Nathan is still having posting problems and has asked me to forward this
response to Jon's message. Gary Richmond
Reply to Jon Awbrey, 2 Oct. 2011:
Jon,
Let me make a quick reply and later when I have more time I'll go back to Joe's
paper to see if he may have had something like what you say in mind. I suppose
a lot depends on precisely what Joe meant by "directly concerned with semiotic"
when he wrote that 90% of Peirce's philosophical output was directly concerned
with semiotic. And also on how much he was limiting the scope of his claim by
his qualifying reference to Peirce's philosophical output. It would seem that
to be "directly concerned with semiotic" is to be about semiotic, not just
involved with sign usage. We wouldn't normally say, for example, that in
completing one's tax return one is directly concerned with mathematics. I
certainly think it is plausible to regard all of Peirce's writings about
normative logic as semiotic works (I do not include the mathematical theory of
relations in normative logic) but it seems to me that the rationale for
Peirce's classification of the sciences precludes counting writings about
phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics as belonging to semiotic proper, and this
goes as well for the sciences that come after logic, including his metaphysical
writings. Since mathematics, psychology, and physics are not philosophical
sciences, presumably Joe was not including Peirce's considerable contributions
in those areas.
Having said this, I nevertheless agree that a great deal of Peirce's
philosophical output does, at least in part, deal directly with semiotic but I
believe it is considerably less that 90%. I suspect this is in part because I
do not believe that the bulk of Peirce's metaphysical writings can correctly be
said to be "directly concerned with semiotic." But, as I said, when I get more
time I'll look at this question more carefully with more consideration of the
breakdown between works on philosophy and works in other sciences and I'll see
if I can get a better sense of how Joe defended, or would have defended, his
claim. Perhaps there has been relevant discussion in earlier slow reads.
Let me encourage everyone who still has something to say about the slow read
let by Sally Ness to keep it going as long as the spirit moves. No reason why
we can't overlap for a time.
Nathan
_________________________________________________________________
Nathan Houser
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
Senior Fellow, Institute for American Thought
Indiana University at Indianapolis
>>> Jon Awbrey 10/02/11 7:44 PM >>>
NH = Nathan Houser
NH: JR began this paper by pointing out that Peirce conceived of semiotics
as a foundational theory capable of unifying sub-theories dealing with
communication, meaning, and inference. This may call for some discussion.
He then claims that 90% of Peirce's "prodigious philosophical output" is
directly concerned with semiotic." This is an odd claim in a way since it
does not seem to be straightforwardly true. How can we make sense of it?
From my sense of Peirce's work, I would have say that I agree with the claim
that Joe makes on this point, even if I can't say whether it would be for any
of the same reasons he had in mind. Understanding Peirce's pragmatism depends
on understanding sign relations, triadic relations, and relations in general,
all of which forms the conceptual framework of his theory of inquiry and his
theory of signs.
Regards,
Jon
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