An adjustment to my email from last night. I wrongly used the term "meaningless," slipping into old habits. The distinction, JR suggests, produces a meaning (by the more rigorous use of that term): the separation of concerns that concerns him. I should have said: *in semeiotic theory* the distinction is "misleading" because to draw the distinction causes an undue separation of concerns.
With respect, Steven On Nov 25, 2011, at 2:27 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: > Dear Jon, > > It's important to note that in his opening statement JR is not making a > general statement about the distinctions of empirical and non-empirical, but > rather is making the statement that *in semeiotic theory* the distinction is > meaningless because to draw the distinction causes an undue separation of > concerns. > > My apologies for the discontinuity in leadership of this reading. The > Supercomputing conference demanded more of my attention than I expected and I > returned with a virus that has occupied me since my return. I will continue > tomorrow (Friday). > > With respect, > Steven > > > > > On Nov 24, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > >> * Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell, >> "On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic", >> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm >> >> Re: Comments by Auke van Breemen (AB) >> >> Auke & All, >> >> By way of recalling our present engagement, >> let's review Joe's statement of his thesis: >> >> JR: The thesis of my paper is that it is doubtful that any distinction >> should be drawn between empirical and nonempirical semiotics or even >> between experimental and nonexperimental semiotics. Doing so tends to >> reproduce within the semiotics movement the present academic distinction >> between the sciences and the humanities which semiotics should aim at >> discouraging, rather than reinforcing. But to overcome this undesirable >> dichotomy, it is necessary to disentangle the conceptions of the >> experiential, the experimental and the empirical from certain other >> complexes of ideas with which they have become associated by accident >> rather than necessity. >> >> The thoughts that occur to me on reading this statement are as follows. >> >> On the one hand I am much in favor of seeking deeper-lying continuities >> where only divisions appear to rule the superficial aspects of phenomena. >> That is one of the things that attracts me to Peirce's theory of inquiry, >> that succeeds in connecting our everyday problem-solving activities with >> the more deliberate and disciplined methodologies of scientific research. >> >> On the other hand I cannot help noticing the facts of usage. For example, >> even though the words "experiential", "empirical", and "experimental" may >> be near enough synonyms in some contexts, in other contexts a person will >> tend to use "empirical" to emphasize a shade of distinction between casual >> experience and the deliberate collection of data, perhaps even bearing the >> motive of testing a specific array of hypotheses. In that empirical setting, >> a person will tend to use "experimental" to suggest an even more deliberate >> manipulation of events for the purpose of generating data that can serve to >> sift the likely from the unlikely stories in the heap of hypotheses in view. >> >> Sufficient unto the day ... >> >> Jon >> >> AB: It would be handy if 'reply' gives a reply to the >> list message instead of a reply to the sender. >> >> Yes, it seems that different browsers handle that differently. >> I try to remember always to hit "reply to all", but often don't. >> >> AB: You wrote a sentence that raises some questions, at least in my mind. >> >> JA1: An equivocation is a variation in meaning, or a manifold of sign senses, >> and so Peirce's claim that three categories are sufficient amounts to an >> assertion that all manifolds of meaning can be unified in just three >> steps. >> >> AB: In comparison with the sentence you wrote earlier in the same mail >> there are two differences: >> >> JA2: Peirce's claim that three categories are necessary and sufficient >> for the purposes of logic says that a properly designed system of >> logic can resolve all equivocation in just three levels or steps. >> >> AB: a. unification of all manifolds of meaning is not without further >> qualifications the same as disambiguation. So, in principle at >> least I could support JA2 and not support JA1. >> >> AB: b. In JA1 the problem of the meaning of 'meaning' presses itself >> upon the reader, in JA2 meaning is given, the only problem >> that remains is to make a choice between alternatives that >> are supposed to be given. >> >> AB: So, JA1 is a much stronger claim than JA2. Since you wrote in JA2 >> about levels or steps, but in JA1 just about steps, your claim seems >> to amount to the proposition that all manifolds of meaning can be unified >> in a single run of a procedure that consists of three steps. Of course >> unification can be taken as quite empty (for instance as "signs written >> on the same sheet are unified", but then "unification of all manifolds >> of meaning", is rather unsatisfying on the meaning side of the issue. >> >> AB: I am inclined to reason that, given: >> >> JA3: Peirce's distinctive claim is that a type hierarchy of three levels >> is generative of all that we need in logic. >> >> AB: It is possible to design a procedure with the three steps of >> JA1 that unifies all manifolds of meaning, not in three steps. >> >> -- >> >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ >> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey >> knol profile: http://knol.google.com/k/Jon-Awbrey# >> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >> polmic: www.policymic.com/profiles/1110/Jon-Awbrey >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >> listserv. 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