Gary, Just some short comments to your main points in this post. - I saw there is a further post by you, but I have not yet read but the title of it.
I've never thought the concept of 'ground' in Gestalt theory is, or could be, the same or even nearly the same as in Peirce's philosophy. One, the simplest, reason being that Gestalt theory is just a psychological theory of perception. It's not a philosophy, not even philosophical. - Although it may be useful in philosophy, providing examples which can be used as philosophical demonstrations. - As was the case with Wittgenstein. - Anyway, I look forward to reading your thoughts on Zeman. Then, to your trichotomics. - I think there still are some problems. Trichotomies, in Peircean semiotics, apply to divisions of signs, sign classifications in the first place. You write: >> Relata of the socio-logical sign relation in human semiosis (from the >> standpoint of the utterer of the sign): >> Utterer (1ns) >> |> Intended meaning of the sign (3ns) >> Semiotic interaction (2ns, in the sense that signs are both uttered & >> interpreted) Taking the standpoint of the utterer first is not the same as putting the utterer the first in the diagram. - It means thinking out what the first - from this particular standpoint - actually - and even necessarily- is. Well, think about it. I've not been so well lately, so there may be lags in responding. Best, Kirsti On 5.1.2012, at 4.05, Gary Richmond wrote > Kirsti, List, > > Thanks for your interesting response, Kirsti. I want to comment later in > the week on several topics you discussed, most especially the concept of > 'Ground'. While I'm finding the list discussion of 'ground' in Gestalt > theory intriguing, I want to consider Peirce's quite different (as I see > it) notion in the light of Jay Zeman's thoughtful analysis of the > concept. At the moment my time is constrained because the Winter college > term (in which I'm teaching as well as planning a faculty development > seminar) began this week, so please see this more as a 'promissory note' > for the Peircean 'ground' discussion which I intend to get to later in > the week. > > Firstly, thanks for your affirmation of my approach to tricategorial > analysis through trikonic diagrams. I hope that this diagrammatic > approach will prove valuable when we begin a discussion of Deacon's > important book, *Incomplete Nature*, especially as emergence and other > evolutionary themes seem to me to lend themselves to such analysis. As > regards the present thread on the reciprocity of the social and logical > principles, reflecting on your remark regarding "triadic thinking" in > consideration of logical-social reciprocity got me, as you know, > imagining that what first appears to be a kind of dual relation--(1) > social being and (2) logical thinking--turns out to be a tri-categorial > one, a trichotomy. > > However, I think that your criticism of the diagram I provided is > correct, essentially that it suffers from trying to convey too much > information in a single figure, over-loading it, so to speak. True, it > was meant to be a mere preliminary schematic, very abstractly > diagramming the possible semiotic relations in consideration of the > human socio-logical (not to be confused with the sociological science, > btw). In any event, you're comments suggested to me that at least 2--and > perhaps 3--diagrams will be needed to explicate the relations we've been > considering, at least one for the 'utterer' and another for the > 'interpreter'. > > So, one of the two or more proposed diagrams might look like this, > > Relata of the socio-logical sign relation in human semiosis (from the > standpoint of the utterer of the sign): > Utterer (1ns) > |> Intended meaning of the sign (3ns) > Semiotic interaction (2ns, in the sense that signs are both uttered & > interpreted) > > A second diagram would show this relationship from the standpoint of the > interpreter. Perhaps a third diagram--probably of a different > character--may be needed to show the relationship of the two. > > My principal point now is that your comments suggested to me that what > may first appear to be a dyadic relationship may turn out to be a > triadic one. Further, the dialogical relationship is, for Peirce, a > trichotomic one [see also, "thinking always proceeds in the form of a > dialogue" CP 4.6; and, especially, "every evolution of thought should be > a dialogic" CP 4.551).] > > Best, > > Gary > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > E202-O > 718 482-5700 > > *** *** *** *** >>>> Määttänen Kirsti 01/02/12 5:12 PM >>> > Gary, list, > > To me, your trichotomics is a fruitful approach. I don't see any basic > disagreement between our views. > > To comment your provisional diagram: It may be better to take the case > with the utterer as the first separately from taking the interpreter as > the first. Putting both in the same position in the same diagram I find > a bit confusing. Perhaps making a diagram for both as separate cases > (though interrelated, of course) might be better. > > It may well be the case that Peirce did not use the concept of Ground in > his later writings. Still, I can't see any grounds for he abandoning it. > - But if you, or anyone else in the list, knows of some explicit > critical comments by Peirce on the concept, I would be most grateful to > know. > > Peirce's work during his life presented such a wealth of approaches, so > many of them worked up to details. As I see it, he did