Maybe we should look in Royce, in what he wrote after listening carefully to Peirce. Problems of Christianity and, maybe, in the exchange with Dewey…in the complete Dewey, a nasty misunderstanding from a philosophy congress, around 1912 or ’13. Royce’s reply is a footnote to Dewey’s attack.
Regards, John W. From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Aaron Massecar Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 7:56 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry" Hi Maughn, John, List, I tried to send this earlier today, but it didn't go through for some reason. I am trying it again... After a search through the collected papers and the Chronological Writings (I have electronic versions of both), I could not find those three words put together. That said, I did find a lot of quotes that, without stretching too much, would get you close to a "community of inquiry" or a "community of inquirers." In general, you can find the notion of a community the Some Consequences of Four Incapacities (1868) and Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869). I am sure that there are more out there, but here some that I found. In general, you could say that philosophers are inquirers and thus a community of philosophers is a community of inquirers, which might give you what you are looking for, but this could run into problems depending on your understanding of philosophers. I understand Peirce to be saying that philosophers are inquirers in a broad sense of inquiry. Once you tie this into his conception of scientific inquiry as a way of fixing belief, then you get a sufficiently broad notion of inquiry that would apply to both science and philosophy (as if there was a separation between the two). Please let me know if I missed anything Aaron -- Aaron Massecar, PhD Department of Philosophy University of Guelph Guelph, ON N1G 2W1 Some Consequences of Four Incapacities P 27: Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2(1868): 140–57 2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (W 2:213) The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite seriess of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions—the real and the unreal —consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. (W 2:239) But scientific progress is to a large extent public and belongs to the community of scientific men of the same department, its conclusions are unanimous, its interpretations of nature are no private interpretations, and so much must always be published to the world as will suffice to enable the world to adopt the individual investigator's conclusions (W 2:339) Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man, proud man, Most ignorant of what he's most assured, His glassy essence. (W 2:241-242) _____ From: "Maughn Gregory" <grego...@mail.montclair.edu> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Tuesday, 1 November, 2011 9:42:17 AM Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry" Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service, which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches. I concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in Peirce's works. I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this. Maughn Gregory --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. 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