List, Sally: First, thank you Sally for your excellent posts. Your efforts contribute substantially to to the meaning of this paper.
I am reluctant to say much about the paper as again my views are rather idiosyncratic on this topic. The view from within a discipline, from within its history, from within its traditions, is rather different than the view from the outside. In this sense, I am skeptical that the scientific community places much weight on the concept of sincerity. Three aspects of an experimental scientific communication stand out in my mind. The first is methods. What do I know of the methods? Secondly, the data speaks more loudly than anything else. Finally, the rhetoric. The rhetoric strongly influences me if I do not know the author(s). It reveals their "soul" so to speak. If I know the authors or know their works, then the issue of bias enters the picture. But, bias is distant from sincerity. One can be completely biased, yet highly sincere. (In interdisciplinary scientific communication bias is oft a mixture of arrogance and ignorance supporting a good narrative!) I suspect that the difficulty of interdisciplinary communication are a tad beyond JR's perspective. Cheers Jerry On Sep 17, 2011, at 7:16 PM, Sally Ness wrote: > Segment 4 > > Dear List, > > This post will address paragraphs 18 to 21 of the paper, "Sciences as > Communicational Communities." The paragraphs are reproduced below in their > entirety. As I have mentioned before, this segment appears to be the crux of > the paper, where JR lays out his vision of scientific communication (similar > in most respects to that already discussed in this slow read in relation to > the paper, "Peirce and the Socratic Tradition"). He then formulates his > understanding of the relation of scientific communication to academia, and > delivers his key insight regarding how, in practice, scientific communication > can be maintained, despite the realities confronted in academic institutions. > > JR makes four important points in these paragraphs about the character of > scientific communication: > > 1) [P18] Scientific communication must be sincere. Otherwise multiple > perspectives on the subject-matter will fail to cohere in a coordinated > manner, and the subject-matter will cease to control inquiry. > > 2) [P19] Scientific communication must be about subject-matter that is > unitary and real. Otherwise, the subject-matter itself will fail to produce > a coherence of perspectives. > > 3) [P19] Scientific communication must evidence objectivity, which can be > defined both as an attitude of the inquirer and as a formal feature of the > inquiry process. Otherwise, communication will tend toward chaos. > > 4) [P20] Scientific communication must regard all (sincere) participants as > being peers, equal with respect to both the shared public understanding of > the community's subject matter and with regard to being entitled to respect > in relation to the perspectives they contribute to the community's > communication. Otherwise the coordination of perspectives will become > deranged (fail to cohere as the subject-matter, in truth, would dictate). > > JR then concludes with a final point about the relation between scientific > communication and academia: > > 5) [P21] While the fundamentally hierarchical character of academia > inevitably plagues the sciences, corrupting and compromising its practices, > the norms of science remain unchanged by this corruption and stand in > enduring opposition to those of academia. > > In this section, JR sets forward an alternative to the academic politician's > negotiational view of the relation between scientific inquiry and academia. > He grants that science is generally situated in academic contexts that > disease and deform it politically. However, JR does not recognize the same > degree of integration occurring at the science/academic interface that the > sociologist of knowledge does. In JR's view, this interface does not > permeate the sciences so completely as to have modified the community's basic > norms of conduct. As a result, it is still possible to conceive of living a > scientific life while also maintaining a separate status as a professor. The > two identities may come into conflict when their norms are not in harmony, > but they nonetheless each have their own discrete character. > > In this final point, JR is able to explain how the authoritarian, > hierarchically-oriented, politically-governed behavior that scientists have > been accurately documented as occasionally (even habitually) exhibiting can > be seen to occur while science in general can remain apolitical. Because > scientific norms remain uncorrupted and uninfluenced by academia, it is > possible for scientists, even if they are also professors, to engage in > scientific inquiry according to the norms of a scientific life proper. If > they fail to do so, it is because they fail to conduct themselves according > to the norms of science, not because science is nothing but a "negotiational" > endeavor. > > A few questions arise in relation to JR's views presented in this segment: > > * How distinctly is JR speaking "in the spirit of Peirce" here, with regard > to his 4-fold definition of scientific communication? Does Peirce place the > same kind of stress on each of these four points as JR does? Is there any > deviation or inclination, however subtle, that might identify a Ransdellian > take on Peirce here? Would Short, or Ketner, or Houser, or de Tienne, or > Apel, or deWaal, or even Eco, or other interpreters of Peirce put it quite > the same way? > > * What, exactly, is "unitary" subject-matter as JR employs the term? A great > deal is hanging on this concept, it would seem. Is inorganic subject-matter > more unitary than organic subject-matter? If so, that would explain why the > hard sciences have the superior status they are granted in this paper (it > might even necessarily explain it, following JR's logic of objectivity). I > have no immediate recollection of how Peirce uses this concept in relation to > science. Perhaps some listers may be able to give some additional detail on > this. > > * In the paper, "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?," listers may recall that JR > stressed the differences between what he termed the > "mechanistic-technological" conception of science (p. 5, 6), associated with > Descartes and, more recently Kreis and Carnap, and Peirce's pragmaticist > (teleological) conception of science. JR claimed that for Peirce, the > character of the subject-matter did not exercise a defining influence on the > identity of science. In this earlier paper, JR writes that Peirce, "does not > identify science or the scientific by reference to any special type of > property of the subject-matter of the science (its "primary qualities," for > example), or by reference to some special "scientific method" (in the sense > in which that would usually be understood) but rather by reference to the > communicational relationships of its practitioners . . ." In view of the > arguments presented in the paper now under discussion, it would seem that JR, > in the phenomenology paper, is edging up to more of a "negotiational" > perspective than would seem to be tenable under the terms of the present > paper. I wonder what "unitary-ness" is