not have time to > come back to many, many of the issues taken up earlier. > > The triad with Ground as the first in the triad may well be one of the > issues he did not take up in his late > writings Still, I have given the concept a lot of thought. And studied > it in practice, taking it into use and trying it out. - As I view it, it > has a quite definite place in the architecture of Peirce's system. > > Gestalt theory, with its idea of figure and (its) ground were (within > its limited scope) after something similar to what Peirce meant with his > concept of the Ground. But it just amounts to claiming that for every > figure there is a background which makes it possible for anyone to see > the figure. - And this not a trivial matter! - It is a most important > philosophical matter. > > You, and most listers probably know the concern Wittgenstein gave to the > duck/rabbit picture. One of the examples of being unable to see both > simultaneously, either the one of the other figure just vanishes, when > one - or the other - takes precedence. > > Gestalt theory dealt with these kinds of pictures. - There are plenty. > > To my knowledge and understanding, Wittgenstein never got any further > than to the understanding that for every figure there is a background, > and that the background always changes. Even if by little and little, > and so little that virtually no one can see it change. Still, it does. > > On this philosophical understanding Wittgenstein based his writings on > certainty and on paradigms, the essential part of his later writings. - > On this I am fully convinced, be it or be it not - so far -a generally > accepted view on Wittgenstein. > > Peirce does not give so much - if any - attention to the idea of figure > and ground. Still, his concept of Ground is in full accordance with the > ideas of Gestalt theory. But his concept has a vastly broader ground > (pun intended), and vastly broader consequences. > > I take your provisional trichotomical diagram as an example. If you > take an utterer as the first, and the sign she or he utters as the > second, then the utterer always has in mind, not only his intention with > uttering the sign, but also all kinds of things she or he knows & > understands and assumes the interpreter also knows & understands. > In so assuming, she or he may be mistaken. As is often the case, but > seldom totally so. > > Mostly, there is a partial understanding. This partial understanding > makes communication both possible and worthwhile. This partial mutual > understanding is what I take Peirce means with the concept of Ground. > > Ground is a communal matter. Common ground is the essence (esquisse) and > prerequisite of community and communication. - It is always partial, > that is true. And always so. - But without it, there could not be any > community, nor communication. > > To end with an anecdote: About fifteen years ago I started to see both > the duck and the rabbit in the picture. Earlier it had been impossible, > the figures I saw just changed from one to the other. The second step in > experimenting consisted of changing the figure at will. Then I could > choose to see the rabbit or the duck as I chose. > > Every now and then I used to take up looking at the duck or the rabbit, > as I chose, as a past time. - Not very often, though. - To my surprise, > it once happened that I saw both, simultaneously. > > Within Gestalt theory, it is supposed to be a human universal that these > kinds of figures are seen in an either/or way. - Well, it only takes one > case to to prove an assumption of universality wrong. - Just as it > takes only one case to prove a possibility. > > I do not know any drawing with three changing figures. - Well, now that > that think again, I do. It is this very same duck/rabbit picture. Seeing > both simultaneously IS the third figure. > > So I change my claim. I do not know any drawing designed for three > alternating and alternative figures. - If anyone knows, I would be very > glad to hear about it. > > Best wishes for the still nascent year! > > Kirsti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1.1.2012, at 21.53, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Kirsti, List, >> >> I meant to answer your thoughtful and stimulating post earlier, but > end of the year (and end of the college term), plus personal matters, > not to mention a 9 day holiday break to Charleston, SC with no internet > access, prevented me from doing so until I returned to NYC. >> >> Of course we both agree (and I would tend to assume--or, at least > hope)--that most everyone here would agree that there is no circular > reasoning involved in Peirce's commenting both that "the social > principle is rooted intrinsically in logic" and, nine years later, that > "logic is rooted in the social principle." You commented further: >> >> KM: Within triadic reasoning it is possible and reasonable to make a > claim that two (or even more) are rooted in each other. What changes is > what is taken as the first. - The concept of Ground is to my mind what > is needed here. - You can take one or the other as the first, as the > ground upon which you view the other. - You then get a different view. > You take a different perspective on the same state of things. // Nothing > more. They are both rooted in each other. >> >> GR: I would suggest that a triadic (or, more specifically, in Peirce's > sense of categorial triadicity, *trichotomic*) analysis of this issue, > namely, the