Gary, Jim W., Ben, List:
Upon awakening this morning, I recognized that I should have been more explicit
in my comment last evening. Your prompt response eases my task.
The question is one of the distinction between semantics and syntax and
arithmetic operations on logical terms as well as the distinction between
arithmetic division and logical division.
The logical point is one of the distinction between division as a separation of
a number into EQUAL parts and the separation of a logical term into components.
The quote from CSP is:
In reference to the doctrine of individuals, two distinctions should be
| borne in mind. The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division,
| must be one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied.
| For, let 'A' be such a term. Then, if it is neither true that all 'A' is 'X'
| nor that no 'A' is 'X', it must be true that some 'A' is 'X' and some 'A' is
| not 'X'; and therefore 'A' may be divided into 'A' that is 'X' and 'A' that
| is not 'X', which is contrary to its nature as a logical atom.
|
For example, consider the the term of "my memory".
I hope this illustrates the grounding of feelings on this notion of the usage
of the term "individual". :-)
BTW, this quote of CSP brings to my mind Bertrum Russell's famous paper "On
denotation" which, even though it has been twenty years since I first read it,
continues to give me a good chuckle. Oh, how human it is to follow the herd,
philosophically or otherwise.
I would be delighted to learn of your rhetorical clarification of the practical
distinction between a logical atom, a mathematical atom and a chemical atom;
only the latter can be separated into parts (nucleus and electrons - non-equal
parts.)
The natural antecedence of unequal parts of chemical atoms was either not
known to or not accepted by CSP. Consequently, he sought to use the logic of
chemistry to found a critical component of the over-all structure of his
pragmaticism. (see EP2, #26, especially p362-363.)
This mistaken judgment (either from ignorance or intent) killed the notion of
phaneroscopy within the natural sciences BECAUSE chemical valences of four,
five, six,... are not the same as the chemical valence of three and the things
with higher valence are not the logical equivalence of things with valence
three. In other words, CSP's principle of "Thing-representation-form" as
represented in the diagrams of EP2, #26 FAILS for chemical valence. In so far
as the logic of chemistry founded CSP's logic of phaneroscopy, it is not
supported by the perplexity of the mathematics of modern chemistry. The modern
concept of chemical relations, such as between two strands of a DNA molecule,
is vastly richer than CSP's diagrams of p. 364 of EP2.
Indeed, exactly the contrary exists in nature. As the number of relations
within a chemical molecule increases, the information content increases as a
consequence of the different sorts of parts. It is this increase in information
that becomes the natural source of DNA as the genetic material and a component
of our uniqueness as individual human beings. Jim Willgoose find this line of
reasoning to be "picturesque". In fact, it is among the central concepts of
molecular biology and the neurosciences.
Gary, you comment on an earlier post wrt to the usage of the term "special
sciences" by Ben. I went on a business trip shortly after the posting and,
upon my return, decided that it was not worth re-opening the cold thread. Ben
does a very fine job of articulating historical ideas; my interests reside in
projecting historical concepts onto the present and hopefully, into the future.
So, I am glad you brought it up. I feel it is analogous to the exchange of
usage you and I had concerning the nature of community / communication /
communism / communion / and common. Your argument of "convention" as a
standard of usage is applicable to Ben's usage. I persist in maintaining that
one should, in professional discussions, use words in the sense of their Greek
and Latin roots so as to enhance the possibility of being understood and to
diminish the possibility of being miss-understood.
Pragmatically, it is simply my experience that the rapid expansion of
applications of the mathematically-grounded sciences has blurred the boundaries
that CSP was so fond of classifying. If you go to your physician (a
practitioner of the clinical sciences), he may request a glucose test (a
chemical test) and a Cat scan (a physical machine) to obtain information about
your feeling (a biological state.) In what sense are the clinical sciences a
special science?
So, practically, the terminology that I am accustomed to classifies the various
manifestations of the mathematical sciences based on current usage and the
hierarchical (categorical?) structures and scalings (size) of things.
As for Deacon's usage, the social sciences are what they are - they deal with
the community and are unique in that regard. Such is the function of
adjectives in creating sub-classes.
Cheers
Jerry
On Dec 11, 2011, at 9:51 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Jerry, you wrote,
>
> [[ One should also note the inexact usage of the term "division" when in fact
> the meaning is "separation" (with respect to "logical atoms".) ]]
>
> But i'm afraid it is your usage that is inexact. A logical atom (for Peirce
> and every other logician that i know of) is defined by its Greek root, which
> means exactly "indivisible". The current usage of "atom" in physics and
> chemistry parted company with logic as soon as it was demonstrated that
> physical "atoms" could be divided into component parts -- protons, neutrons,
> electrons etc.
>
> By the way, you also posted earlier about Peirce's usage of the term "special
> sciences", saying that it is meaningless in contemporary science. Ben already
> replied to that, but i'd like to add a comment or two. I had never heard this
> term before i came across it in Peirce, but his usage is so handy and
> straightforward that i've been using it myself ever since, in reference to
> any non-cenoscopic science, in other words any science that studies a special
> (limited) range of phenomena (and generally uses special apparatus to make
> its observations). Physics, chemistry and psychology are all special sciences
> in this sense.
>
> But i came across a very different sense while reading Terrence Deacon's
> _Incomplete Nature_ -- thanks to Gary Richmond for pointing to it, and i hope
> we can discuss it next year as Gary suggested, because it makes explicit use
> of some important Peircean ideas. Deacon implies that the usage of "special
> sciences" which he mentions is current within some (unspecified) academic or
> scientific community with which he is familiar. On page 40, for instance, he
> speaks of an "effort to include the special sciences (e.g., psychology,
> sociology, economics) within the natural sciences." I gather that by this
> usage, physics and chemistry are unequivocally "natural sciences", and
> therefore *not* "special", while the three sciences named by Deacon are
> "special" because their status as "natural" sciences is questionable.
> Elsewhere in the book Deacon seems to distance himself from this usage by
> referring to "the so-called special sciences". I recall using the terms
> "hard" and "soft sciences" to make a distinction like that, but have never
> heard the term "special sciences" used that way -- but then i don't move in
> academic circles. I'm wondering whether anyone else on peirce-l has come
> across this usage of the term.
>
> Gary F.
>
> } Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already enough
> names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32 (Feng/English)] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Jerry LR Chandler
> Sent: December-10-11 11:32 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Doctrine Of Individuals
>
> Jon, List:
>
> Thanks for posting this set of fragments on individuals.
>
> The writings are well worth studying, particularly if one is interested in
> the leaps in CSP's mental development and his loss of correspondence with
> modern chemical theories.
>
> The changing views of the notion of "individual" is amusing.
>
> One should also note the inexact usage of the term "division" when in fact
> the meaning is "separation" (with respect to "logical atoms".)
>
> One is forced to conclude that CSP's notion of a "logical atom" is remote
> from any sort of relation to chemistry where the reference for an atom is an
> atomic number and the signs from the indexical object.
>
> It appears that he recognized this distinction and moved toward chemical
> thinking in his developments of his versions of graph theory.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
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