if it is not a "primary quality" of > scientific subject-matter. I wonder what "controlled observation" is if it > is not a special method developed in relation to the primary quality of > unitary-ness of scientific subject-matter. Do other listers see here a > contradiction in JR's two papers? > > It seems worth noting that, in the phenomenology paper, which was not > addressed to scientists, JR seems strongly critical of the > mechanistic-technological conception of science and characterizes that > conception as having "reigned in modern times." One would assume that JR saw > it as having reigned in modern times in the discipline of physics as well as > in the other sciences. However, in this paper, addressed as it is to > physicists, JR seems to be retreating from that critical view of the reigning > conception of science in their discipline. Instead, JR presents a view in > which "unitary and real" subject-matter is an essential condition for > enabling scientific communication, and praises the hard sciences for its > special method of dealing with such subject-matter. Has JR compromised > Peirce's perspective here as well as his own? Has he made the > subject-matter of science unnecessarily exclusive and hierarchical? For, if > some subject-matter is better for science than others (more "unitary"), is > there not then a politics inherent in the hierarchy of unitary-ness as > exhibited by the various objects of scientific inquiry? If not, how can JR's > views as presented in these two papers be reconciled? > > I hope to post again in 5 days times. > > Best, > Sally > > > > > > > > > > > > > SEGMENT 4 of "Sciences as Communicational Communities" > [paragraphs 18-21] > > But leaving the plight of the sociologist aside for the present, I believe > that if the basic conception of scientific publication as communication that > I articulated above in a crude but basic form is thought through > consistently, it will be seen that this entails first of all that everything > said about the subject-matter should be said responsibly and sincerely, which > is to say that lying, misdirection, evasion, waffling, and all other forms of > deliberate or tolerated misrepresentation--in short, any of the many forms of > insincerity--are the most fundamental of all violations of scientific method. > Secrecy is a limitation on science: where secrecy begins science ends, > strictly speaking; but that is a limitation on the scope of inclusion of a > scientific community, and although necessarily crippling to whatever extent > it is practiced, it is not secrecy but rather insincerity--lying in its most > general form--that kills science immediately insofar as it enters into it > effectively. Why? Because no real subject-matter can be understood from the > perspective of a single person--reality has facets--but is essentially a > matter of the coordination of multiple perspectives on the same thing, and > lying introduces pseudo-perspectives that tend toward defeating attempts > within a scientific community to establish a coherent coordination of the > perspectives available at a given time, thus deracinating inquiry by > destroying the integrity of its connection with its subject-matter as its > ultimate source of control. > [19] > The coordination of the diverse perspectives of the individual members > of the community, which is a primary function of the publication process, > assumes that the subject-matter which concerns its members is unitary and > real, since if it were unreal this would be shown by a continuing inability > to establish such a coordination. And what is meant by objectivity in > inquiry, considered as an attitude of the inquirer, is the commitment to > establishing such a coordination by reference to a common object, and by the > cultivation of communicational practices designed to maximize the kind of > collaboration that can have such a result. Objectivity considered as a formal > feature of the inquiry process, rather than as a stance taken by the > inquirer, is that referential structure in the communicational process > regarded logically. Where such communicational practices exist, authentic > publication policies are in effect and are working effectively; where there > is no attempt at such a coordination there is no objectivity in the field, > and the publication practices are more likely to be conducive to chaos than > to growth and to function more as a blight than a blessing. > [20] > Though it may not be readily apparent, this also implies that every > individual in such a community is to be regarded as presumptively equal with > every other as a provider of content to be assimilated into the coherent > coordination of perspectives sought for, and although it is true that some > people's opinions will inevitably be weighted more heavily in practice than > others--and no doubt should be if they establish a track record that warrants > it--this must remain at the level of individual judgment and not be confused > with the shared public understanding of a given scientific community, which > is always concerned only with characteristics of the subject-matter since it > is that and that only which constitutes the concern constitutive of the > particular community of inquirers as such. In other words, no community of > scientific inquiry as such can legitimately concern itself with ranking its > own members in terms of their status and worth in the community because to do > so is to lose sight of its subject-matter by lapsing into group introspection > instead. More could be said about this, and will be elsewhere, but I will > only add further here that we see here the typical point of attempted entry > of authoritarianism into inquiry, and can see why its effective entry always > corrupts to the extent that this effect ramifies. > [21] > This is why it is of the first importance not to confuse what it means > to be a scientist of this type or that with being a professor of this rank or > that in a local hierarchical university system. I don't doubt that such > confusions do in fact plague the sciences like they plague every other > academic field, causing a falling away from science into the acrimony of > politics, and that the essential egalitarianism of science is betrayed in > many ways as it actually exists in practice; but these compromises and > betrayals are academic diseases and deformities, inherited as congenital > birth defects due to the origins of academia as a medieval hierarchical > institution, not a norm of the scientific life proper, which is fundamentally > at odds with this hierarchical heritage. Let me stress that the point is not > to adopt an unrealistic view of the importance of prestige and > accomplishment, but rather to recognize that pains should be taken not to > allow this to subvert in practice the principle of presumptive equality which > is the essential element of the idea of a peer. The reason is essentially the > same as in the case of lying: a peer is--logically regarded--equivalent to a > respected perspective on the subject-matter, and to treat a peer either as > superior or inferior is to derange the coordination of perspectives which is > the constant task of the ongoing science. > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. 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