reciprocity of the logical & the social principles, requires > no less than three categorial elements (the two so far considered being > necessary but not sufficient), a point you make near the conclusion of > your message as I understand you. So, this trichotomic relation might be > diagrammed in this way (these are just my first thoughts and, so, may > need some revision as I reflect further on the matter):: >> >> Relata of the socio-logical sign relation: >> >> Possible sign utterer *or* interpreter (1ns) >> |> Intended meaning/interpretation of the sign (3ns) >> Semiotic interaction (2ns, in the sense that signs are both uttered > *and* (sometimes) interpreted) >> >> "Ground" is, for me, a somewhat problematic concept in Peirce who > later abandons the use of the term. But perhaps you are using 'ground' > here more in the sense in which it is used in Gestalt theory? But I > won't get into this just now (although it is an interesting topic in its > own right). >> >> In any genuine tricategorial relation, while it is possible to > emphasize any one of the three elements, one understands, nonetheless, > that whichever element one emphasizes (the 'figure') the other two > categorial characters remain as 'ground' (that is, 'background') to the > relatum stressed or, say, logically discriminated for some analytical > purpose (see EP 2:270 where Peirce distinguishes Discrimination from > Precission--or, precisive abstraction--and both from Dissociation). In > such genuinely trichotomic cases, they are, as you suggested, > always-already grounded in each other. >> >> So, yes, as you say, it is a matter of "perspective"--emphasizing one > of the three for some, say, theoretical or rhetorical purpose. And, as > you concluded, "with triadic reasoning, there has to be a third." Is > this along the lines of your thinking on the matter? If not, where do we > differ in our thinking on this matter? >> >> In any event, happy new year to you, Kirsti, and to all members of the > forum. >> >> Best, Gary >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> E202-O >> 718 482-5700 >> >> *** *** *** *** >> >>>>> Määttänen Kirsti 12/21/11 5:35 PM >>> >> Gary, >> >> What Peirce states is that t"he social pricniple is rooted > intrinsically in logic" AND that "logic is rooted in the social > principle". Your question was. at least partly, about circular > reasoning. - I can't see any problem with it. The problems with circular > reasoning apply for cases about cause=> effect claims. Peirce is not > making such a claim. >> >> Within triadic reasoning it is possible and reasonable to make a claim > that two (or even more) are rooted in each other. What changes is what > is taken as the first. - The concept of Ground is to my mind what is > needed here. - You can take one or the other as the first, as the ground > upon which you view the other. - You then get a >> a different view. You take a different perspective on the same state > of things. >> >> Nothing more. They are both rooted in each other. - But if you choose > take a closer look on one, or the other, you also make a decision on > your the perspective. You take the one or the other as your aim and > object. Which makes the other the ground the one chosen may be rooted > on. >> >> Then you may change the perspective. To give a more full view of the > whole. With it, you change the relation of the ground and the object. >> >> As a result, you get a better idea of both. >> >> Of course, with triadic reasonin, there has to be a third. - But I > won't go into that now. >> >> My very best wishes for happy holidays! >> >> Kirsti >> >> On 18.12.2011, at 22.09, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >>> Ben, Jon, Terry, >>> >>> Something which has always intrigued me about the two occurrences of > the >>> almost identical phrases being considered here, and which had a > brief >>> list discussion a couple of years ago, is that in the earlier (1869) >>> version, >> >>> "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole >>> world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively" >> >>> is immediately followed by >> >>> "So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic," >>> while in the later (1878), nearly identical--except for the "as it > seems >>> to me" reservation, >> >>> "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the >>> whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, > collectively" >> >>> reverses the wording of that concluding thought to >> >>> "Logic is rooted in the social principle." >>> >>> At the time of that earlier discussion the consensus of thread >>> participants was that this did *not* represent a kind of circular >>> reasoning. But, as I'm working on an article centered on the "Logic > is >>> rooted in the social principle" idea, I'm wondering if anyone has > any >>> fresh thoughts about this now that these two different ways of > stating >>> this notion have been connected to the "He who would not sacrifice > his >>> own soul" idea, something I don't recall occurring in the earlier >>> discussion (which restricted itself to the reversal of the language > of >>> the concluding thought). >>> >>> Also, if anyone could easily recover that earlier discussion (Ben?), >>> that too would be most helpful. Thanks in advance! >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> E202-O >>> 718 482-5700 >>> >>> *** *** *** *** >>>>>> Benjamin Udell 12/18/11 2:15 PM >>> >>> Terry, Jon, >>> >>> Peirce said it at least