that *all *living beings feel, and so by Peirce's definition, have some degree of consciousness. "But what is to be said of the property of feeling? If consciousness belongs to all protoplasm, by what mechanical constitution is this to be accounted for? The slime is nothing but a chemical compound. There is no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the laboratory, out of its chemical elements; and if it were so made, it would present all the characters of natural protoplasm. No doubt, then, it would feel. To hesitate to admit this would be puerile and ultra-puerile. CP 6.264 Taking up consciousness in the realm of the "third Universe," Peirce remarks in this familiar passage: "The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. . ." CP 6.455 Gary f, you mentioned the lake metaphor which, it would seem to me, has implications for memory at very least. "I think of consciousness as a bottomless lake, whose waters seem transparent, yet into which we can clearly see but a little way. But in this water there are countless objects at different depths; and certain influences will give certain kinds of those objects an upward impulse which may be intense enough and continue long enough to bring them into the upper visible layer. After the impulse ceases they commence to sink downwards. CP 7.548 As for consciousness and logic -- and the relationship of metaphysics to logic, this passage is suggestive: "I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical research, but shall merely say that in the opinion of several great thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics. In the last lecture,* I endeavored to show how logic furnishes us with a classification of the elements of consciousness*. We found that all modifications of consciousness are inferences and that all inferences are valid inferences (Emphasis added). CP 7.580 Conclusion: In my search I didn't find any passages suggesting that inanimate objects -- like rocks -- have consciousness, nor that God has consciousness in the sense discussed above. My own tentative guesses regarding this are that Peirce might say that inanimate objects lack consciousness but that in consideration of objective idealism that they participate in a universal process of mind. As for God, I'd say that if God has anything like consciousness, it is much more abstract and universal than what we think of consciousness as being Finally, I'd conclude that according to Peirce, anything that feels has consciousness, from protoplasm, plants and animals, through humans. (Recent research regarding how plants feel would seem to support this idea.) Best, Gary R On Sat, Dec 14, 2024 at 1:29 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, Jon, list, (trying again to get the links to work) > > The passage you quote, Jon, represents one pole of a spectrum of concepts > of consciousness (or at least uses of the word) that Peirce expressed from > time to time. At the other end, perhaps, is his remark in the Additament to > his “Neglected Argument” essay of 1908: > > “Since God, in His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a > disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we > call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or > some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God > probably has no consciousness” (EP2:447 > <http://gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm#xcnc>). In the middle is the graded > concept of consciousness that he refers to as a “bottomless lake > <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snm.htm#btmlslk>.” Whether these are three > different aspects of “consciousness” or three ways of talking about it is > hard to say, in my opinion. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 13-Dec-24 13:08 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Conscious is ubiquitous: Rumi and Peirce > > > > Gary R., List: > > > > Rumi's first quoted remark is indeed reminiscent of this passage by Peirce. > > > > CSP: But there is *another *class of objectors for whom I have more > respect. They are shocked at the atheism of Lucretius and his great master. > They do not perceive that that which offends them is not the 1ns in the > swerving atoms, because they themselves are just as much advocates of 1ns > as the ancient Atomists were. But what they cannot accept is the > attribution of this 1ns to things perfectly dead and material. Now I am > quite with them there. I think too that whatever is 1st is *ipso facto* > sentient. If I make atoms swerve--as I do--I make them swerve but very very > little, because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I do > not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the materialists > hold them to be, only with a small dose of sentiency superadded. For that, > I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I mean is, that all that there > is, is 1st, Feelings; 2nd, Efforts; 3rd, Habits--all of which are more > familiar to us on their psychical side than on their physical side; and > that dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete > induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute > irrationality of effort to complete death. (CP 6:201, 1898) > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