twice. >>> >>> Peirce (1869), "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further >>> Consequences of Four Incapacities", JSP v. II, n. 4, pp. 193-208. >>> Reprinted (CP 5.318*357), (W 2:242*272), (EP 1:56*82). >>> >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_23/v2_23.htm, near > the >>> end: >>> Upon our theory of reality and of logic, it can be shown that no >>> inference of any individual can be thoroughly logical without > certain >>> determinations of his mind which do not concern any one inference >>> immediately; for we have seen that that mode of inference which > alone >>> can teach us anything, or carry us at all beyond what was implied in > our >>> premises--in fact, does not give us to know any more than we knew >>> before; only, we know that, by faithfully adhering to that mode of >>> inference, we shall, on the whole, approximate to the truth. Each of > us >>> is an insurance company, in short. But, now, suppose that an > insurance >>> company, among its risks, should take one exceeding in amount the > sum of >>> all the others. Plainly, it would then have no security whatever. > Now, >>> has not every single man such a risk? What shall it profit a man if > he >>> shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? If a man has a >>> transcendent personal interest infinitely outweighing all others, > then, >>> upon the theory of validity of inference just developed, he is > devoid of >>> all security, and can make no valid inference whatever. What > follows? >>> That logic rigidly requires, before all else, that no determinate > fact, >>> nothing which can happen to a man's self, should be of more > consequence >>> to him than everything else. He who would not sacrifice his own soul > to >>> save the whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, > collectively. >>> So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic. >>> >>> Then, Peirce (1878), "The Doctrine of Chances", Popular Science > Monthly, >>> v. 12, pp. 604*15 (CP 2.645*68, W 3:276*90, EP 1:142*54). >>> >>> > http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_12/March_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_III >>> From Section IV: >>> But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death must >>> happen to some man. At the same time, death makes the number of our >>> risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result >>> uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on > the >>> assumption that this number is indefinitely great. We are thus > landed in >>> the same difficulty as before, and I can see but one solution of it. > It >>> seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably >>> requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop > at >>> our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, >>> again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings > with >>> whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It >>> must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond > all >>> bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole > world, >>> is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, > collectively. >>> Logic is rooted in the social principle. >>> Best, Ben >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Jon Awbrey" >>> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU >>> Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 1:42 PM >>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Help on a Peirce Quote >>> >>> Terry, >>> >>> Internet search gave this: >>> >>> "He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, >>> is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, > collectively." >>> >>> http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319896 >>> >>> But I can't read the reference right now. >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ >>> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey >>> knol profile: http://knol.google.com/k/Jon-Awbrey# >>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >>> polmic: www.policymic.com/profiles/1110/Jon-Awbrey >>> >>> Terry Bristol wrote: >>> >>> Dear List * >>> >>> I wonder if anyone can help me locate a Peirce quotation. >>> >>> The gist of it runs something like this: >>> >>> 'Anyone who wouldn't sacrifice himself for the whole is irrational.' >>> >>> It has to do with the pragmatist's common theme of 'inclusionality' > * >>> that the interests of the individual and the interests of the whole > are >>> inseparable. >>> >>> Thank you >>> >>> yours, >>> >>> Terry >>> >>> >>> Terry Bristol, President >>> Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy >>> 3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd >>> Portland OR 97214 >>> 503-232-2300, cell 503-819-8365 >>> >>> "Science would be ruined if it were to withdraw entirely into > narrowly >>> defined specialties. The rare scholars who are wanderers-by-choice > are >>> essential to the intellectual welfare of the settled disciplines." >>> Benoit Mandelbrot >>> >>> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >>> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message > to >>> lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the > body >>> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >>> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU >>> >>> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU >> >> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. 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